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ABSTRACT 
This thesis reasons on dynamic wireless sensor networks (WSN) analyzing 
different models and architectures. The main goal of all the work is the 
development of a tool designed to fulfill the needs of real on-field research, 
especially applied to indoor environment such as houses and hospitals. The 
idea was born from my last university thesis where alongside the original 
project of a remote controlled surgical room arose the need to monitor the 
hospital's patients and surgeons. In that occasion we were forced, for many 
reasons, to use a sort of batch system consisting of RFID tags and sensors 
with memory, whose data were downloaded after many hours or days, or 
simply sensors directly connected to computers. Instead a set of wireless 
sensors have allowed a real-time interaction with the remote controlled 
system. 
My thesis first shows a background of the wireless sensor network theory, 
technologies and security issues and shows how the work was developed. 
In the first period of time a developer starter kit was chosen from many 
available, evaluating different properties, including costs, open source or 
free IDE and the possibility of modify the base library supplied.  
An initial project was developed using this kit, modifying the nodes to 
install the required sensors.  Following the main requests of the team, the 
network was created balancing the energy consumption and the reliability. 
The developing work was supported by field tests on real research scenarios 
of increasing complexity. The initial test results on the original project, 
developed with the supplied library, revealed weaknesses in battery life, 
nodes connection stability and security thus changes were made 
accordingly. An heartbeat system was designed and implemented to create a 
fault tolerant system consisting in a couple of devices. Then the security 
issues were evaluated in consideration of the increasing number of attack's 
techniques designed for the WSNs. A cryptography key protection 
mechanism was implemented to protect the AES algorithm itself and the 
data, together with a software deletion mechanism, in front of an hardware 
read access, to avoid  the steal of the initial pass-phrases of the program 
itself. Finally some consideration were made on the WSN performance and 
study results. In conclusion we can say that our wireless network has been 
used successfully, although it has shown limits on stability and data flow 
capacity. In most cases the WSN capacity of disappearing and to be 
unattended for long time were preferred then the data stream reliability 
because of the comfort quality perceived by study’s subjects (i.e. house's 
inhabitants or patients). 
3 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
to my beloved Samuela 
and all my family 
 
 
 
4 
5 
Contents 
ABSTRACT.................................................................................................. 1 
CONTENTS.................................................................................................. 5 
1 INTRODUCTION.............................................................................. 11 
1.1 THE STATEMENT ........................................................................... 11 
1.2 MOTIVATIONS ............................................................................... 12 
1.3 STUDY CONTEXT ........................................................................... 13 
1.4 PROBLEMS AND CHALLENGES ....................................................... 14 
1.5 THE APPROACH ............................................................................. 15 
1.6 ORGANIZATION OF THE THESIS...................................................... 16 
2 WSN APPLICATIONS ..................................................................... 19 
2.1 APPLICATION DOMAINS ................................................................. 19 
2.1.1 Industrial control and monitoring............................................ 19 
2.1.2 Home automation and consumer electronics........................... 20 
2.1.3 Security and military sensing................................................... 21 
2.1.4 Asset tracking and supply chain management ......................... 22 
2.1.5 Intelligent agriculture and environmental sensing .................. 23 
2.1.6 Health monitoring .................................................................... 23 
2.2 NETWORK PERFORMANCE OBJECTIVE ........................................... 25 
2.2.1 Low power consumption .......................................................... 25 
2.2.2 Low cost ................................................................................... 25 
2.2.3 Security..................................................................................... 26 
2.2.4 Network type............................................................................. 28 
2.2.5 Worldwide availability ............................................................. 28 
6 
2.2.6 Data throughput ....................................................................... 28 
2.2.7 Message latency ....................................................................... 29 
2.2.8 Mobility .................................................................................... 29 
2.2.9 Size ........................................................................................... 29 
2.3 WSN APPLICATION TAXONOMY .................................................... 31 
3 WSN CLASSIFICATION AND STANDARDS .............................. 33 
3.1 A DEFINITION OF WSN.................................................................. 33 
3.2 WSN CLASSIFICATIONS................................................................. 35 
3.2.1 Single-sink single-hop WSN ..................................................... 36 
3.2.2 Single-sink multi-hop WSN ...................................................... 37 
3.2.3 Multi-sink multi-hop WSN........................................................ 37 
3.2.4 Actuators .................................................................................. 39 
3.3 WIRELESS SENSOR NETWORK STANDARDS .................................... 40 
3.3.1 The IEEE 802.15.4 low-rate wpan standard............................ 41 
3.4 PROTOCOL LAYERS ....................................................................... 46 
3.4.1 The physical (PHY) layer ......................................................... 46 
3.4.2 Packet structure ....................................................................... 50 
3.5 THE MEDIUM ACCESS CONTROL (MAC) LAYER............................. 50 
3.5.1 Frame and super-frame structure ............................................ 54 
3.5.2 The association request and response command formats........ 59 
3.5.3 The Disassociation Notification............................................... 60 
3.5.4 Security..................................................................................... 61 
3.6 ZIGBEE STANDARD ....................................................................... 62 
3.6.1 The network layer (NWK APL) ................................................ 62 
3.6.2 The application layer ............................................................... 65 
3.6.3 ZigBee Versions from 2004 to PRO......................................... 65 
3.6.4 Brief comparison with other protocols .................................... 67 
4 WSN IMPLEMENTATION ASPECTS .......................................... 71 
7 
4.1 NETWORK FORMATION AND ADDRESS ASSIGNMENT FOR A 
HIERARCHICAL (TREE) TOPOLOGY ............................................................ 71 
4.1.1 Routing in ZigBee tree topology .............................................. 76 
4.2 ROUTING ALGORITHMS FOR A MESH TOPOLOGY ............................ 77 
4.2.1 Dynamic source routing........................................................... 78 
4.2.2 On-demand distant vector ........................................................ 79 
4.2.3 Zigbee Route discovery ............................................................ 79 
4.2.4 Route discovery ........................................................................ 84 
4.2.5 Route maintenance and repair ................................................. 90 
4.3 THE NWK LAYER MANAGEMENT SERVICE.................................... 91 
4.3.1 Network discovery.................................................................... 91 
4.3.2 Network formation ................................................................... 92 
4.3.3 Establishing the device as a ZigBee router.............................. 92 
4.3.4 Joining and leaving a network ................................................. 93 
4.3.5 Resetting the NWK layer .......................................................... 95 
4.3.6 Synchronization........................................................................ 96 
4.3.7 The NWK layer frame formats ................................................. 97 
4.4 THE APL LAYER ......................................................................... 102 
4.4.1 The application framework .................................................... 103 
4.4.2 The ZigBee device objects...................................................... 109 
4.4.3 The APS sublayer ................................................................... 112 
4.5 SECURITY.................................................................................... 114 
5 DESIGN AND IMPLEMENTATION OF A WSN....................... 117 
5.1 SELECTION OF THE DEVELOPER KITS ........................................... 117 
5.2 MESHNETICS STARTER KIT .......................................................... 118 
5.2.1 Hardware general specification............................................. 120 
5.2.2 MeshBean2’s expansion connectors ...................................... 120 
5.2.3 eZeeNet functional diagram................................................... 121 
5.2.4 EZeeNet API........................................................................... 124 
8 
5.2.5 State after reset ...................................................................... 125 
5.3 DEVELOPMENT OF APPLICATION CODE ........................................ 125 
5.3.1 General Software Specification and user code limitations .... 126 
5.3.2 TinyOS Functions................................................................... 127 
5.3.3 Framework Interfaces ............................................................ 129 
5.4 DEVELOPMENT OF THE APPLICATION .......................................... 130 
5.4.1 Call Sequences ....................................................................... 139 
5.4.2 The heartbeat system.............................................................. 145 
5.5 BUFFERING.................................................................................. 148 
5.6 DATA COMPRESSION ................................................................... 149 
5.6.1 Data structure ........................................................................ 150 
5.6.2 Data compression validation ................................................. 152 
5.6.3 Compression results ............................................................... 153 
5.6.4 The software analysis............................................................. 154 
5.7 PRACTICAL OF EXPERIENCES ON MESHNETICS BOARDS .............. 158 
5.7.1 The hardware analysis ........................................................... 159 
5.7.2 Board changes and additions................................................. 161 
5.7.3 Extracting Keys from Second Generation Zigbee Chips........ 163 
6 RESULTS ......................................................................................... 169 
6.1 WSN PERFORMANCE BENCHMARKS ............................................ 169 
6.1.1 Application performance........................................................ 170 
6.2 ON-FIELD TEST APPLICATION I .................................................... 176 
6.2.1 The monitoring system ........................................................... 179 
6.2.2 Data analysis.......................................................................... 187 
6.2.3 The efficiency of the HVAC heat exchanger. ......................... 189 
6.2.4 Conclusion of the first on-field study ..................................... 190 
6.3 ON-FIELD TEST APPLICATION II................................................... 190 
6.3.1 The monitoring system ........................................................... 192 
6.3.2 Conclusion of the second  on-field study................................ 193 
9 
6.4 THE NETWORK INTRUSION DETECTION SYSTEM (NIDS) ............. 194 
7 CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORKS................................... 197 
7.1 EVALUATION OF RESULTS ........................................................... 197 
7.2 DIFFICULTIES ENCOUNTERED ...................................................... 200 
7.3 PERSPECTIVES ............................................................................. 201 
7.3.1 MCU Evolution (the third generation devices)...................... 202 
7.4 OPEN PROBLEMS ......................................................................... 203 
BIBLIOGRAPHY .................................................................................... 205 
A. SECURITY ATTACKS AND ATTACKERS ........................... 215 
B. DEVELOPMENT KITS AND MESHNETICS ‘HOW TO’ 
GUIDE....................................................................................................... 229 
C. DATA COMPRESSION.............................................................. 245 
D. ACRONYMS ................................................................................ 251 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS..................................................................... 255 
 
11 
1  
Introduction 
1.1 The statement 
The wireless sensor networks are rapidly evolving in these years attracting 
interest in a number of application domains related with monitoring and 
control of phenomena, as they promise to accomplish tasks at low cost and 
with ease.  
Researchers see WSNs as an “exciting emerging domain of deeply 
networked systems of low-power wireless motes with a tiny amount of CPU 
and memory, and large federated networks for high-resolution sensing of the 
environment” [WMC04]. 
In a WSN, the sensors have a variety of functions, and capabilities. The 
research’s field is now going forward under the push of recent technological 
advances and the pull of a plethora of potential applications.  
Most of the actual sensor’s networks as the radars system, nation weather 
stations, country electrical power grid are all examples of sensor’s networks; 
however all these systems use specialized computers and communication 
protocols and consequently, are very expensive.  
Much cheaper WSNs are now being developed for coming applications in 
security, health-care, and commerce. These systems are multidisciplinary 
and involves radio signals and networking, signal processing, systems 
architectures, database management, resource optimization, power 
management algorithms, and platform technology such as operating 
systems.  
The networking principles and protocols of these systems are relatively 
young and are being developed in these years [KEW02].  
The recent engineering advances coupled with many other factors as 
ubiquity of the Internet or the developments in IT, are opening the door to a 
new generation of low-cost sensors that are capable of achieving high-grade 
spatial and temporal resolution. 
However there are many difficulties in application development that slow 
down the adoption of WSN technology.  
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In most cases the developers need to focus at hardware level to solve 
problems, requiring a very close knowledge of the operating system used 
beyond physical architecture.  
According to [Mot06] the technical background needed is seldom found in 
high level domain experts and, as a second problem, the programmer 
usually loses the general view and application logic. 
To simplify the developing without sacrifice the efficiency, a high-level 
abstraction is needed and several different solutions and approaches have 
been proposed. 
In this thesis we study the development of a WSN, evaluating different 
approaches and techniques, building a complete system useful in real on-
field researches.  
 
 
1.2 Motivations 
The main goal of this work is the development of a tool designed to fulfill 
the needs of real on-field research, especially applied to indoor environment 
such as houses and hospitals.  
The idea of this study of such a WSN system arose during my master degree 
thesis [Gad06]. In that project study , started on 2003, we developed a 
prototype of a real-time control system of surgical theatres data flows.  
While we did not find any particular problem gathering data from the 
surgical room programmable logic controller (PLC) and studying a possible 
evolution of such PLC, many problems were found trying to analyze the 
incoming data from patients and medical staff. 
These human data are very valuable to estimate the infections (literature 
estimate the patient’s infection probability at more than 40%, with the 10% 
of the total with critical infection such as septicemia, (see [Sco09]) or 
hypothermia risks (even more dangerous than infections due to its direct 
implications to death) of the patient. 
It is to underline that each critical infection, as an example, in the 2009 
American implications infections cost report are declared to have a mean 
cost of over 13 thousands dollars [Sco09]. 
On the other hand the medical staff comfort, mainly the surgeons, is very 
important to reduce staff errors probability, especially in surgery requiring 
several hours. 
In that study we were forced to use a sort of batch system consisting of 
RFID tags, sensors with their own memory and battery (iButton), whose 
data were downloaded after many hours or days, or simply sensors directly 
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connected to computers. Instead a set of wireless sensors have allowed a 
real-time interaction with the remote controlled system. 
The main reasons for such solution were the availability on the market of 
only ad-hoc systems with proprietary firmware that were designed to fit one 
specific problem and usually with an high cost. For instance the Bluetooth 
kit used in [FGM08], (kindly granted for a period from manufacturer at no 
cost) as a price of some thousands Euro and has all the typical problems of 
the Bluetooth devices: the modules cannot be used simultaneously due to 
their Bluetooth configuration and highly suffer the proximity of other 
Bluetooth devices (e.g. mobile phone often in the pocket of medical staff 
even when in a surgical room), moreover cannot cover areas greater than 
few meters (about 10m). 
Moreover the Wireless Sensor Networks (WSNs) such as the ZigBee were, 
at time of the beginning of my master degree thesis, just at its first 
generation devices (a radio device without logic needing a separate MCU to 
perform most of the operations), and where considered more a new study 
field rather than a support to other projects. 
If can be designed a WSN, capable of different kind of measurements, 
without interfering with the common patients and medical staff behaviors, it 
can be very useful to cover a wide range of applications allowing the 
monitoring, even  for long periods, of the environments and their living 
peoples while they are performing everyday operations.  
Finally we can say that literature lacks in these type of studies in many 
fields in which, instead, they can help to support or refute a theory. 
 
 
1.3 Study context 
My work was developed at CIAS (Centro Ricerche Inquinamento ambienti 
Alta Sterilità - pollution of high sterility environment research center) a 
interdepartmental research centre directed by professor S. Mazzacane and 
collaborating with different kind of scientists such as engineers, biologists, 
medical staff, IT staff, architects and sometimes physicists.  
The centre cover many different areas starting with high sterility 
environments, such as cleanrooms, and indoor air quality (IAQ), including 
thermo-hygrometric and olfactory parameters, to reach issues related to 
mental or physical diseases. Sometimes two different areas converge into a 
unique research scenario such as in [Gad06] where the pollution and dust 
presence in a surgical room (a high sterility environment) controlled by our 
system prototype can be correlated to the patients’ infections.  
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The system design, of course, must be aware of this different application 
scenarios and needs. 
 
 
1.4 Problems and challenges 
As the project context suggest (see par. 1.3) the system must be designed to 
adapt to different situations, it needs to be easily divided into many 
networks if there are many concurrent studies or subjects to analyze. Thus, 
in our case, it is not suitable a special device that acts as a gateway from the 
WSN to a computer, but is much more useful that many devices can 
perform such a role. The second need of our system is the flexibility which 
means that we can easily: 
 
• change the type of sensors, and this operation can be performed by 
any researcher. This problem involves both the hardware design, that 
can require modifications and the software development, for 
example  building a modular sensors driver library 
• change the way the nodes act in the network can be modified 
accordingly to their kind of activity (i.e. continuous measurements 
sampling or long idle periods). For this properties the application 
design must be as dynamic and event/environment driven as 
possible. 
• place the nodes (or the sensors only) in hostile environments such as 
wet pipes or unattended locations. Usually we can achieve this goal 
protecting the node and choosing the sensors wisely. 
 
The main features of the projected solution must be the non interference 
with the living people, this is of great relevance when trying to convince the 
potential subject’s of study, as well as the possibility to monitor and interact 
with the system remotely, required not only by the cooperating research 
centre but also to achieve the non-interference task.  
One of the main challenges, instead, come from the device energy 
consumption, since it can greatly affect the period of time the WSN can 
achieve its task without an external (and invasive) intervention.  
Another challenge is the WSN coordinator bottleneck. In fact all network 
topologies where a central node exist where most of the traffic (in our case 
the data flow) needs to pass through, then this node will be a bottleneck. In 
WSNs this node is the gateway device (the WSN  coordinator) that connects 
the WSN to other networks or to just a single computer.  
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Finally we must consider the node firmware, growing in size each time a 
new specifications set is released, taking the most part of the 
microcontroller memory (and sometimes computing) resources. 
 
 
1.5 The approach 
We start considering the WSN as part of a system to automatically gather 
data. The system required must be used in an inhabited environments with 
the less impact possible, avoiding any kind of discomfort to the living 
people.  
We have studied the taxonomy of our researches and identified the 
minimum requirements to satisfy. This system must be flexible to adapt at 
many different contexts having the ability to change from a space time 
properties of type local/periodic (such as HVAC monitoring) to a much 
more intensive application global/event driven (such as environment 
condition or people action control-response).  
Apart from the environment’s impact, the development time is also 
considered a crucial aspect, since most researches cannot wait months to 
start gathering data because of a software problem, most of the times, 
indeed, even a manual intervention is preferred to an automatic system non 
really reliable and inefficient. 
We have started from the WSN state of the art [BPC07] to evaluate the best 
solution to fit our WSN system, we have chosen the ZigBee WSN as a large 
recognized emerging standard with several manufacturer proposals and we 
have used one of this proposal to develop our system. 
We have finally used our studies as a test-bed field to prove how really 
efficient and flexible is the WSN system. To achieve the task of sensor 
interchangeability we have designed a modular library that can be reduced 
(with only a sensors driver selection) for memory requirements. In this way 
the nodes can be configured by a command sent via the WSN coordinator 
without the need to change the node firmware itself but just needing a warm 
reset (usually the reset request is also sent via the coordinator device). 
We have partially redesigned the upper layer (the Network layer) to solve 
some communication problems such as isolated nodes, timer malfunctions 
and to dynamically change the node role inside the network. To add more 
reliability to the application we have also implemented an heartbeat system, 
that is not a new idea, but is adapted to a wireless context using the beacons 
of the first device as the beat signals and, moreover, saving the battery 
energy of the second node. 
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On the test results basis we have, also, improved the WSN reliability and 
security covering the weakness found, such has the possibility to read the 
AES key from the node memory or the flaw against DOS attack exploiting 
the AES-CTR procedure. 
Moreover a Network Intrusion Detection System (NIDS) was modified to 
use a special WSN node (a network sniffer) and a packet capture library to 
gather and monitor ZigBee network traffic. 
Finally to improve the WSN performance we have implemented a Huffman 
compression algorithm (only the compression with a static table on the 
node) due to its simplicity and compression speed, this partially solve the 
bottleneck problem when we have a single sensor (e.g. an tri-axial 
accelerometer) producing an high data flow (90 values/sec or more), but the 
WSN can also be split into many networks since each node can act as the 
coordinator. 
Part of the system design effort has been directed to the applications 
projected to gather the data from the WSN, send the data to the database 
server. For performance and memory reasons the application is 
multithreaded (and can be executed without problems on a Pentium III PC).  
Furthermore a web interface was created to allow the scientists’ remote 
access. This actual system shows the data with a delay of few seconds 
(typically less than 2 seconds) thus, for the kind of requirements we have, it 
can be considered a real-time system. 
 
 
1.6 Organization of the thesis 
Apart from this introduction the following chapter propose an overview of 
the Wireless Sensor Networks. In the third chapter are shown the WSN 
classification, standards, and protocol layers. 
Next are proposed some WSN implementation aspects used while 
developing the application such as network formation, routing algorithms 
and security issues. It’s also includes some of the ZigBee higher layers 
because of their been both accessed and modified during the application 
developing. 
The fifth chapter aims to describe the author work done starting from the 
choice of the devices and their hardware modifications, to the completion of 
WSN application.  
The subsequent chapter is dedicated to the results achieved by our WSN 
system, thus are described the benchmark, throughput and lifetime results 
obtained and the on field test applications with their relative gateway 
applications. 
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Finally in the last chapter were presented the author’s conclusions and 
perspectives for the future works. 
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2  
WSN Applications 
2.1 Application domains 
We can briefly see the main application domains for the WSN as described 
in [Cal06]. The environment can be the physical world, a biological system, 
or an information technology (IT) framework. And new doors are opening 
everyday as a result of the technology improvements. 
We must not forget that a stated goal is to develop complete MEMSs–based 
sensor (micro-electro-mechanical systems) at a volume of 1 mm3 
[WMC04]. 
 
2.1.1 Industrial control and monitoring 
A industrial facility has a relatively small control room, surrounded by a 
large plant. The control room has usually several indicators and displays 
that describe the state of the plant (valves, quantity, temperature and 
pressure of stored materials, equipment’s condition, and others) and input 
devices that control actuators in the plant (heaters, valves, etc.) that affect 
the state of the plant itself.  
The sensors, their displays, the input devices and the actuators are often 
relatively inexpensive compared with the cost of the armored cable that 
must be used to communicate in a wired installation.. The information 
shown usually changes slowly so the data bandwidth required is relatively 
small although a high reliability level is required. 
The costs can be significantly reduced if an inexpensive wireless 
communication is used instead and a multiple routing network can be used 
to maintain the reliability level. 
An example of wireless application in an industrial environment [Cal06] 
is the control of commercial lighting. A wireless system can be programmed 
to control the lights, grouping them with ease to turn on and off 
simultaneously, cutting down the expense of all wired switch and can be 
much more flexible when a change is needed. 
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The monitoring and control of moving machinery, where wired sensors and 
actuators are often unusable, is another area suitable for wireless networks.  
Because the wireless networks may implement distributed routing 
algorithms and can be self-healing they can proof to be resilient to an 
explosion or other serious damage to the industrial plant, providing officials 
with critical plant status information under difficult conditions. 
To accomplish to such a job it is important that the wireless system be fully 
operating for the entire interval between maintenance periods. 
This implies, among others the use of a wireless sensor network with very 
low energy requirements.  
The sensor node often must be small, inexpensive and easy to substitute. 
Wireless sensor networks may be of particular use in the prediction of 
component failure for aircraft, where these attributes may be used to 
particular advantage [Fri01].  
Another application in this area for wireless sensor networks is the heating, 
ventilating, and air conditioning (HVAC) of buildings.  
This is one of the application also of the WSN developed during my thesis 
period. 
HVAC systems are typically controlled by a small number of thermostats 
and humidistat strategically located. Once more the wired connections limit 
the possibility and the number of these thermostats and humidistat  
To improve the granularity response of a HVAC system wireless handlers 
and dampers can be used coupled with wireless thermostats and humidistat 
sensors that may be placed around each room to provide detailed 
information about the control system. So the HVAC system can fit the need 
of the working team, for example reducing the volume dampers for an 
empty project-room and opening dampers for the meeting-room while in 
use. A wired system usually lacks to accomplish such a task. 
 
2.1.2 Home automation and consumer electronics 
There are many possible applications for wireless sensor networks at home. 
[Cal02]. Many of the industrial applications, someone described in the 
previous paragraph, may be used in a home, for example a HVAC system 
exist, and equipped with wireless thermostats, dampers and the right sensors 
can keep the rooms of the house comfortable in a way more efficient than a 
home equipped with a single and wired thermostat.  
However, a lot of other opportunities are available, like the “universal” 
remote control, typically a PDA (personal digital assistant) device that can 
control not only the TV, CD player, but the lights, any kind of curtains, 
locks that are also equipped with a wireless sensor network connection.  
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With this remote control, one may control the house from the comfort of 
one's armchair.  
One of the most interesting application, however, comes from the 
combination of multiple services, such as closing the curtains automatically 
when the television is turned on, or automatically muting the entertainment 
system when a call is received on the telephone.  
Another application in the home is a sensor-based information appliances 
that transparently interact and work together as well as with the home 
occupant [Pet00]. These networks are an extension of the information 
appliances proposed by Norman [Nit06]. 
Toys represent a large market for wireless sensor networks, they can be 
enhanced or enabled by wireless sensor networks in several ways, limited 
only by one's imagination. 
A particularly interesting field is PC-enhanced toys, which use the 
computing power of a nearby computer to add functionality to the toy itself, 
for example, speech recognition and synthesis, without placing the 
expensive yet limited speech recognition and synthesis circuits in the toy but 
using the  computing power of the computer. The overall cost of the toy will 
be reduced improving its capabilities and performance.  
It is even possible to give the toy complex behavior not practical with other 
technologies (see http://toys.media.mit.edu/). 
Another home application is similar to the Remote Keyless Entry (RKE) 
feature found on many cars. With a WSN, wireless locks, door and window 
sensors, and wireless light controls, the home owner may have a remote 
control similar to a car-key with a button. When the button is pressed, the 
device locks all the doors and windows in the home, and additionally can 
turns off the programmed indoor lights, turns on outdoor security lights, and 
sets the home's HVAC system to nighttime mode.  
The user receives an ok sound once this is all done successfully or an error 
code if something goes wrong and in this case he can read on the display 
where is the source of the problem. Also a full home security system can be 
implemented as well to detect a broken window or other troubles. 
Outside of the home, the wireless sensor networks are suitable for many of 
activities consumer-related, like tourism and shopping [ACK94]. 
In these contexts WSNs can provide, furthermore, specific information 
about the consumer’s behaviors .  
 
2.1.3 Security and military sensing 
The security system described in the previous paragraph for the home 
environment can be use in industrial security applications.  
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Similar systems have existed for several years [Swa96] employing 
proprietary communication protocols.  
They can support multiple sensors relevant to security, including magnetic 
door opening, infrared, broken glass sensors, smoke and sensors for direct 
human intervention. 
One of the benefits of using wireless sensor networks is that they can be 
used to replace guards and sentries, not only in military field, around 
defensive perimeters.  
In addition wireless sensor networks can be used to locate and identify 
targets for potential attack or to support the attack by locating friendly or 
enemy troops and vehicles.  
Wireless sensor networks can be camouflaged to look like rocks, trees, or 
gravel. These networks, are difficult to destroy in battle, thanks to their 
distributed control and routing algorithms [Hew01].  
The use of spread spectrum techniques, combined with the burst 
transmission format, common to many wireless sensor networks (to 
optimize battery life), can give them a low probability of detection by 
electronic means.  
 
2.1.4 Asset tracking and supply chain management 
A lot of application of wireless sensor networks is expected to be 
concerning  resource tracking and supply chain management. 
One example is the tracking of containers in a port. Such port facilities may 
have thousands of containers or even more, some of which are empty,  
while others are to be shipped in different destinations and they are stacked, 
on land and on ships. 
The efficiency of organization is an important factor in the shipper's 
productivity so that they can be moved the fewest number of times and with 
the fewest errors. [Cal06]  
An error in the location record of any container can be very expensive and 
the lost container can usually only be found by an exhaustive search. 
Wireless sensor networks can be used to improve such required efficiency; 
by placing sensors on each container, its location can always be determined. 
Similar problems can be found in railways transport system where railroad 
cars of different types must be organized, and in the industries of non-
durable goods. 
The use of wireless sensor networks for the tracking of nuclear materials has 
already been demonstrated in the Authenticated Tracking and Monitoring 
System (ATMS) [Sch98], [Sch00]. 
The ATMS profit from wireless sensors (state of the door, infrared, smoke, 
radiation, and temperature sensors) within a shipping container to monitor 
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the state of its contents. Notification of events are transmitted within the 
shipping container via a wireless system to a mobile processing unit 
connected to a GPS receiver and an International Maritime Satellite 
(INMARSAT) transceiver. Through the INMARSAT system, the location is 
well known and so is the status of each shipment which may be monitored 
anywhere in the world. 
 
2.1.5 Intelligent agriculture and environmental sensing 
An example of the use of wireless sensor networks in agriculture is the 
rainfall measurement. Large farms and ranches may cover several square 
kilometers, and they may receive rain only occasionally and only on some 
portions of the farm. Thus it is important to know which fields have 
received rain, so that irrigation, usually expensive, can be omitted and 
which fields have not and must be irrigated.  
Such an application is ideal for wireless sensor networks. The amount of 
data sent over the network is usually very low (if is of type "yes or no rain" 
is just of one bit), and the message latency can be on the order of several 
minutes. However costs must be low and energy consumption must be low 
enough for the entire network to last an entire season. 
The wireless sensor network is capable of much more than just rain soil 
measurements because the network can be fitted with a large variety of 
chemical and biological sensors.  
This type of application is very important in vineyards, where 
environmental changes may have vexing effects on the value of the final 
product. 
The location determination features of wireless sensor networks may be 
used in advanced control systems to enable more automation of farming 
equipment or in the determination of animals’ position. 
Wireless sensor networks may also be used for low-power sensing of 
environmental contaminants such as mercury [Bri98]. 
MEMS sensors may be integrated with a wireless transceiver in a standard 
CMOS process, providing a very low-cost solution to the monitoring of 
chemical and biological agents. 
 
2.1.6 Health monitoring 
“Health monitoring” is usually defined as “monitoring of non-life-critical 
health information”, to differentiate it from medical telemetry, and in this 
field wireless sensor networks is expected to grow quickly, although WSN 
can applied to some telemetry application as well. 
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We can classify health monitoring applications into two general classes 
available for wireless sensor networks. The first class is athletic 
performance monitoring, for example, tracking one's pulse and respiration 
rate via wearable sensors and sending the information to a personal 
computer for data analysis [Ber01]. The second class is at-home health 
monitoring like personal weight management [Par00]. 
The patient's data can be wirelessly sent to a personal computer and then be 
used, analyzed or just saved. Another example is the remote monitoring of 
patients with chronic disorders like diabetics [Lub02]. 
The use of wireless sensor networks in health monitoring is expected to 
increase rapidly due to the development of biological sensors compatible 
with conventional CMOS integrated circuit processes [YLH02]. 
The sensors, which can detect nucleic acids, enzymes, and other biologically 
materials, can be very small, enabling their applications in pharmaceuticals 
and medical care. 
A developing field market is that of implanted medical devices. In the USA, 
the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) established rules 
governing the Medical Implant Communications Service, "for transmitting 
data in support of diagnostic or therapeutic functions associated with 
implanted medical devices." (see http://wireless.fcc.gov).  
A developing field related not only to health monitoring is that of disaster 
relief. For example, the wireless sensors of the HVAC system in a collapsed 
building (earthquake event or gas explosion) can provide victim location 
information to rescue workers if acoustic sensors, activated automatically by 
accelerometers or manually by emergency personnel, are included.  
Wireless disaster relief systems like avalanche rescue beacons, which 
continuously transmit signals, are already on the market, so that rescuers can 
use to locate the wearer while is in an emergency situation, are used by 
skiers and other mountaineers in avalanche-prone areas.  
The actual systems have their limitations, first of all they provide only 
location information, and give no information about the health of the 
wearer. Thus in a large avalanche, when several beacons can be detected by 
emergency personnel, There is no way to decide who should be assisted 
first.  
It was recently proposed that these systems be enhanced by the addition of 
health sensors, including oximeters and thermometers, so that would-be 
rescuers would be able to identify those still alive under the snow [Mic02]. 
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2.2 Network performance objective 
To meet the requirements of the applications just described, a wireless 
sensor network design must achieve several objectives. The need for these 
features leads to a combination of technical issues not found in other 
wireless networks. 
 
2.2.1 Low power consumption 
WSN applications usually require network components with a power 
consumption that is lower than currently required by implementations of 
existing wireless networks such as Bluetooth.  
For example, devices for certain types of smart tags, badges, or medical 
sensors powered from small coin cell batteries, should last for several 
months or even years.  
The monitoring and control applications of industrial equipment require 
exceptionally long battery life so that the maintenance schedules of the 
monitored equipment are not compromised. Other applications may require 
a very large number of devices that make frequent battery replacement 
impractical.  
Moreover there are applications that cannot employ a battery at all; network 
nodes in these applications must get their energy from the environment 
[Sta99]. An example may be the wireless car tire pressure sensor, for which 
it is desirable to obtain energy from the mechanical or, as alternative, 
thermal energy present in the tire instead of a battery that may need to be 
replaced before the tire does [Cal06]. 
In addition to low power consumption a system with limited power sourcing 
often has limited peak power sourcing capabilities as well and this is an 
important factor to consider in system design. 
 
2.2.2  Low cost 
Cost plays an important role in applications adding wireless connectivity to 
inexpensive systems, and for applications with a large number of nodes. 
Most applications require wireless links of low complexity and low cost 
relative to the total product cost. 
To meet this objective, the network design and communication protocol 
must avoid the need for expensive components, such as discrete filters, by 
employing relaxed analog tolerances wherever possible, and minimizing 
memory and computing requirements [Cal06].  
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However one of the largest costs of many networks is administration and 
maintenance. Thus to be a true low-cost system, the network should achieve 
ad-hoc, self-configuration and self-maintenance capabilities.  
An “Ad hoc” network is a network without a predetermined logical 
topology or physical distribution.  
“Self-configuration” is the ability of network nodes to detect the presence of 
other nodes and to organize into a structured network without human 
intervention.  
“Self-maintenance” is the ability of the network to detect, and recover from, 
faults in either network nodes or communication links without human 
intervention. 
 
2.2.3 Security 
The security of wireless sensor networks involve two factors of equal 
importance: how secure the network is and how secure the network is 
perceived to be by users.  
The perception of security is very important because users have a natural 
concern when their data is transmitted over the air.  
Moreover, an application employing wireless sensor networks often replaces 
a wired version in which users could physically see the wires or cables 
carrying their information, and know that no one else was intercepting their 
information or injecting false information with reasonable certainty.  
The wireless systems must work to reach that feeling to achieve the wide 
market needed to lower costs. 
However security is more than just message encryption. In fact encryption is 
not an important security goal of wireless sensor networks.  
Usually the most important security goals are to ensure that any message 
received has not been modified in any way and is from the sender who 
claims to be.  
In fact if one has a wireless light switch in a home, there is little to be 
gained by encrypting the commands “turn on” and “turn off”. 
Any potential eavesdropper know that only two possible commands are 
likely, but he or she may also be able to see the light shining out the home 
window from his or her position.  
Therefore having secret commands in this application is of little importance. 
What is really important is that the malicious eavesdropper in the street can 
not be able to inject false or modified messages into the wireless sensor 
network, with the possibility of causing the light to turn on and off as he 
likes. 
This requires message authentication and integrity checking, which is 
performed by appending to a message a sender dependent Message Integrity 
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Code (MIC sometimes known as MAC Message Authentication Code) to 
the transmitted message.  
The desired recipient and sender share a key, which is used by the sender to 
generate the MIC as well as by the recipient to confirm the integrity of the 
message and the identity of the sender.  
To avoid the “replay attacks” in which an eavesdropper records a message 
and retransmits it later, a message counter or timer must be included in the 
calculation of the MIC. In this way two authentic messages containing the 
same data will not be identical. 
Regarding security the wireless sensor network engineer faces three main 
difficulties: the length of the MIC must be balanced according to the typical 
length of transmitted data, and the desire for short transmitted messages. 
Although a 16-byte (128-bit) MIC is often cited as necessary for the most 
secure systems, it becomes cumbersome when single-bit data is being 
passed (e.g., on, off).  
The designer must balance the security needs of the users with the low-
power requirements of the network. Note that this may involve not only 
choices of MIC length but also combinations of message authentication, 
integrity checking and encryption and must be automatically performed, as 
part of a self-organizing network. 
To minimize the cost of the network devices, the security features must be 
capable of implementation without an expensive hardware, with a minimum 
addition of logic gates and memory (RAM and ROM).  
Since the computational power available in most network devices is very 
limited, the combination of low gate count, small memory requirements, and 
low executed instruction count limits the security algorithm’s types 
available. 
The last but perhaps the most difficult problem is key distribution. Many 
methods are available, including several types of public key cryptography, 
employing dedicated key loading devices and various types of direct user 
intervention.  
All have their advantages and disadvantages when used in a given 
application so the wireless sensor network designer must select the 
appropriate one for the application developed. 
WSN have additional requirements including, fault tolerance, scalability to 
very large networks, and the need to operate in hostile environments 
[Aky02]. 
Although the design of a network that meeting these requirements may seem 
difficult, usually they don’t need to be achieved all simultaneously in the 
same system, for example the strict power and cost requirements come with 
more relaxed requirements in other areas. 
 
28 
2.2.4 Network type 
Although a star network with a single master and one or more slave devices 
may satisfy many applications, the transmit power of the network devices is 
limited by government rules and battery life concerns, network types that 
support multi-hop routing must be employed when additional range is 
needed. 
The additional memory and computing cost for routing tables and 
algorithms, in addition to network maintenance and overhead, must be 
supported without excessive cost or power energy consumption.  
It is to be emphasized that many applications are of relatively large order 
(hundreds of nodes) and device density may also be high (for example in 
market price tag applications).  
 
2.2.5 Worldwide availability 
Several proposed applications of WSN, such as wireless luggage tags or 
shipping container location systems, require that the network be capable of 
fully operate worldwide. 
Additionally, to maximize efficiency of products, production, marketing, 
sales, and distribution and to avoid the establishment of proprietary or 
regional variants, it is desirable to produce devices capable of worldwide 
operation.  
Although this capability can be implemented by employing GPS or 
GLONASS receivers in each network node, the cost of adding a second 
receiver, plus the additional performance required to meet the varying 
worldwide requirements, makes this approach economically impractical.  
It is, instead, preferable to employ a single band worldwide, one that has 
minimal variation in government regulatory requirements to maximize the 
total available market for wireless sensor networks. 
 
2.2.6 Data throughput 
Wireless sensor networks have limited data throughput requirements 
compared with Bluetooth (IEEE 802.15.1) and other WPANs and WLANs. 
The maximum desired data rate, according to [Cal06], averaged over a long 
period, may be set to be 512 b/s, although this is rather arbitrary.  
The typical data rate is expected to be below this; even 1 b/s or lower in 
some applications. It needs to be underlined that those values represent the 
data throughput, not the data rate transmitted over the channel, which may 
be significantly higher. 
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This low amount of data throughput implies that, with any practical protocol 
overhead, the communication efficiency of the network will be very low 
(especially when compared against TCP/IP packets that may be 1500 bytes 
long).  
Regardless what design is chosen, the efficiency will be very low, and the 
situation, therefore, may be viewed in positive: the protocol designer has the 
possibility to design free of the consideration of communications efficiency, 
usually a critical parameter in protocol design. 
 
2.2.7 Message latency 
Wireless sensor networks have soft Quality of Service (QoS) requirements, 
because, in general, they do not support synchronous communication, and 
have data throughput limitations that disallow the transmission of 
applications like real-time video and voice. The message latency 
requirement for wireless sensor networks is, therefore, very relaxed in 
comparison to that of other networks. In fact, while the LAN has a typical 
latency of 1-10ms and the WLAN has a latency period of 5-20ms, the WSN 
start from a latency value of 150 ms to many seconds (e.g. for sleeping 
nodes). 
2.2.8 Mobility 
Wireless sensor network applications, in general, do not require the nodes to 
be moved from their starting places. And usually WSNs suffer less control 
traffic overhead and may employ simpler routing methods than mobile ad 
hoc networks, because the network is released from the burden of look up 
for open communication routes, (e.g., MANET) 
 
2.2.9 Size 
To achieve the main goals of low-cost, mass production and low energy 
consumption it is fundamental that a node is as small as possible in size. It 
will be also much easier to place the nodes, even in hostile environment, 
while design the wireless sensor network. 
With the progress of silicon processes, transceiver systems decrease in size. 
Forty years ago, for example, a simple transceiver was a shoebox sized 
device of about 10 kg. Today the radio transceiver has become a single 
piece of silicon, less then a coin in size (fig. 2.1), with few passive 
components. 
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Figure 2.1 - NEC Electronics 16-bit Microcontrollers 
 with Embedded Radio Transceiver 
 
 
Most of the microcontrollers today have native ability to interface with 
sensors (built-in digital I/O and A/D converters). The 8-bit or 16-bit 
microcontroller may already include 64 or even  256 kilobytes of flash 
memory, RAM, and various hardware timers, along with the ability to 
interface directly to the radio transceiver. The MCU requires few external 
components to be fully functional. 
Therefore, the silicon system size of a WSN node is usually smaller than the 
batteries they use. This compact form factor lends itself well to innovative 
uses of radio technology in sensor applications. Integration is the key issue, 
and even higher levels of integration will be achieved in the future 802.15.4 
platform. 
 
 
 
Figura 2.1 - A WSN taxonomy 
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2.3 WSN application taxonomy 
WSNs are mission-driven systems that provide a task efficiently. Since 
WSN are service providers they can be modeled at different levels of 
abstraction. To better understand the WSNs  properties and characteristics 
there is a need for a classification and definition of WSN applications.  
To build such unambiguous classification scheme we start considering the 
main properties of the systems.. This scheme is analogous to an object-
oriented classification, where an object is described by its attributes and is 
classified on the basis of its capabilities,. The properties of the wireless 
applications are grouped into five categories: goal, interaction pattern, 
mobility, space and time. Each of these are further classified to provide 
sufficient details that are required for a typical WSN application. 
The classification scheme is depicted in figure 2.1 while for a classification 
of the WSN devices refers to[ChE06]  
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3  
WSN classification and standards 
3.1 A definition of WSN 
A sensor network is an infrastructure include measuring, computing, and 
communication elements that gives someone the ability to observe and react 
to events in a specified environment. [SMZ07]. 
Thus a wireless sensor network (WSN) can be defined ([VDM06], [Cho06]) 
as a network of devices, possibly low-sized, denoted as nodes that can 
measure some physical environmental phenomena and communicate the 
information gathered from the monitored field through wireless links, 
possibly via multiple hops relaying, to one or more sinks (named controller 
or monitor) that can use it locally or is connected to other networks through 
a gateway. The sink can be a common node or a specialized device with an 
increased power computing and memory capabilities. 
The nodes can be stationary or moving, aware of their location or not, 
homogeneous or not. 
Network sensor systems are seen as an important technology that will 
experience major deployment in the next few years for a multitude of 
applications discussed in the next paragraph.  
There are four basic components in a sensor network [SMZ07]:  
 
• a set of distributed sensors;  
• an interconnecting network (in our case wireless-based);  
• a central point for coordination and of information processing;  
• a set of computing resources at the central point (or beyond) to 
handle the data flow, correlation, event trending, status querying, 
and knowledge discovery.  
 
In this system the nodes, with sensing and computation capability, are 
considered part of the sensor network as some of the computing may be 
done in the network itself. 
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The algorithmic methods for data management, because of the large 
quantity of data that can potentially be collected, play an important role in 
WSN. 
The computation and communication infrastructure associated with sensor 
networks is often specific to this environment and rooted in the device and 
application-based nature of these networks.  
For example, unlike most other settings, in-network processing is desirable 
in sensor networks; furthermore, node power (and/or battery life) is a key 
design consideration.  
There are a number of different types of networks  whose classifications 
are based primarily on the distances they may reach [Lew04].You see in 
Table 3.1 how they relate to the wired world and to each other. 
 
 
Table 3.1 Different Types of Networks 
Network Type Wired Wireless 
 Local Area 
Network (LAN) IEEE 802.3 (Ethernet) IEEE 802.11X 
Personal Area 
Network (PAN) IEEE 1394 USB 
IEEE 802.15.1 
IEEE 802.15.3 
IEEE 802.15.4 
 
Metropolitan Area 
Network(MAN) Broadband (DSL, cable) 
IEEE 802.16 
 
Table 3.1 – type of network 
 
 
The WSN discussed in this thesis are usually classified as WPAN 
networks. 
The IEEE (Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers) provides 
standards for wired and wireless networking. The numbers are assigned by 
the IEEE and become well known to industry users. The 802 series dictates 
how each format must work. You can obtain lots of interesting information 
about these standards and their use from various Web sites (like 
www.dailywireless.org).  
The IEEE formed the WPAN Study Group in 1998. The study group’s main 
goal was to investigate the need for a wireless network standard for devices 
within a personal operating space (POS). In the same year the Bluetooth 
Special Interest Group (SIG) was formed. In 1999 the WPAN study group 
became IEEE 802.15 (WPAN Working Group). The 802.15 WPAN 
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(Wireless Personal Area Network) is an effort to develop standards for short 
distance wireless networks 
These WPANs includes wireless networking of portable and mobile 
computing devices, such as PCs, Personal Digital Assistants (PDAs), 
peripherals, cell phones, and pagers, letting these devices communicate with 
each other. 
Since the formation of 802.15 four sub-projects have started, including 
Bluetooth (Bluetooth 1.0 Specification in released in July of 1999) and the 
co-existence of 802.11 and 802.15 networks, and 802.15.4  as well as a 
standard for high bit rate (20 Mbps or higher) WPANs. 
In general WSNs techniques (contention-oriented, channel sharing and 
transmission) are now incorporated in the IEEE 802 family of standards, 
indeed, these techniques were originally developed in the late 1960s and 
1970s expressly for wireless environments and for large sets of dispersed 
nodes with limited channel-management computing capabilities. [SMZ07]  
 
 
3.2 WSN classifications 
A WSN as defined in paragraph 3.1 is a distributed systems (see [Cal06]) 
composed of several embedded devices, each equipped with a processing 
unit, a wireless communication interface, and many sensors/actuators.  
 
 
 
Figure 3.1 - single-sink WSN 
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Usually in these scenarios tiny battery powered devices are used, so that 
deployment results easy and increase the global flexibility [Aky02], 
providing low-cost, fine-grained interactions with the environment. 
The result of the definition of WSN in paragraph 3.1 lead to a traditional 
single-sink WSN (Figure 3.1).  
Most of the scientific papers in the literature deal with such a definition but 
this single-sink scenario suffers from an obvious bottleneck ([VDM06]) 
which implies a lack of scalability: increasing the number of nodes also the 
amount of data gathered by the sink also increases and once its capacity is 
reached the network size can not be augmented. 
Furthermore, for reasons related to the MAC (medium access control) and 
routing aspects discussed later, the global network performance cannot be 
independent from the total network size. 
 
3.2.1 Single-sink single-hop WSN 
We can give an evaluation of the capacity of a single-sink single-hop WSN, 
as in [VDM06], defined in terms of maximum number of nodes that a sink 
can accept.  
We consider a WSN where nodes are requested to send their samples 
(composed of D bytes each) taken from the monitored space every TR 
seconds. Initially we may assume that all nodes send their data directly to 
the sink (a star topology). N Denote the number of nodes, Rb the channel bit 
rate. Taking account of the overhead introduced by protocol stack layers, we 
define a factor, αA≤ 1 thus if SA is the maximum data throughput measured 
at the application layer, then will be SA= Rb·αA. 
All protocol layers contribute to lower αA and reducing it will lower the 
throughput even if the channel bit rate is unchanged. In modern 
communication systems αA typically is a value between 0,5 and 0,1 
[VDM06]. 
Under such assumptions, the application throughput will be approximately 
equal to N·D·8/ TR . Thus, we arrive at the following inequality: 
N·D·8/ TR ≤ Rb·αA  
Therefore we can assert 
(3.1) N ≤ Rb·αA·TR /( 8D) 
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This equation rappresents an approximate estimation of the number of nodes 
that can be part of a single-sink single-hop WSN. To give a numerical 
example, assume R b = 250 Kbit/s,  
TR = 1s, αA =0,1, D = 3; then the maximum number of nodes is 
approximately 1000. On the other hand, if TR = 50 ms, then N can not 
exceed 50.  
As seen the requirements of the application play a relevant role when 
defining the capacity of a single-sink WSN and also that the protocol 
overhead can play a significant role, through αA. 
In the case discussed above, the nodes are all within range of the sink. If the 
transmission range of links between sink and nodes is R, then the density of 
nodes for a bidimensional space is (no smaller than)  
N / π R2 . 
 
 
3.2.2 Single-sink multi-hop WSN 
Now we will assume that the N nodes are distributed according to a smaller 
density, thus some of them must reach the sink through multiple hops. If a 
node can send its sample to the sink through h hops, then the delivery of the 
data sample requires h transmissions. 
Let us denote by hm the average number of hops per data sample taken from 
the fi eld; if no smart reuse of radio resources is introduced, then we have 
for a single-sink multi-hop WSN [VDM06] 
(3.2) N ≤ Rb·αA·TR /( 8Dhm) 
Therefore, the capacity of the network is reduced by a factor of hm . 
 
3.2.3 Multi-sink multi-hop WSN 
A more general scenario includes multiple sinks in the network (see Figure 
3.2 ). Maintaining the same node density, a larger number of sinks will 
decrease the probability of isolated group of nodes that cannot deliver their 
data due to an unfortunate signal propagation.  
Moreover a multiple-sink WSN can be scalable: in fact, the same 
performance can be achieved even by increasing the number of nodes, while 
this is not true for a single-sink network.  
Still a multi-sink WSN does not represent a trivial extension of a single-sink 
case. There are mainly two cases:  
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All sinks are connected, wired or wireless, through a separate network,  
The sinks are disconnected 
 
 
 
Figure 3.2 -Multi Sink WSN 
 
 
In the first case, a node needs to forward the data collected to any of the 
sinks.  
From the protocol viewpoint, this means that a selection can be done based 
on a suitable criterion (e.g., minimum delay, maximum throughput, 
minimum number of hops).  
in this case the presence of multiple sinks ensures better performance then 
the single-sink network with an equal the number of nodes in the same area, 
but the communication protocols will be more complex.  
In the second case, when the sinks are not connected, the presence of 
multiple sinks just make a partition of the monitored field into smaller areas; 
however from the communication protocols viewpoint there are no 
significant changes, apart from simple sink discovery mechanisms. 
Because of the better potential performance, the first case is clearly the most 
interesting due to  the sinks connected through any type of mesh network is 
clearly the most interesting case. 
We can do an approximate evaluation of the capacity of a multi-sink WSN, 
assuming that each sink (denoting as NS their number in the network) can 
serve N nodes with N limited by expressions (3.1) and (3.2). 
We can assert: 
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(3.3)  N ≤ NsRb·αA·TR /( 8Dhm) 
assuming that group of nodes attached to a given sink do not interfere with 
those attached to other sinks. To give a numerical example we will use the 
same value as for the single sink case: Rb = 250 Kbit/s, T R = 50 ms, αA = 
0,1, D = 3; then, if there are NS = 5 sinks in the network, the maximum 
number of nodes is about 250. 
 
3.2.4 Actuators 
Both the single-sink and multiple-sink networks reviewed above do not 
include the presence of actuators, namely devices able to manipulate the 
environment rather than observe and measeure it. WSANs are composed of 
both sensing and actuators nodes (see Figure 3.3 ).  
The inclusion of actuators doesn’t represent a simple extension of a WSN. 
In fact from the communication protocol point of view the data-flow must 
go to the opposite direction in this case:  
when sensors provide data the protocols should be able to manage many-to-
one communications, and one-to-many when the actuators need to be 
controlled. The complexity of the protocols in this case is even greater. 
 
 
 
Figure 3.3 - WSAN 
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3.3 Wireless sensor network standards 
The main value of wireless sensor networks is their low price. To achieve 
the economies of scale needed to reach a large market and facilitating the 
volume production minimizing the cost of components, the development of 
a standardized communication protocol is fundamental. Thus products from 
many manufacturers may operate together. This synergy will encourage 
their use avoiding the proliferation of proprietary and incompatible 
protocols.. 
The IEEE 802 Local and Metropolitan Area Network Standards Committee 
(LMSC) recently created Working Group 15 to develop a set of standards 
for WPANs [BGH00].  
To deal with the need for low-power and low-cost wireless networking the 
IEEE New Standards Committee (NesCom) officially funded a new task 
group in Working Group 15 to begin the development of a standard for 
Low-Rate WPANs (LR-WPANs), called 802.15.4 (see Fig. 3.4 for more 
details). 
 
 
 
Figure 3.4 - 802 Standards' Wireless Space (source ZigBee Alliance) 
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The goal of this group was to provide a standard having ultra-low 
complexity, cost, and power for low-data-rate wireless connectivity among 
inexpensive, fixed, portable, and moving devices [IEE03].  
The main target of Task Group 4, as for all IEEE 802 wireless standards, 
was limited to the creation of specifications of the Physical (PHY) layer and 
Media Access Control (MAC) sub-layer of the Data Link Layer in the 
International Standards Organization (ISO) Open Systems Interconnection 
(OSI) reference model. In May 2003 the 802.15.4 standard was approved. 
 
3.3.1 The IEEE 802.15.4 low-rate wpan standard 
As noted in the previous paragraph, the scope of the IEEE 802.15.4 task 
group, as defined in its original Project Authorization Request, is to “define 
the PHY and MAC specifications for low data rate wireless connectivity 
with fixed, portable and moving devices with no battery or very limited 
battery consumption requirements typically operating in the Personal 
Operating Space (POS) of 10 meters.” 
Moreover the purpose of the project is “to provide a standard for ultra low 
complexity, ultra low cost, ultra low power consumption and low data rate 
wireless connectivity among inexpensive devices. The raw data rate will be 
high enough (maximum of 200 kbps) to satisfy a set of simple needs such as 
interactive toys, but scaleable down to the needs of sensor and automation 
needs (10 kbps or below) for wireless communications.” [Mid00]  
The maximum and minimum raw data rates were later raised respectively to 
250 and 20 kb/s. 
This diverse set of goals requires the IEEE 802.15.4 standard to be 
extremely flexible. 
The IEEE 802.15.4 standard supports a large variety of possible applications 
in the POS Unlike protocols such as IEEE 802.11 that are designed for a 
single application.  
The possible  applications vary from those requiring high data throughput 
and low latency to those requiring very low throughput and able to tolerate 
significant message latency.  
The IEEE 802.15.4 standard supports peer-to-peer and star connections, and 
is able to support a wide variety of network topologies. When security it is 
required that is entrusted to the AES-128 algorithm (see [Nis01] for more 
information about AES). 
The standard includes optionally beacons (see Appendix A), with a  variable 
beacon period that is a binary multiple of 15.36 ms, up to a maximum of 
15.36 ms × 214 = 4 minutes and 11.65824 seconds, thus that the optimum 
trade-off can be made between message latency and network node power 
consumption. When applications have duty cycle (see Appendix F) 
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limitations the beacons can be omitted as, for example, may happen on 
networks in the 868 MHz band, which has law limits on node duty cycle, or 
systems that require nodes with constant listening mode.  
The channel has a contention based access, the mechanism use a carrier 
sense multiple access with collision avoidance (CSMA-CA), if beacon is 
used it will be followed by a contention access period (CAP) for devices 
attempting to gain access to the channel, the length of the CAP is a fraction 
of the period between beacons.  
The CAP may be limited to a fixed time of approximately 2 ms by a  
“battery life extension” mode.  
When an application requires low message latency, the standard employs 
the optional guaranteed time slots (GTSs), which reserve channel time for 
devices without follow the CSMA-CA access mechanism. 
A 16-bit address field is used to address the devices, meaning that up to (28 - 
2) × (28 - 2) = 64,516 logical addresses (two values in each byte are 
reserved);  
Therefore the standard also includes the ability to send messages with 64-bit 
extended addresses, allowing a sufficient number of devices for any 
application to be placed in a single network.  
The messages can be fully acknowledged and in this case each transmitted 
frame (excepted the beacons and the acknowledgments themselves) may 
receive an explicit acknowledgment.  
The overhead introduced with explicit acknowledgments is usually 
acceptable given the low data throughput typical of wireless sensor 
networks and the results is a reliable protocol.  
Moreover the acknowledgments may optionally support the passive 
acknowledgment techniques, used in some ad hoc routing schemes, for 
example, the gradient routing (GRAd) algorithm (discussed later in this 
chapter). 
Several features is designed to minimize power consumption are 
incorporates in the IEEE 802.15.4 standard.  
Besides the use of long beacon periods and the battery life extension mode, 
the active period of a beaconing node can be drastically reduced (according 
to a powers of two), allowing the node to sleep within two beacons. 
One important goal in the design of the IEEE 802.15.4 was the coexistence 
with other device and services using the same unlicensed bands. 
As evidence the dynamic channel selection is implemented in the protocol, 
so if an interference from other services appear on a channel used by an 
IEEE 802.15.4 network, the network coordinator ( PAN coordinator) scans 
the other available channels to find a the suitable channel. 
In this scan, The coordinator obtains a measure of the peak energy present 
in each channel and then uses this information to select a free channel.  
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This channel selection scan can also be used prior to the establishment of 
the network or even prior to each frame transmission (except beacon or 
acknowledgment frames). Each network node must complete two clear 
channel assessments (CCAs) as part of the CSMA-CA mechanism to ensure 
the channel is unoccupied prior to transmission. 
A link quality indication (LQI) byte is appended to each received frame by 
the PHI layer before it is sent to the MAC layer. This information may be 
used by receiving nodes for several purposes, at the discretion of the 
network designer and according to application needs.  
 
 
 
Figure 3.5- Network topologies and node types 
 
 
For example, the LQI can be used as an indication of channel noise, perhaps 
leading to a dynamic channel selection process and move to another free 
channel or it can be used for power control of its own transmitter (assuming 
a symmetrical channel). It may be also used as part of a network routing 
algorithm based on link quality between network nodes or to estimate the 
location of each network node relative to its peers. 
The LQI may be generated indifferently from a signal level determination, a 
signal-to-noise determination, or a combination of the two. This enables 
received signal strength indication (RSSI) and signal quality estimators to 
be used together.  
Although a byte is reserved for the LQI, to ease the burden on developers 
that do not desire to make use of it (appropriate for some applications), the 
IEEE standard specifies that at least eight unique values shall be used in the 
LQI, including 0 × 00 and 0 × FF are to be associated respectively with the 
lowest and highest quality 802.15.4 signals detectable by the receiver. 
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To maximize the utility of the IEEE 802.15.4 tried to balance the desire to 
enable small, low-cost, and low-power network nodes with the needs to 
produce a standard that met a wide variety of on-field applications.  
The resulting standard includes three types of network node functionality: 
 
• PAN coordinator. The PAN coordinator is the node that initiates 
the network and is the controller of the network. The PAN 
coordinator may transmit beacons and can communicate with all the 
device in range. Depending on the network design, it may have 
memory sufficient to store information on all devices in the network, 
and must have memory sufficient to store routing information as 
required by the algorithm employed by the network. 
 
• Coordinator. The coordinator may transmit beacons as the PAN 
coordinator  and can communicate directly with any device in range. 
A coordinator may become or be promoted to PAN coordinator and 
start a new network. 
• Device. A network device does not beacon and can directly 
communicate only with a coordinator or PAN coordinator. 
 
These three functions are to be encapsulated into two different device types: 
 
• Full function device (FFD)). An FFD can operate in any of the three 
network roles (PAN coordinator, coordinator, or device). It must 
have sufficient memory to store routing information as required by 
the algorithm employed by the network. 
 
• Reduced function device (RFD). An RFD is a very low cost device, 
with minimal memory requirements. It can only function as a 
network device. 
 
Wireless light switch is a typical example of a RFD. It must be as 
inexpensive to produce as possible, and has limited functional requirements. 
The light itself, however, may be the archetypical FFD because it can be 
more expensive, has access to mains power, and can have additional 
network functions as a more permanent feature of the building [Cal06]. 
The IEEE 802.15.4 standard, as said before, supports multiple network 
topologies.  
In the standard, two network types are discussed: star networks and peer-to-
peer networks. In the star network, the master device is the PAN coordinator 
(FFD node), and the other network nodes may either FFDs or RFDs.  
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In the peer-to-peer network, FFDs are usually used, one of them is the PAN 
coordinator. RFDs may be used in a peer-to-peer network, but they can only 
communicate with a single FFD belonging to the network, and so do not 
have a real “peer-to-peer” communication. 
Similar to all IEEE 802 wireless standards, the IEEE 802.15.4 standard 
standardizes only the physical and medium access control (MAC) layers.  
In fact the IEEE 802.15.4 standard incorporates two physical layers: 
 
• The lower band: the 902–928MHz, for most of the Americas and 
pacific lands, 868.0–868.6 MHz (for Europe),  
 
• The upper band: 2.400–2.485 GHz (worldwide with marginal 
differences in the band boundary) 
 
The channel numbers and their center frequencies are defined as follows: 
 
 
Figure 3.6- 802.15.4 channels (from ZigBee Alliance) 
 
 
FC = 868.3 Mhz, for k = 0 
 
FC = 906 + 2 (k-1)  Mhz, for k = 1,2,…,10 
 
FC = 2405 + 5 (k-11)  Mhz, for k = 11,12,…,26 
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3.4 Protocol layers 
As noted before, the IEEE 802.15.4 standard incorporate two distinct layers, 
the physical (usually simply called PHY) and the medium access control 
(MAC) layer.  
However, to easily build an application without the need of a low level 
knowledge about the node structure, at least two more layers are required: 
the Data-link layer and Network layer. Thus a Alliance between some of the 
major industry was born to promote a 802.15.4 based standard containing 
the two more layers (see fig. 3.6 and 3.10).  
The ZigBee standard will be discussed later in this chapter, now we will 
focus on the two IEEE 802.15.4 layers. 
 
 
 
Figure 3.7 - OSI Data link layer architecture 
 
 
 
3.4.1 The physical (PHY) layer  
The physical layer (PHY) of the reference model specifies the network 
interface components, their parameters, and their operation.  
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Moreover, to support operation of the MAC layer, the PHY layer includes a 
variety of features, such as receiver energy detection (RED), link quality 
indicator (LQI), and clear channel assessment (CCA).   
 
 
Parameter 2.4-GHz PHY 868/915-MHz PHY 
Sensitivity @ 1% 
PER 
-85 dBm -92 dBm 
Receiver 
maximum input 
level 
-20 dBm  
Adjacent channel 
rejection 
0 dB  
Alternate channel 
rejection 
30 dB  
Output power, 
lowest maximum 
-3 dBm  
Transmission 
modulation 
accuracy 
EMV < 35% for 
1000 chips 
 
Number of 
channels 
16 1/10 
Channel spacing 5 MHz NA(Single 
channel)/2 MHz 
Transmission rates Date rate 250 kbps 20/40 kbps 
Symbol rate 62.5 
kilosymbols/sec 
20/40 
kilosymbols/sec 
Bit per symbol 4 1 
Symbol period 16 µs 49 µs/24 µs 
Chip rate 2 megachips/sec 300/60 kilochips/sec 
Chip modulation O-QPSK with half-
sine pulse shaping 
(MKS) 
BPSK with raised 
cosine pulse shaping 
Chip pseudo-noise 
sequence 
32 15 
RX-TX and TX-
RX turnaround 
time 
12 symbols  
Table 3.2 IEEE 80215.4 PHY Layer Main Parameters 
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The PHY layer is provided by a wide range of operational low-power 
features, including low-duty-cycle operations, strict power management, 
and low transmission overhead [SMZ07]. These parameters are listed in 
Table 3.2. 
The two PHY bands, viewed in the paragraph 3.3.1, employ a form of direct 
sequence spread spectrum (DSSS).  
The DSSS is one of the spread spectrum modulation techniques, and as all 
these kind of techniques, use a carrier signal that occur on the full device’s 
transmitting bandwidth (the so called spectrum) thus the modulation occupy 
more bandwidth than the information signal itself. 
DSSS provides a higher data rates and shorter delays than FHSS (the 
frequency hopping technique also used in wireless transmission see 
appendix A for more information about FHSS), because the device don't 
spend time retuning. 
The spread-spectrum techniques are resistant to interference, signals that 
stay in one narrow area (and don’t move), but they don’t do as well when 
other spread spectrum systems are operating nearby.  
 
 
 
Figure 3.8- DSSS modulation technique 
 
 
In our case DSSS is resistant to interference via the spreading function that 
concentrate the desired signal but spread and dilutes any interfering signal, 
however few nearby FHSS systems are sufficient to cripple a DSSS system, 
on the other hand, because a DSSS system is transmitting on every 
frequency in the band, a nearby FHSS system will be unable to find any 
clear channel to use.  
FHSS usually degrades more gracefully than DSSS in the presence of 
interference but neither works well when competing at close range. 
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DSSS transmission is generated multiplying the data by a noise signal 
generated as a pseudorandom sequence of 1 and -1 values. This noise signal 
has a much higher frequency than the information signal. 
Direct-sequence spread-spectrum transmissions multiply the data being 
transmitted by a noise signal.  
The noise-like signal can be used by receiver to reconstruct the original 
data, by multiplying it by the same pseudorandom sequence (because 1 × 1 
= 1, and −1 × −1 = 1). This process is known as de-spreading. 
To work correctly, the transmit and receive sequences must be synchronized 
via some sort of timing process.  
 
 
Application  Frequency Band Used 
AM radio  535–1635 kHz 
Analog cordless telephone  44–49 MHz 
Television  54–58 MHz 
FM radio  88–108 MHz 
Television  174–216 MHz 
Television  470–806 MHz 
Wireless data  700–720 MHz 
Cellular  806–890 MHz 
Digital cordless  900 MHz 
Personal communications  900–928 MHz 
Nationwide paging  929–932 MHz 
Satellite telephone uplink  1610–1625.5 MHz 
Personal communications  1850–1990 MHz 
Satellite telephone downlink  2.4835–2.5 GHz 
IEEE 802.11b/g wireless LANs  2.4 GHz 
IEEE 802.15.4/Zigbee alliance  2.4 GHz 
IEEE 802.16/WiMax  2–66 GHz 
IEEE 802.11a wireless LANs  5 GHz 
Large dish satellite TV  4–6 GHz 
Small dish satellite TV  11.7–12.7 GHz 
Wireless cable TV  28–29 GHz 
Table 3. 3 - Common Wireless Applications and Their Frequencies 
 
 
If a second transmitter use the same channel but with a different noise 
sequence, the de-spreading process results in no processing gain for that 
signal, allowing multiple DSSS transmitters to share the same channel 
within the limits of the cross-correlation properties of their sequences. In 
table 3.3 can be seen the frequency commonly used by wireless 
applications. 
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3.4.2 Packet structure 
The packet structure of the IEEE 802.15.4 PHY layer is shown in fig. 
3.9. The first field of this structure contains a 32-bit preamble used for 
symbol synchronization. The next field contain a 8-bit value used for frame 
synchronization and represent a start of a packet delimiter. The PHY header 
(8-bits) field specifies the length of the PHY service data unit (PSDU) that 
can carry up to 127 bytes of data. 
 
 
 
Figure 3.9- 802.15.4 PHY-layer packet structure 
 
 
The total packet transmission time is about 4,3 ms at 250kbps or 52 ms at 
40kbps (the two typical bands). 
 
3.5 The medium access control (MAC) layer 
As already mentioned the need to conserve energy is the most critical issue 
in the design of MAC layer protocol for WSNs.  
Several factors may contribute to energy waste such as idle listening, packet 
collisions, and overhearing. 
The media access regulation requires the exchange of control and 
synchronization information between the competing nodes. The exchange of 
a large number of control and synchronization packets may result in a 
significantly increase of energy consumption. On the other hand long 
periods of idle listening may decrease network throughput increasing energy 
consumption.  
In some cases the energy wasted by idle listening is equal to one-half of the 
total energy consumed by a sensor during its lifetime. [Bou08]  
Another source of significant energy waste is the retransmission of colliding 
packets. Moreover a high number of collisions may lead to significant 
performance degradation.  
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The excessive overhearing yet causes a node to receive and decode packets 
intended for other nodes increases energy consumption and degrading the 
network throughput.  
The main objective of a WSN MAC-layer protocols is to reduce such 
energy waste discussed above. 
These protocols can be categorized into two main groups:  
 
• schedule-based MAC-layer protocols: these protocols are a class of 
deterministic protocols in which the channel access is based on a 
schedule. Channel access is limited to one sensor node at a time. 
This is achieved by a resources pre-allocation to individual nodes.  
 
• contention-based MAC-layer protocols: these protocols avoid pre-
allocation of resources. Instead, a single radiochannel is shared by 
all nodes and allocated on demand. However each simultaneous 
attempts to access the communications channel results in collision. 
The main objective of contention-based MAC layer protocols is to 
minimize the occurrence of collisions, rather than completely avoid 
them.  
 
To reduce energy consumption, these protocols differ in the mechanisms 
used to reduce the possibility of a collision while minimizing overhearing 
and control traffic overhead. 
Resolving collisions is usually achieved using distributed, randomized 
algorithms to reschedule channel access among competing sensor nodes. 
The basic approach used to reduce overhearing is to force nodes into a sleep 
state when they become inactive. [SMZ07] 
Communication between wireless sensor nodes is usually achieved by a 
unique channel. Usually only a single node can transmit a message at any 
given time using this channel, so the shared access of the channel requires a 
protocol among the nodes. The MAC protocol is designed to regulate access 
to the shared wireless medium such that the performance requirements of 
the application are satisfied. 
From the perspective of OSI Reference Model, the MAC functionalities are 
provided by the lower sublayer of the data link layer (DLL).  
The higher sublayer of the DLL is referred as the logical link control layer 
(LLC). The presence of the LLC sublayer allows support for several MAC 
options, depending on different characteristics as network topology used, 
type of communication channel, quality of service requirements. 
The MAC sub layer resides directly above the physical layer (see fig. 3.6 
and 3.10) and perform the following three functions [SMZ07]: 
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• Assembly of data into a transmitting frame by appending a header 
field containing addressing information and a trailer field for error 
detection 
• Disassembly of a received frame to extract addressing and error 
control information to perform address recognition and error 
detection and recovery 
• The regulation of access to the shared transmission medium  
 
 
 
Figure 3.10- Stack Reference Model and their relative tasks 
 
 
The LLC sub layer of the DDL provides a direct interface to the upper layer 
protocols. Its main objective is to shield the upper layer protocols from the 
characteristics of the underlying physical network. The use of the LLC 
sublayer is very limited as interoperability is usually achieved by other 
network layer protocols. 
The IEEE 802.15.4 MAC-layer specification is designed to support a 
large variety of industrial and home applications for control and monitoring 
as previously discussed (see paragraph 2.2). These applications usually 
require low to medium data rates and moderate average delay and high 
flexibility. moreover, the complexity and implementation cost of the IEEE 
802.15.4 standard compliant devices must be low to minimize energy 
consumption and enable large scale production of these devices. 
To achieve these goals IEEE 802.15.4 MAC-layer specification embeds in 
its design several features for flexible network configurations and low-
power operations. 
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These features include [SMZ07]: 
 
• Various network topologies and devices support 
• Optional super-frame structure to control the network devices’ duty 
cycle 
• Direct and indirect data transmissions 
• Contention- based and schedule-based MAC methods 
• Beaconed and non-beaconed modes of operation (beacon mode uses 
a super-frame structure to coordinate access to the medium. Support 
for  contention-based access and guaranteed time slots allocation; in 
non-beaconed mode, the protocol uses an unslotted CSMA/CA 
based access scheme.) 
• Efficient energy management schemes for an extended battery life 
that includes adaptive sleep for period of time over multiple beacons 
• Flexible addressing scheme to support the deployment of large-scale 
networks (over 65,000 nodes per network) 
 
Based on the logical devices types seen in paragraph 2.4.1, a IEEE 802.15.4 
wireless personal area network can be organized in one of three possible 
topologies: star, mesh (peer-to-peer), or cluster tree. The three network 
configurations are depicted in figure 3.5. The star network topology 
supports a single coordinator, with up to 65,536 devices.  
In this topology configuration, one of the FFD-type devices assumes the 
role of network coordinator. All other devices act as end devices. 
The selected coordinator is responsible for initiating and maintaining all the 
end devices on the network.  
The end devices can only communicate with the coordinator. The mesh 
configuration allows path formation from any source device to any 
destination device, using tree and table-driven routing algorithms. 
distance vector routing (AODV) and Internet Engineering Task Force  
(IETF).  
In the mesh topology the radio receivers of the PAN coordinator and the 
routers must be always active. 
Cluster tree networks enable a peer-to-peer network to be formed using 
multihop routing.  
A cluster tree network is self-organized and supports network redundancy to 
achieve a high degree of fault tolerance and self-repair. The cluster tree 
topology fits latency-tolerant applications. 
The cluster can be significantly large, comprising up to 255 clusters of up to 
254 nodes each ( for a total of 64.770 nodes). 
The routing algorithm employs a simplified version of the on-demand  
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Any FFD can be a coordinator. The PAN coordinator, chosen from one of 
the coordinators, build up the first cluster and assigns to it a cluster identity 
(CID) of value zero. All other clusters are then formed with a designated 
cluster coordinator for each cluster. 
Each PAN is uniquely identified by a 16-bit identifier. A PAN coordinator 
is designated as the controller of the WPAN.  
Every network has exactly one PAN coordinator, selected from within all 
the coordinators of the network.  
A coordinator is a device configured to support advanced network 
functionalities including: 
 
• Managing a list of all associated network devices 
 
• Exchanging data frames with network devices and a peer coordinator 
 
• Allocating 16-bit short addresses to network devices  
 
• Generating beacon frames on a periodic basis (used to announce the 
PAN identifier, and other network and device parameters.) 
 
Must be noted the MAC layer offers channel scan capability and not only 
and association/disassociation functionalities. This scan procedure work on 
several logical channels by sending a beacon request message and listening 
or just listening in case of a passive scan (RFD nodes) for beacons to locate 
other PANs coordinators. 
The higher protocol’s layers decide which PAN to join and ask the MAC 
layer to provide the association procedure for the selected PAN/channel. 
The MAC layer send a join request to one of the network coordinators and if 
accepted the node receives his address that it may use for all communication 
purposes. 
 
3.5.1 Frame and super-frame structure 
The MAC layer provides four frame form structures, one for each type of 
message that can be sent: 
 
• Data frame: provides up to 104 byte data payload capacity, include 
a sequence numbering to ensure that packets are tracked and a Frame 
Check Sequence (FCS) validates error-free data. 
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Figure 3.11- Data Frame Format 
 
 
• ACK frame: is a short packet that provides active feedback that 
packet was received without error 
 
 
 
Figure 3.12 - ACK Frame format 
 
 
• Command frame: allow remote control/configuration of client 
nodes and a centralized network manager to configure individual 
clients. 
 
 
Figure 3.13- MAC Command frame format 
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RFD Command Frame 
Identifier Command TX RX 
00000001 Association request X  
00000002 Association response  X 
00000003 Disassociation notification X X 
00000004 Data request X  
00000005 PAN ID conflict notification X  
00000006 Orphan notification X  
00000007 Beacon request   
00000008  Coordinator realignment  X 
00000009 GTS request   
Table 2.4 - MAC Commands 
 
 
• Beacon data frame: client devices can wake up only when a beacon 
is to be broadcast, listen for their address, and if not heard, return to 
sleep. Beacons are important for mesh and cluster tree networks to 
keep all of the nodes synchronized without requiring nodes to 
listening for long periods of time and consume battery energy. 
 
The frames are depicted in the fig 3.11-3.14  
As already mentioned the IEEE 802.15.4 MAC defines an optional super-
frame structure. When used it is initiated by the PAN coordinator. 
Furthermore, its format is decided by the coordinator.  
 
 
 
Figure 3.14 - Beacon data frame format 
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As Figure 3.15 shows, the super-frame is divided into 16 equally sized slots.  
 
 
 
Figure 3.15 - Super-frame structure 
 
 
The first time slot of each super-frame is always used to transmit the 
beacon. The beacon has synchronization function for the devices, it 
identifies the PAN and describe the super-frame structure itself.  
The remaining time slots are used by competing devices, through a CSMA-
CA based protocol, for communications during the contention access period.  
All communications between devices must be completed by the end of the 
current CAP and the beginning of the next network beacon. 
The PAN coordinator may dedicate groups of contiguous time slots of the 
active super-frame to these applications with specific latency and bandwidth 
requirements. These slots are named guaranteed time slots (GTSs) and their 
number cannot exceed seven. However a GTS may occupy more then one 
time slot. Together the GTSs form the contention free period (CFP).  
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Figure 3.16 - Super-frame with GTSs 
 
 
The CFP always appears at the end, of the active super-frame and starts at a 
slot boundary immediately following the CAP, as depicted in Figure 3.16. 
The CAP time slots still remain for contention-based access between 
devices and new devices trying to join the network.  
All communication transactions using contention-based access and GTS-
based access must respectively complete before the end their associated 
CAP and CFP. 
Network devices can send requests for GTS allocation during the CAP 
period to reserve contiguous time slots, either the receive (from the 
coordinator) or transmit (to the coordinator) data.  
Devices can switch off their power and go into a sleep mode when have no 
data to send. However devices are must to remain active, during their 
allocated GTSs but are allowed to go into a sleep mode during the other 
GTSs periods. 
The coordinator may also send a super-frame containing both an active and 
an idle period to reduce energy consumption, as shown in figure 3.17.  
The active period, always composed by the 16 time slots, contains the frame 
beacon, the CAP time slots and the CAP slots when applicable. The inactive 
period defines a configurable time period during which all network nodes, 
including the coordinator, can go into a sleep mode switching off their 
power and set a wake up timer to the next beacon frame (just before it). 
Summarizing the general MAC frame format is composed of three basic 
components: a header, a payload, and the footer.  
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Figure 3.17 - Super-frame with inactive period 
 
 
The MAC header contains a frame control field and the address field. The 
control field carries the frame type and other information necessary for 
network control and operation. The address specifies the source PAN 
identifier and source node address, the destination PAN identifier and 
address.  
The MAC payload contains the data frame to be exchanged between the 
communicating devices. The MAC footer contains the frame check 
sequence field and is also used to detect frame errors. 
 
3.5.2 The association request and response command formats  
The association command is part of the MAC association services and is 
formed by association request and response illustrated in Figure 3.18.  
The capability information field of the association request supply 
information  about many questions regarding the device that requested to 
join the network: 
 
• The device is a PAN coordinator, the alternate PAN coordinator 
field is set to zero if the device cannot act as a PAN coordinator. 
• Is this node an FFD or an RFD device, if the device type field is set 
to one, the device is an FFD. 
• The device is battery powered or connected to a main power source,  
for battery powered nodes, the power source field is set to zero. 
• The device keep its receiver in ON mode all the time or turn off the 
receiver and go to power-saving mode when the device is idle. The 
receiver is ON when idle field is set to zero if the receiver is turned 
off during idle mode. The value of this field comes from the MAC 
attribute macRxOnWhenIdle and is equal to FALSE if the receiver is 
turned off during idle mode. 
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• The device want to have a new address after joining the network. If 
the device needs a short address, the allocate address field is set to 
one. 
 
The PAN coordinator uses the association response command to accept or 
deny the association request from a node. If the coordinator has reached its 
maximum capacity it will be indicate in PAN capacity status.  
If the association is accepted and the node also asked for a new short 
address, the short address is sent in the short address field of the association 
response. 
 
 
 
Figure 3.18 - The Association Request Command (a)  
and The Association Response Command (b) 
 
 
3.5.3 The Disassociation Notification  
The disassociation is a procedure that an associated node uses to notify the 
parent  or the coordinator that the device itself wants to leave the network . 
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Figure 3.19 - MAC Disassociation Notification Command 
 
 
The disassociation frame format is depicted in Figure 3.19. A device will 
leave a network based on either its own decision or the request of the 
parent/coordinator (for instance when the parent itself wants to leave the 
network). 
 
3.5.4 Security 
The security services specified by the IEEE 802.15.4 model provide support 
for infrastructure security and application data security. There are four kind 
of services: 
• The first security service of provides support by preventing 
unauthorized parties from joining the network and allows a device to 
maintain a list of network trusted devices. This list is used by any 
network node to detect and reject messages from unauthorized 
devices.  
• The second security service supports message integrity protection to 
prevent the tampering attempt of a legitimate data message from an 
authorized sender while the message is in transit (by any kind of 
intruder).  
• The third security service provides the data confidentiality of e 
message. This is achieved implementing the a 128-bit key advanced 
encryption standard (AES) cryptographic algorithm.  
• The fourth security service deals with sequential data freshness to 
prevent replay attacks, where an unauthorized party resend 
legitimate messages at a later time. 
 
The MAC layer describes a variety of security suites, based on this four 
security services, each one offering a different set of security properties and 
guarantees. The MAC standard specify that the security is not enabled by 
default and the application must explicitly set the appropriate parameters to 
enable the desired security level. 
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3.6 ZigBee standard 
ZigBee and IEEE 802.15.4 are standards-based protocols that provide the 
network infrastructure required for wireless sensor network applications. 
ZigBee is a trademark like Wi-Fi and WiMAX and its stack, shown in 
figure 3.20, only defines some functionalities in layers on top of the IEEE 
802.15.4 standard. 
The IEEE 802.15.4 standard has been adopted by the ‘ZigBee Alliance’ for 
wireless personal area network technology. “The Alliance is an association 
of hundreds of members from around the world, working together to enable 
the reliable and cost-effective networking of wireless devices for monitoring 
and control, based on an open global standard” [Kin05].  
802.15.4 defines the physical and MAC layers, and ZigBee defines the 
network and application layers. Using the IEEE 802.15.4 specifications, 
allow the alliance to focus on the design issues. 
 
3.6.1 The network layer (NWK APL) 
ZigBee Alliance provides the network layer (NWK) and some applications, 
and differentiates between a usual node, a coordinator and a router. The 
only difference between the last two is based on the connection to some 
external network. 
The NWK and addresses three main items via ZigBee Device Objects 
(ZDOs): 
The role of discovery is, as the name suggests, to discover nodes and then 
they use unicast messages to inquire about the ZigBee coordinator’s or 
router address. This may also query about addresses of other associated 
devices. There is also a broadcast inquiry for the coordinator’s/router 
addresses. 
Must be noted that there is a distinction between the MAC and the network 
addresses, clearly IP but the field is left open for any proposal. 
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Figure 3.20- ZigBee stack architecture 
 
 
• Service discovery 
 
• Security 
 
• Binding 
 
The equivalent of the Address Resolution Protocol (ARP) is also supported 
in ZigBee by a similar mechanism: a broadcast with the network or the 
MAC address shall return the other missing one. 
ZigBee use profiles like Bluetooth but is more evolved. A profile defines the 
applications running on top of a device where it also specifies the members 
and the possible actions. So it is a set of device requirements, collaborating 
to fulfill a role. An example could be a thermometer, a blood pressure 
probe, and a console together forming a patient monitoring application 
[LAD07].  
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Figure 3.21- ZigBee extended architecture 
 
 
As profiles play an important roles in ZigBee, the discovery on the other 
hand allow the locating procedure for some services via their profile 
identifiers. 
The security services in ZDO have the role to authenticate and derive the 
necessary keys for data encryption. Thus ZigBee complements IEEE 
802.15-4 for security. 
The encryption key is used as in Bluetooth to authenticate and derive a 
shared secret, named ‘link key’. An initiator device and a responder have a 
pre-established trust. Three more steps follow this trust establishment: an 
exchange of test data, derivation of the link key and a confirmation. 
The master secret shared between devices could be sent before with an out-
of-band channel. It’s called a proximity authentication channel and is used 
in several similar protocols. 
Another ZDO’s component is the network manager, implemented in the 
coordinator and it allow the selection of  an existing PAN to interconnect. 
Furthermore it provides the creation of new PANs and implements also a 
routing algorithm between routers of different PANs that it has discovered. 
The binding manager is last component and has the role to bind nodes to 
resources and applications and to bind devices to channels in order to 
calculate the remaining available bandwidth a coordinator can grant on the 
link. 
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3.6.2 The application layer 
The application layer consists of the application support sub-layer (APS), 
the ZigBee device object, and the application-defined objects (see fig 3.21). 
The responsibilities of the APS sub-layer include maintaining tables for 
binding devices together and forwarding messages between devices.  
The ZDO can be thought as a special application object resident on all 
nodes. It has its own profile, referred to as the ZigBee device profile (ZDP) 
that can be accessed by user application and other ZigBee nodes. 
The ZDO is responsible for device management, security keys and policies, 
including, but not limited to, defining the role of the device within the 
network, initiating and responding to binding requests, and establishing a 
secure relationship between network nodes.  
The designer-defined application objects implement the actual applications 
according to the ZigBee-defined application descriptions. 
 
3.6.3 ZigBee Versions from 2004 to PRO 
In conclusion we can say that the main goal in developing ZigBee 
technology was to provide a standard for the operation of remote monitoring 
sensor devices and for this reason several features were added in the 
subsequent version of the ZigBee standard  
The ZigBee 1.0 specification was ratified in December 2004, and is referred 
to as ZigBee 2004. Most manufacturer developed their ZigBee 1.0 
compliant library during the 2005. In December 2006, the ZigBee 2006 
specification was released, which was followed in October 2007 by the 
ZigBee 2007 and at the end of the same year by PRO version specification. 
Each new release adds to and improves functionality provided in previous 
versions of the specification.  
The table below illustrates a high-level comparison showing the similarities 
and differences between the 2004, 2006, and 2007/PRO ZigBee versions. 
 
 
 2004 2006 2007 PRO 
Interference avoidance 
Coordinator selects best available RF 
channel/Network ID at startup time. 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
RF channel and/or Network ID can be changed 
during operation to address interference. 
  Yes Yes 
Automated/distributed address management 
Addresses automatically assigned using 
hierarchical, distributed scheme. 
Yes Yes Yes  
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Addresses automatically assigned using 
stochastic scheme 
   Yes 
Group addressing 
Devices can be assigned to groups, which can be 
addressed with a single frame; thereby reducing 
network traffic for packets destined for groups. 
 Yes Yes Yes 
Centralized data collection 
Low-overhead data collection by ZigBee 
coordinator supported 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Low-overhead data collection by other devices 
supported under special circumstances (e.g. with 
Tree Routing). 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Many-to-one routing allows the whole network 
to discover the aggregator in one pass. 
   Yes 
Source routing allows the aggregator to respond 
to all senders in an economical manner 
   Yes 
Security 
128-bit AES encryption with 32-bit Message 
Integrity Code (MIC) 
Yes* Yes Yes Yes 
Frame counters to assure message freshness Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Security applied at the NWK layer by default, 
and supported at higher layers. 
 Yes Yes Yes 
Key rotation prevents hacking of NWK key. 
 Yes Yes Yes 
Trust Center operates on the ZigBee Coordinator 
to manage trust on behalf of network devices 
and act as central authority on which devices can 
join the network. 
   Yes 
High Security mode supported, which is 
selectable by Trust Center policy, and requires 
Application Layer Link Keys, peer-entity 
authentication, and peer-to-peer establishment 
using Master Keys. 
   Yes 
Trust Center can run on Coordinator or any 
other device in the network. 
   Yes 
Network scalability 
Addressing algorithm supports networks with 
tens to hundreds of devices. 
Yes Yes Yes  
Addressing algorithm supports networks with 
hundreds to thousands of devices. 
   Yes 
Message size 
< 100 bytes, with exact size depending on 
services employed (e.g. security). 
Yes Yes   
Large messages, up to the buffer capacity of the 
sending and receiving devices (supported using 
Fragmentation and Reassembly 
  Yes Yes 
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Standardized commissionino 
Standardized start up procedure and attributes 
support the use of commissioning tools in a 
multi-vendor environment. 
 Yes Yes Yes 
Robust mesh networking 
Fault tolerant routing algorithms respond to 
changes in the network and in the RF 
environment. 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Every device keeps track of its 
“neighbourhood”; thereby improving reliability 
and robustness. 
   Yes 
Cluster Library support 
The ZigBee Cluster Library, as an adjunct to the 
stack, standardizes application behaviour across 
profiles and provides an invaluable resource for 
profile developers. 
 Yes Yes Yes 
* AES in version 2004 is optional and not activate by default 
Table 3. 5- ZigBee changes from 2004 to PRO version (source [Dai08]) 
 
 
About the backward compatibility  the first ZigBee 1.0 original 
specifications were abandoned and the compatibility is not assured as we 
can see from the below list, while is required a backward compatibility from 
the 2007/PRO versions toward the 2006 specifications: 
 
ZigBee 2007/PRO: 
• Backward compatibility with ZigBee 2006 required.  
• Backward compatibility with ZigBee 2004 not required.  
 
ZigBee 2006  
• Backward compatibility with ZigBee 2004 not required.  
 
ZigBee 2004  
• Original ZigBee version. 
 
3.6.4 Brief comparison with other protocols 
As previously noted ZigBee focuses on large scale monitoring applications 
in which nodes require a low data rate and very low power consumption.  
ZigBee protocol can be used to connect the ZigBee nodes to be integrated 
with the IP networks. This approach enables remote sensing and controlling 
on the Internet. 
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Technologies such as the well known Wi-Fi target devices running 
applications that require large amounts of data to be transferred, thus the 
Wi-Fi devices require large amounts of battery power.  
The Bluetooth technology is mainly a cable replacement among personal 
devices and it supports a lower bandwidth than Wi-Fi.  
Both Wi-Fi and Bluetooth support a network sizes reasonably limited, while 
ZigBee can support up to 65536 nodes in a single network.  
Furthermore ZigBee allows nodes to go in sleep mode, saving a 
considerable amount of energy. The bandwidth supported by ZigBee 
standard is much smaller than that of Wi-Fi and Bluetooth and for this 
reason it is only suitable for applications that require small amounts of data 
transmission.  
Accordingly with its network size capability, ZigBee is suitable for large 
scale applications such as industrial control.  
Wireless USB as the same target of Bluetooth and suffers from the same 
power problem similar to Wi-Fi with a small transmission range offered.  
In conclusion Wi-Fi, Bluetooth and Wireless USB are not suitable for the 
same application domains as ZigBee (large scale monitoring and controlling 
applications).  
On the other hand technologies such as Wibree, Z-Wave and EnOcean, 
made for similar market, suffer from the lack of standardization [Hos08]. 
The Wibree technology, developed by Nokia, is a low-powered extension to 
Bluetooth. The main advantage of this technology is that it can be 
implemented using existing Bluetooth devices. Although it has a higher data 
transmission rate than ZigBee, it has a very limited range, which makes it 
unattractive for large-scale networks. 
Z-Wave technology has been developed by a consortium, including Intel 
Corporation, to meet requirements similar to ZigBee, however, it is aimed 
exclusively at home automation and, furthermore, is not based on any 
recognized standard.  
ZWave, like ZigBee, can use a self-adaptive mesh topology to achieve 
wide-range and reliable networking. Unfortunately it does not use any 
coordinator to achieve this and its bandwidth is lower capability than 
ZigBee. This results in higher power consumption and an increased chance 
of data packets collision among nodes.  
Moreover a Z-Wave network is smaller than a ZigBee network which limits 
its potential applications and future expansion. 
EnOcean do not use batteries. Their wireless sensors are powered by 
‘energy harvesting’ such as temperature fluctuations, solar power, piezo-
electricity, vibrations or movement.  
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Table 3.6 – Comparison of different wireless technologies 
 
 
Like ZigBee, they form Hierarchical (tree) and mesh networks that can 
interface with IEEE 802.11x and ZigBee networks, however Unlike ZigBee 
and Z-Wave, it has been developed and patented by a single company 
limiting the market expansion.  
Table 2.6 illustrate a brief comparison of the discussed wireless 
technologies. 
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4  
WSN implementation aspects 
 
In this chapter are presented many nontrivial problems and at least one of 
their solutions. The main reason to describe this problems is due to the need 
to use these solutions while implementing our WSN system. 
 
 
4.1 Network formation and address assignment for a 
hierarchical (Tree) topology  
It is important to note that, although the address assignment procedure is 
driven by MAC layer, with the ZigBee library provided with our nodes it is 
possible to force an assignment by an upper layer, having, in some 
circumstances, a better control on the network itself. In our system this kind 
assignment, according to the idea to easy the visualization of the network, it 
is used by default and create the short address (as explained later in this 
paragraph) with the last two byte of the device MAC address. This method 
is very easy to implement but is not completely safe (i.e. two nodes may 
have the last two bytes of MAC address with the same value).Moreover,  
when we designed our WSN system, this behavior did not make possible to 
implement the node backup system (described in the next chapter and 
named ‘heartbeat’ system) so we decided to use the address assignment 
described in this paragraph. 
A wireless network is established by a join procedure, in our case a 
multi-hop network join procedure will be considered.  
When a node c needs  to join a network, a discovery procedure is started by 
the network layer. With support from the MAC layer scan procedure (see 
paragraph 3.3.1 and 3.5), it senses the adjacent routers, and when the upper 
layer has decided which network to join, the network layer selects a ‘parent’ 
node p from his neighborhood, and asks the MAC layer to start an 
association procedure.  
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If  the association request from the MAC layer is satisfied, p’s network layer 
assigns c to a 16-bit short address and lets the MAC layer reply positively to 
the association request.  
Node c will use the short address received for any further network 
communication. 
The network, through the parent-child relationships established between 
nodes, has a tree shape with the PAN coordinator as the root, the ZigBee 
routers as internal nodes and end-devices as leaves.  
The distributed algorithm for network address assignment is based on the 
tree structure of the network. 
The ZigBee PAN coordinator fixes the maximum number of routers (Rm) 
and end-devices (Dm) that each router may have as direct children and also 
decides the maximum depth of the tree (Lm).  
Thus to a newly joined router is assigned a range of consecutive addresses, 
16-bit integers, on the basis of its position (depth) in the tree.  
The first integer in the range is the router node address while the rest will be 
available for assignment to its children (both routers and end-devices). 
The size A(d) of the range of addresses assigned to a router node at depth 
d < Lm is defined by the following recurrence [BPC07]: 
 
If d = Lm -1 
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If 0≤d<Lm-1 
 
All nodes at depth Lm are assigned a single address as they are all end-node. 
The recursion is easily to be solved and it’s used by each router to assign 
addresses to its children.  
Assuming that a router at depth d receives the range of addresses [x,x + 
A(d)), It will have address x and it will assign range  
 
[x + (n - 1)A(d + 1) + 1,x +n + A(d + 1)]  
 
to its n-th router child (1 ≤ n ≤ Rm) and address  
 
x + RmA(d + 1) + m  
 
to its m-th end-device child (1 ≤ m ≤ Dm).  
 
73 
 
Figure 4.1 - Address allocations for Lm = 3, Dm = 2 and Rm = 2 
 
 
Figure 4.1 show an example network with a maximum Level Lm = 3 and Dm 
= 2, Rm = 2 respectively, where all addresses have been assigned to end-
devices (blue nodes) and routers (white nodes).  
The address appears inside each represented node, while the assigned 
address ranges are displayed in brackets next to each router. 
An alternative to this algorithm is proposed by [Sha08] and was used to 
develop our WSN system. 
In this case the parameters affecting the address allocation are the following: 
 Lm. The network maximum depth ( nwkMaxDepth ). 
 Cm. The maximum number of children a parent can accept ( 
nwkMaxChildren ). 
 Rm. The maximum number of routing-capable children a parent can accept 
( nwkMaxRouters ).   
 d The depth of a device in a network. 
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All the listed parameters are integer values and it will always be verified 
that Cm ≥ Rm. 
 
Figure 3.4b shows an example of the application of this algorithm where Lm 
= 3, Cm = Rm = 2.  
 
 
 
Figure 4.2 - Address allocations for Lm = 3, Cm = Rm = 2 
 
 
The address allocation starts with assigning the zero address ( addr = 0) to 
the WSN coordinator. To determine the address of the rest of the devices, a 
simple function ( Cskip ( d )) is introduced [PFL08]: 
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According to the parameters condition specified erlier Cskip(d) will always 
return an integer value. 
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In our example the value of Cskip(d) is calculated at each depth and the 
difference between the address of any two routing-capable devices is an 
integer multiple of the value of Cskip of their parent.  
In the example, in Figure 4.2, the device X address is a single increment of 
the WSN coordinator address ( addr = 1). The device Y address is the 
address of device X plus the value of Cskip of their parent (C skip = 7). 
Therefore, the address of device Y is equal to 8 ( addr = 8). The address of 
all the rest of the devices can be determined in the same way. 
If the calculated Cskip value becomes zero it means that the device cannot 
accept any children therefore they will be simple end-devices.  
In Figure 4.2, the Cskip value is equal to zero for all device s at level the 
depth level three.  
The address of an end device that is not capable of routing is calculated 
differently.  
Each end-device’s address is assigned using the following equation: 
The nth end device address=Parent address+Cskip(d)x Rm+n 
For example, in Figure 3.4b , the end devices connected to device Z will 
have the following addresses: 
First end device address =9+0·2+1=10 
Second end device address=9+0·2+2=11 
 
The Cskip(d) function can be very helpful when a device is expected to 
relay a message toward a destination on behalf of another device.  
The relaying device needs to know whether the destination device is a 
descendant of the relaying device. If, as example, the relaying device is at 
depth d and its address is equal to A, a destination device with a destination 
address of D is a descendant of the relaying device if the following 
relationship is true: 
A<D<A+Cskip(d-1) 
For example, in Figure 3.4b, device Y is at depth one and has an address of 
8 ( A = 8). Then device Y receives a message that needs to be relayed 
toward the destination address of 11. Device Y uses the following to realize 
that the destination address is one of its own descendants: 
8<11<8+7 
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Thus the destination is a descendant of a device, the next step is calculating 
the address of the next hop. If the destination is one of the device children, 
the address of the next hop will simply be equal to the destination address. If 
the destination is not a child but it is a descendant, the address of the next 
hop is calculated from the following equation: 
Address of the next hop= A +1+int ×

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The function int calculate the integer part of any floating-point number. 
In Figure 3.4b, when device Y needs to relay the message to destination 
address 11, the address of the next hop will be 9: 
Address of the next hop= 8 +1+int ×




 +−
3
1811
 3 = 9 
In a hierarchical topology, a device will relay a frame only if the frame was 
received along a valid path and this implies that one of the following 
conditions is satisfied [Sha08]: 
 
The frame is received from one of the device children and the source device 
is a descendant of that child. 
The frame is received from the device parent and the source device is not a 
descendant of the device. 
 
Also the star topology can use this address assignement algorithm if we 
consider it a special tree network form where the only parent in the network 
is the ZigBee PAN coordinator. In a star network, all children are end-
device at the depth of 1 and will communicate directly with the ZigBee 
coordinator.  
The devices in a star topology cannot communicate directly with any device 
other than the ZigBee coordinator.  
The address allocation method previously discussed is applicable to both 
ZigBee-2006 and ZigBee PRO 2007. 
 
4.1.1 Routing in ZigBee tree topology 
The network routing algorithm is strictly topology’s dependent. In a tree 
topology routing can only happen along the parent-child links established as 
a result of join operations (this is called ‘‘tree-based routing’’). 
The routers maintain only their own address and the address information 
about their children and parent. When the way addresses are assigned, a 
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router can easily determine whether the forwarded message destination 
belongs to a tree rooted at one of its children (router or end-device). In this 
case it routes the packet to the appropriate child; otherwise it routes the 
packet to its parent. 
This routing algorithm is very simple to implement, and allows routers to 
operate in a beacon-enabled network although is not necessarily the most 
energy-efficient.  
All ZigBee routers and coordinators send beacons to communicate via a 
slotted CSMA-CA protocol (as described in paragraph 2.4.1) and sleep in 
the inactive portion of their superframe (see par. 2.6).  
The trick, of course, is to have short active periods compared to the beacon 
interval and having the neighbouring routers start their superframe suitably 
respect to one another to avoid overlapping frames.  
Communication from a child to a parent happens only in the CAP (see par. 
2.4.1) of the parent while communication from a parent to a child is indirect. 
While a node drives communication with its children according to its 
superframe it has to synchronize with the parent’s beacon to exchange data 
with it. 
 
 
4.2 Routing algorithms for a mesh topology 
The mesh routing algorithms information was used to balance the routing 
table, used do decide the next destination of a message, that requires our few 
memory resource, with the network capabilities (i.e. number of discovered 
routes). Our WSN does not have many nodes and a table with twenty entry 
can cover the entire network, without exhausting the device resources. Of 
course, if we plan to add more nodes, depending from the new numbers, the 
decision may be different and a new compromise between table size and 
resource saving can be chosen (but is not our subject of study). 
In a mesh topology, unlike to the tree topology, there are no hierarchical 
relationships. Any device in a mesh topology is allowed to attempt to 
contact any other device. The message can be sent directly to the destination 
node or by taking advantage of routing-capable devices to relay the 
message. 
In mesh topology, the route from the source node  to the destination is 
created on demand and can be modified according to the environment 
changes. The capability of a mesh network to create and modify routes 
dynamically greatly increases the reliability of th
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If, for any reason, the source device cannot communicate with the 
destination device, by using a previously established route, the routing-
capable devices in the network cooperate to find an alternative path.  
Ad hoc networks use commonly two routing algorithms as a basis for the 
development of a mesh network. 
Those routing algorithms are named respectively dynamic source routing 
and on-demand distant vector.  
The mesh network topology is more complex and beaconing is not allowed 
but, as noted before, is more fault tolerant and resilient.  
Routers maintain a routing table (RT) and perform a route discovery 
algorithm to construct or update these data entry structures on all the path 
nodes.  
The routing table entry is described in Table 4.1.  
 
 
Field Name  Description 
Destination Address 16-bit network address of the destination 
Next-hop Address  16-bit network address of next hop towards 
destination 
Entry Status  One of Active, Discovery or Inactive 
Table 4.1 – RT’s record structure 
 
 
In figure 4.3 is depicted a simplified version of the routing algorithm used to 
send a packet.  
As can be noted, when a direct routing is not possible, the routing table is 
consulted for the next hop to the destination.  
If no entry addresses the given destination, the node attempts to start the 
route discovery procedure and in case there aren’t sufficient resources 
available it falls back to the tree-based routing. 
 
4.2.1 Dynamic source routing 
Dynamic source routing is one of several protocols being analyzed by the 
IETF for use thanks to ad hoc wireless networks.  
This routing protocol is based upon the concept of source routing and it was 
implemented to enable each node to be mobile. 
A source routing represents an Internet Protocol (IP) option that, when 
enabled, allows the originator of a packet to specify the complete path it will 
take to its destination as well as the path responses take when the destination 
responds to the originator [Hel05].  
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Source routing is defined in the RFC791 standard and is mainly used for 
diagnostic testing of a specific route or when the default route connection is 
not optimal. 
Dynamic source routing is very similar to IP source routing. A route request 
is used under dynamic source routing to determine the path from the source 
to the destination.  
The destination issues a route reply, providing the reverse path. The route 
between source and destination does not need to be a perfect reversed image 
of the path between destination and source, although some protocols require 
bidirectional connections.  
The IEEE 802.11 standard is one of such protocols and enables a destination 
node on a wireless LAN using dynamic source routing to reverse the route 
to itself to determine the route to the source node. Each node, in a dynamic 
source routing environment, examines every packet it receives. This 
operating method is referred to as promiscuous mode.  
The node by examining the addresses in each packet learns where other 
devices are located. Due to this, nodes do not need to transmit periodic 
routing advertisements, such as Routing Information Protocol (RIP) 
transmissions used to inform other nodes of the state of the network. 
 
4.2.2 On-demand distant vector 
The second ad hoc routing algorithm is the On-demand Distance Vector 
(ODV) algorithm. Each router, under this routing algorithm, informs its 
neighbors about its network view in a subnets’ form of directly connected to 
the device itself.  
The neighbors uses this information to compute their distances to all other 
subnets.  
The on-demand distance vector algorithm uses periodic messages to track 
the state of the link between two nodes. 
 
4.2.3 Zigbee Route discovery 
The Route discovery algorithm in ZigBee is based on the well-known Ad-
hoc On Demand Distance Vector routing algorithm(AODV) briefly 
descripted in the previos paragraph.  
Route discovery is a process required to establish routing table entries in the 
nodes along the path between two nodes wishing to communicate. 
It selects the path through which the messages will be relayed to their 
destination’s device.  
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The WSN coordinator and all routers are responsible for discovering and 
maintaining the routes in a network. An end device cannot perform route 
discovery. 
The length ( L ) of a path is defined as the number of devices in the path. As 
an example, Figure 3.5 shows two paths with the lengths of five ( L = 5) and 
seven (L = 7). The connection between two consecutive devices is called a 
link . The links are numbered l1 to l4 in Figure 3.5. 
 
 
 
Figure 4.3 – Path cost analysis 
 
 
Parameters such as link’s quality, number of hops can be used to decide on 
the optimal path. 
To simplify the whole process each link is associated with a link cost . The 
probability of successful packet delivery on each link will determine the link 
cost. Thus a lower probability of successful packet delivery will have a 
higher link cost. The link cost is shown as C { [Di ,Di+1] } in Figure 3.5 . 
There are various ways to determine link cost. The ZigBee standard uses the 
following equation [Azz08]: 
C{l} The lesser of 7 and round 
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C{l} is the cost of link l. The probability of successful packet delivery in 
link l is shown by Pl. The round function rounds the number to the nearest 
integer value. The cost is always an integer between 0 and 7. For example, if 
Pl is 80%, the cost of the link will be the integer 2: 
C{l} The lesser of 7 and round 
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The probability of successful packet delivery  (Pl) can be estimated using 
various methods, and the ZigBee standard allows the implementers to select 
any method they find most suitable for their application.  
However, the initial estimate for the probability of successful packet 
delivery must be based on average LQI.  
The LQI is recorded for each received packet, indicating the signal energy. 
Usually the chance of successful reception of a packet increases as the LQI 
is increased.  
A method to calculate the link cost is to use a lookup table to map different 
levels of LQI directly to the link cost levels of 0 to 7.  
This table is usually created according to the average results of several 
experiments. 
To compare different paths, each path has its own path cost. The total path 
cost (C{P}) is simply the summation of all the costs of the links that form 
the path: 
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Field Name  Size  Description  
Destination 
address  
2 bytes The route will lead to this destination 
address 
Status 3 bits The route status can be one of the 
following: ACTIVE, 
DISCOVERY_UNDERWAY, 
DISCOVERY_FAILD, INACTIVE, 
VALIDATION_UNDERWAY 
Many-to-one 1 bit If the destination has issued a many-to-
one route request,this field is set to one 
Route record 
required 
1 bit If this flag is set, the route taken by the 
packet will be recorded and delivered to 
the destination device 
Group ID flag 1 bit This flag is set if the destination address 
is a group ID 
Next-hop address 2 bytes This is the 16-bit network address of the 
next hop in this 
route 
Table 4.2 - Routing Table (RT) 
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The route with the lowest path cost will have the best chance rate of 
successfully deliver packets. 
The WSN coordinator and routers create and maintain routing tables (see 
Table 4.2 ). 
The routing table is used to determine the next hop when routing a message 
to a particular destination. The status field determines the status of a route. 
The routing table capacity property means that the device is capable of 
using its routing table to establish a route to a specific destination address. 
 
 
Field Name  Size  Description  
RREQID 1 byte Unique ID (sequence number) given to 
every RREQ message being broadcasted 
Source Address 2 bytes Network address (16-bit) of the initiator of 
the route request 
Sender Address 2 bytes This is the 16-bit network address of the 
sender device. The sender device is the 
device that has sent the route request on 
behalf of the source device to the current 
device. This address will be used to send 
the route reply command back to the source 
device. If the same route request is received 
from multiple senders, the address of the 
sender with the lowest overall path cost 
will be kept here. 
Forward Cost 1 byte The accumulated path cost from the RREQ 
originator to the current device. This field 
is updated when the route request 
command is being sent toward the 
destination devic 
Residual Cost 1 byte The accumulated path cost from the current 
device to the RREQ destination This field 
is updated when the route reply command 
is being sent back to the source device 
Expiration time 2 bytes The content of the route discovery table 
expires after a certain period. The initial 
value of this field is equal to 
nwkcRouteDiscoveryTime . 
Table 4.3 - Content of the Route Discovery Table (RDT) 
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Another table related to routing, which is used during the discovery of new 
routes is the route discovery table. Table 4.3 illustrates the discovery entry 
contents structure. 
The route discovery table contains the path costs, the address of the device 
that requested the route (called source device), and the address of the last 
device that relayed the request to the current device. The latter will be used 
to send the result of the route discovery back to the route request originator 
(source device). 
 
 
 
Figure 4.4 - Routing protocol flow diagram 
 
 
All routers and the coordinator maintain a Route Discovery Table (RDT) to 
implement route discovery. 
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The content of the route discovery table, in contrast with the routing table, is 
temporary and expires after nwkcRouteDiscoveryTime milliseconds. 
In a ZigBee network a node also maintains a neighbor table , which contains 
information about the devices in its transmission range ( Table 4.4 ). This 
table is updated every time the device receives a packet from one of its 
neighbors. This table is useful when the node needs to find a nearby router 
or rejoin the network. 
The device also uses the neighbor table when it seeks a new parent. Table 
4.4 includes all required fields and some of the most important optional 
fields.  
 
 
Field Name Description 
Extended address 64-bit IEEE 802.15.4 address 
Network address 16-bit network address 
Device type ZigBee coordinator, router, or end device 
RxOnWhenIdle If the device keeps its receiver ON during idle mode, 
this field is set to TRUE 
Relationship This field determines the relationship of the neighbor 
to the device as parent, child, sibling, previous child, 
or none of the above 
Transmit failure A high value in this field indicates that many of the 
previous transmission attempts resulted in failure 
LQI The estimated link quality 
Incoming beacon 
timestamp 
The time that the last beacon was received (optional 
field) 
Potential parent This field determines whether this neighbor is a 
potential parent (optional field) 
Table 4.4 - The Neighbor Table 
 
 
4.2.4 Route discovery 
The Application (APL) layer can use the NLME-ROUTE-DISCOVERY 
primitive to request that the Network (NWK) layer discover routes for 
unicast, multicast, or many-to-one communication.  
If the discovery request contains the address of an individual node as the 
destination address, the NWK layer will perform a unicast route discovery. 
An unicast route always starts from a single originator address and ends at a 
single destination address. Conversely a multicast route discovery will be 
initiated if the destination address is a 16-bit group ID of a multicast group.  
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If the APL layer does not provide a destination address, the NWK layer will 
consider that the APL layer has requested a many-to-one route discovery. 
The many-to-one routes will promote the device that requested the route 
discovery as the sink device. 
Only the WSN coordinator and routers are capable of perform a route 
discovery request. Moreover, the ZigBee standard does not allow a 
broadcasting's route discovery. Thus if the APL layer issues the NLME-
ROUTE-DISCOVERY request primitive to the NWK layer with the 
destination address equal to the broadcast address (0xffff), the primitive will 
be treated as an invalid request and discard it. 
When a node needs a route to an un-localized destination, it broadcasts a 
route request (RREQ) message that propagates through the entire network 
until it reaches the destination. 
 
 
 
Figure 4.5 - The RREQ message processing algorithm 
 
 
As it travels in the network, a RREQ message accumulates, in the Forward 
Cost field, a value that is the sum of the costs of all the links it traversed.  
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The cost of a link can be dynamically calculated based on a link quality 
estimation provided by the IEEE 802.15.4 interface or simply set to a 
constant value.  
In figure 4.5 is depicted the RREQ message processing flow diagram while 
in algorithm 4.1 is shown the pseudo code for the function implementation. 
 
// S is the source node; D is the destination node 
// RT = Routing Table 
S wants to communicate with D  
if RT of S contains a route to D 
  S establishes communication with D 
else 
  S creates a RREQ packet and broadcasts it to its neighbors 
  // RREQ contains the destination Address(DestAddr), 
  // Sequence Number (Seq) and Broadcast ID (BID) 
 
  for all nodes N receiving RREQ 
    if (RREQ was previously processed) 
      discard duplicate RREQ 
    end if 
    if (N is D) 
      send back a RREP packet to the node sending the RREQ 
    else if (N has a route to D with SeqId >= RREQ.Seq) 
      send back a RREP packet 
    else 
      record the node from which RREQ was received 
        broadcast RREQ 
    end if 
  end for 
 
  while (node N receives RREP) and (N != S) 
    forward RREP on the reverse path 
    store information about the node sending RREP in the RT 
  end while  
 
  S receives RREP 
  S updates its RT based on the node sending the RREP 
  S establishes communication with D 
end if 
Algorithm  4.1 - AODV Routing Protocol 
 
Each RREQ message carries a RREQ ID which the source node increments 
by 1 every time it sends a new RREQ message thus the RREQ ID together 
with the source address together can be used as a unique reference for a 
route discovery process. 
The RREQ reception event starts up a search within the RDT for an entry 
matching the route discovery. If no match is found, a new RDT entry is 
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created for the discovery process and a route request timer is started and it 
will be removed upon the expiration event occur.  
 
 
 
Fase 1 
 
Fase 2 
 
 
Fase 3 
Figure 4.6 - Unicast Route Discovery with Device A  
as the Source and Device F as the Destination 
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Otherwise if an entry is found in the RDT, the node compares the path cost 
for the corresponding value in the RDT entry and the RREQ message. If the 
former is higher it drops the RREQ message, otherwise it updates the RDT 
entry.  
If the node, finally, is not the route discovery destination, it allocates an RT 
entry for the destination, with Discovery status, and rebroadcasts the RREQ 
after updating its path forward cost field.  
If the node, instead, is the final destination, it replies to the originator with a 
route reply (RREP) message that travels back along the path.  
In figure 4.5 is depicted the block diagram illustrating the explained RREQ 
processing [Bou08]. 
Figure 4.6 shows an example of unicast route discovery. In this scenario, 
device A intends to find a route to device F. Device A starts the route 
discovery by broadcasting a route request command. The route request 
command frame (see paragraph 3.5.1 for the command frame structure) 
contains the route request identifier, the destination address, and a path-cost 
field as previously explained.  
The broadcast command is received by all the devices that are in device A 
radio range and are listening to the same channel. In Figure 4.6 , device B 
and device C receive the route request command.  
Device A will wait for passive acknowledgment, and if the broadcast was 
not successful device A will retry the broadcast for nwkcInitialRREQRetries 
times after the initial broadcast. These retries are separated by 
nwkcRREQRetryInterval milliseconds. 
If a ZigBee end device has received the route request command it will 
simply ignore this command because it does not have routing capability.  
Figure 4.6 shows only the routing capable devices located between device A 
and device F, either ZigBee coordinators or ZigBee routers. Device B is a 
ZigBee router, and if device B has routing capacity, meaning a non-full 
routing table, it will perform all the operation required such as adding the 
path cost from device A to device B to the path-cost field of the routing 
request command and broadcasts the route request command.  
The consecutive broadcasting is repeated until the route request command is 
received by the intended destination (node F).  
Device F will use the total accumulated path cost of each received route 
request command to select the optimum path from device A to device F. 
Device F will choose either device D or device E as its next hop for 
transmitting the route reply command (RREP) back to device A.  
The RREP message is addressed to the route discovery source and has a 
residual cost value field that each node increments as it forwards the 
message.  
89 
When a node receipt a route reply message, it retrieves the RDT and RT 
entries for the associated route discovery. The RREQ originator node upon 
the receipt of the RREP sets the RT entry, if this is the first it received, to 
Active and records the residual cost and next hop in the RDT entry.  
 
 
 
Figure 4.7 - The RREP message processing algorithm 
 
 
In all other cases it compares the residual cost from the RDT entry with the 
one from the RREP. If the former value is higher the node discards the 
RREP message; otherwise it updates the RDT entry (residual cost) and the 
RT entry (next hop).  
A node that is not the RREP source, after the update/discard operation, must 
also forward the RREP towards the originator.  
As to be underlined that intermediate nodes never change the RT entry 
status to Active as a result of receiving a RREP message. 
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They will only change the entry status upon reception and routing of a data 
message for the given destination. 
 
 
4.2.5 Route maintenance and repair 
Meanwhile a discovered route is used to relay the messages, there can be 
incidents in which the route itself is not capable of relaying a message 
anymore to the destination. 
The reason can be inside the network (e.g. a router has been removed or 
turned off) or from the surrounding environment (e.g. an object or a signal is 
blocking the wireless connection between two nodes).  
Considering the great effort required to create or repair a route, it is not 
recommended to start a repair procedure as soon as a route fails. Instead, it 
is better to keep a counter for the number of times that an outgoing frame 
has failed due to a link failure. 
A route repair procedure will start when this counter exceeds the 
nwkcRepairThreshold value.  
If it’s possible (it depend on the node capabilities) is a good choice to record 
the time that the link has failed. This will help distinguish between 
permanent and temporary link failures.  
The developer will decide on the best method to start the route repair based 
on the scenario. 
If the route error occurred in a many-to-one topology, the device that has 
found the link failure will send a route error command message to a random 
neighbor.  
All neighbors are expected to have a routing table to the sink (destination) 
device. The neighbor will then forward the route error command frame to 
the sink device. 
 
 
 
Figure 4.8 - Route Repair in a Mesh Network 
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In Figure 4.8 is depicted an example of mesh network route repair 
procedure. The link between node A and node B has failed and a route 
repair is requested.  
The procedure for route repair is similar to route discovery except that 
device A, instead of the original source device, will start the route 
discovery. Device A will use its own address as the source device when 
broadcasting a route request command frame to find the new route to the 
destination device.  
Route repair and route discovery use the same route request command thus 
to distinguish a route repair from a route discovery a single bit subfield  
must be set (to one) for route repair request command (the frame is shown 
in figure 3.13). 
In Figure 4.8  a new route has been established between the originator and 
the destination address.  
The new route may share, along the way, some of the devices with the 
original route.  
If device A cannot establish a new route to the destination (it failed to 
repair) it unicasts a route error command back to the originator.  
The source device in this case will start a new route discovery to establish 
routes to the destination address. 
 
 
4.3 The NWK layer management service 
The NWK layer was modified by the author to implement the fault tolerance 
such as the heartbeat system described in the next chapter and to improve 
the security of the system in consideration of the several flaws found in the 
ZigBee stack. 
The NWK layer main responsibilities, as briefly described in paragraph 
3.6.1, are network formation, joining and leaving a network, route discovery 
and maintenance.  
The NWK layer routing and route discovery were discussed earlier in the 
previous paragraph. The rest of NWK layer capabilities are reviewed in this 
paragraph and its subsections. 
 
4.3.1 Network discovery 
The network discovery procedure is used to discover all the networks 
currently operating in the device environment. The device discovery request 
is sent  to the NWK layer by the APL layer.  
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The NWK layer uses the MAC layer channel scanning to discover the 
existence of other networks.  
The active scan is the preferred scan method if the device is capable of 
performing an active scan. Otherwise, the device will perform a passive 
scan. 
The network discovery procedure delivers the list of discovered networks, 
and their PAN identifiers, the currently used channels, and the version of the 
ZigBee protocol used to the APL layer. 
Information includes also the value of beacon order, super-frame order of 
the networks, and their ZigBee stack profile identifiers. 
The network discovery procedure will verify if there is at least one router in 
any discovered network that currently allows joining. 
 
4.3.2 Network formation 
Upon the receipt of any request from the APL layer the NWK layer can 
establish the device as the ZigBee coordinator.  
The device must be an FFD (see par. 3.3.1) to act as a ZigBee coordinator. 
The first step of network formation is performing an ED scan. The ED scan 
is an energy level detector for each channel and is performed using the PHY 
energy detection service (refer to paragraph 2.4 for more information). This 
ED scan is optional for RFDs. This scan is followed by an active scan on a 
selected number of channels using the MAC services.  
The scan request is issued by the Network Layer Management Entity 
(NLME) to the MAC Layer Management Entity (MLME) see fig. 3.21 for 
more information about the ZigBee Architecture.  
Based on the scan results, the NWK layer choose a frequency channel and a 
unique PAN identifier. The first channel with the lowest number of existing 
networks is considered a proper frequency channel to be used in the new 
network.  
The NWK layer of the ZigBee PAN coordinator assign 0x0000 as its MAC 
short address, which is the same as the network address and then it will is 
configure the super frame using the MAC services. 
 
4.3.3 Establishing the device as a ZigBee router 
As described before a router is responsible for routing data frames, route 
discovery, and route repair. The router can establish its super frame and 
accept the requests from other devices to join the network. The request to 
establish the device as a router is performed by APL layer sending to the 
NWK layer a NLME-START-ROUTER.request
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Considering that a router can form its super frame, this primitive includes all 
the super frame parameters such as Beacon Order, Super frame Order , and 
BatteryLifeExtention (BLE). The NWK layer requests the MAC layer to 
create or update the super frame configurations 
 
4.3.4 Joining and leaving a network 
If the MAC attribute macAssociationPermit , in any device, is set to TRUE, 
the device will accept association requests.  
The NWK layer of a ZigBee coordinator or router can allow other devices to 
join its network via a MLME request to set the value of 
macAssociationPermit to TRUE for a limited (and fixed ) period of time.  
This period is known as ‘permit duration’ . 
The APL layer can invoke  the NLME-JOIN.request primitive to request the 
NWK layer to join the device to a network as either as a router or an end 
device.  
The MAC layer of the child delivers the list of discovered networks to the 
NWK layer. The child then picks a suitable parent. A parent is considered 
suitable if it allows association and the link cost between the parent and the 
child is a value less than 3 (see Cost formulae in par. 4.2.3).  
If there is more than one suitable parent then will be selected the parent in 
the lowest depth from the ZigBee coordinator.  
Selected the parent, the NWK layer of the child initiates the association 
procedure using the MLME-ASSOCIATE.request primitive. 
When the parent device receives the association request, it will determine 
whether the device is already in the parent network as a child by looking up 
its neighbor table. If this node is not found in the neighbor table, the child 
will receive a unique network address.  
Each parent has only a fixed number of addresses available to allocate to its 
children. If the request to join is granted, the parent will update its neighbor 
table adding the new device as its own child. 
The NWK rejoin request command will be used, instead, if the device was 
previously associated with this parent. A child can always rejoin its parent 
even if the parent currently does not accept any new child. 
An alternative way to join a network is the direct join. The direct join is 
used when the parent is already preconfigured with the 64-bit addresses of 
its children. In this case, the child does not attempt to find a suitable parent, 
because its parent is already selected for it [IEE06].  
The parent will initiate the join procedure by searching its neighbor table to 
identify whether the 64-bit address of the child is already listed in the table. 
If a match exists in the neighbor table, no further action is required from the 
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parent. If the address is not found in the neighbor table and the table itself is 
not full, then the parent will create an entry in the table. 
In the direct join the parent does not contact the child therefore the child is 
responsible to start an orphan procedure to complete the child/parent 
relationship. 
Removing a child from the network can be initiated indifferently by the 
child itself or its parent. The MAC layer disassociation function is used to 
remove a device from the network. When a node leaves a network, all its 
children can be removed from the network as well.  
These removed children can join new parents in the network or join another 
network, depending on the implemented application and scenario. 
If the node that plans to remove itself from the network is the PAN 
coordinator or a router, the NWK layer leave command frame is broadcast 
to the entire network by selecting the address of 0xffff as destination. 
The reason for broadcasting the leave command is to let all the devices that 
count on this specific router or coordinator know that they need to update 
their routes or find new parents if necessary.  
 
 
 
Figure 4.9 - Network Layer Reset Sequence 
 
 
Conversely a ZigBee end device send the leave command only to its parent. 
In both cases, the APL layer invoke NLME-LEAVE.request primitive to 
request the NWK layer initiate the removal procedure.  
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When the parent decides to remove a child, it unicasts the leave-request 
command to the child. After the child is successfully removed the parent 
updates its neighbor table accordingly.  
The address of the removed child can be reused only if the APL layer allows 
the address reuse in the NLME-LEAVE.request primitive sent to the NWK 
layer for the removal of this child. If the removed child is a router, the child 
will broadcast a leave command by selecting the destination address equal 
to 0xffff. 
 
4.3.5 Resetting the NWK layer 
The NWK layer can perform reset operation (Figure 4.9 ) upon request of 
the its higher layer. The NWK layer first resets the MAC layer and after 
receiving the MAC reset confirmation, the NWK layer clears all Network  
 
 
 
Figure 4.10 - Synchronization in (a) A Non beacon-enabled Network  
and (b) A Beacon-enabled Network 
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Layer Information Base (NIB) attributes, routing tables, and route discovery 
tables to their default values. The reset request is given by the APL layer in 
the form of NLME-RESET.request. The NWK layer will confirm the result 
of the reset operation by the NLME-RESET.confirm function to the APL 
layer. A device usually performs the NWK layer reset after the initial power 
up, before a new join attempt and after leaving a network. 
 
4.3.6 Synchronization 
A WSN node can use a synchronization procedure to synchronize or extract 
pending data from a ZigBee coordinator or router. There are two 
synchronization scenarios: beacon enabled and non-beacon enabled.  
Figure 4.10 illustrates  the sequence diagram for both cases. 
When the value of macAutoRequest is set to TRUE the MAC generate and 
send a data request command automatically.  
The APL layer uses the NLME-SYNC.request to ask the NWK layer to 
initiate the synchronization and data request process. The result of 
synchronization is delivered to the APL layer by NLME-SYNC.confirm. 
 
 
 
Figure 4.11 - General Network Frame Format 
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4.3.7 The NWK layer frame formats 
The general NWK frame is illustrated in Figure 4.11. It starts with the frame 
control field. The frame type determines if this is a NWK data frame or a 
NWK command frame.  
Since the ZigBee standard evolves a ZigBee protocol version is used in each 
device and is stored in nwkcProtocolVersion. The value of 
nwkcProtocolVersion is always copied into the protocol version subfield of 
a NWK frame. 
The route discover subfield determines the routing option for this single 
frame. If the discover route subfield is set to suppress or enable and a route 
is already established to the destination, the frame will be sent to the next 
hop. However if there is no route established to the destination device and 
the discover route is set to suppress, the device will not start a new route 
discovery. In this case the frame will be discarded or buffered until the route 
becomes available. If the discover route subfield is set to enable, a route 
discovery will be initiated if there is no route to the destination.  
Finally, if the route discovery value is set to force route discovery, a route 
discovery will be initiated for this frame transmission, even if there is a 
existing route established to the destination.  
In ZigBee-Pro, the force route discovery option is removed from the 
discover route sub-field. 
 
 
 
Figure 4.12 - The NWK Layer (a) Data Frame Format and  
(b) Command Frame Format 
 
 
The multicast flag subfield decides whether the frame will be sent using 
multicast (must be set to one). The security subfield is set to one if the 
NWK layer security is enabled. The source route subfield in the frame 
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control is set to one if the source route sub frame field is included in the 
frame. Source routing is a technique in which the sender of a packet specify 
the route that a packet should take through the network. The source route 
subframe contains the list of 16-bit short addresses of the devices that will 
be used to relay the message. The relay index is set to zero at the originator 
device and is incremented every time the frame is relayed. The relay count 
represents the number of times the frame is relayed.  
The NWK layer can include the 64-bit IEEE address in the NWK layer 
frames if the IEEE address subfields are set to one. The 16-bit network 
address of both the source and destination are always included in the frame. 
The radius value  will determine the maximum number of hops of the frame. 
If the radius parameter is not provided, the radius field is set to twice the 
value of the nwkMaxDepth attribute. 
The sequence number allows to keep track of the sequences transmitted by a 
node and its value is incremented every time a new frame is transmitted. 
The multicast control field exists only if the frame is multicast. The 
multicast mode value determines whether the frame is being sent by the 
device in member or non member mode (respectively multicast mode set to 
01 or to 00). The non member radius subfield limits to a fixed number of 
times a multicast frame which is rebroadcast by nonmember nodes. 
 
 
Command Frame 
Identifier  
Command 
00000001 Route request 
00000002 Route reply 
00000003 Route error (network status) 
00000004 Leave 
00000005 Route record 
00000006 Rejoin request 
00000007 Rejoin response 
00000008 Link status (ZigBee-Pro) 
00000009 Network report (ZigBee-Pro) 
0000000A Network update (ZigBee-Pro) 
Table 4.5 - NWK Commands 
 
 
The nonmember radius value is decremented every time the frame is 
rebroadcast by a non-member device and when it becomes zero, the frame is 
no longer rebroadcast by nonmember devices.  
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However, if the content of the non-member radius is set to 0x07, there is no 
limit on the number of times that the frame can be broadcasted by non-
member nodes. Every time a member broadcasts the frame, it will copy the 
content of the max non-member subfield into the non-member radius 
subfield. 
 
 
 
Figure 4.13 - NWK Layer Commands Formats 
 
 
The data and command frame formats are illustrated in Figure 4.12 .  
The routing field is the combination of the fields between the frame control 
and the NWK payload in Figure 4.11 and the NWK commands are listed in 
Table 4.5.  
100 
Each command is identified by an 8-bit integer value known as the NWK 
command identifier, together with the command payload will form the 
NWK frame payload. 
The NWK commands are briefly reviewed here. The formats of the NWK 
layer command payloads in ZigBee 2006 are illustrated in Figure 4.13 .  
The first command is the route request command, which is used in the route 
discovery and route repair procedures described previously (par 4.2).  
This route request is part of a multicast route discovery whether the 
multicast subfield value is set to one. 
The route repair subfield is set to one to identify this request command as a 
route repair instead of a route discovery. 
The reason for distinguishing route repair from route discovery is that the 
route discovery is always initiated by the originator device. The route repair, 
conversely, is initiated by the router device that has tried to relay the 
message of the source device but has found a link failure while attempting 
to send the frame to the next node.  
The route request identifier is an 8-bit sequence number used to identify 
each route request issued by a source node and its value is incremented by 
one by the source device increments every time it performs a new route 
request.  
During the route discovery process, the routers that broadcast the route 
request of the source node keep the route request identifier unchanged.  
The target of the route discovery is to find a route to the destination address 
provided. For more information about route discovery see paragraph 3.3.4 
In the new ZigBee-Pro, there is one more field positioned after the path-cost 
field in the route request command: the destination IEEE address. 
Moreover, in ZigBee-Pro in the command options filed the bits 3 and 4 are 
used for many-to-one route requests. Whether the route requests is not a 
many-to-one route  request the value of bits 2–3 is equal to 0.  
Conversely if the value is equal to 1, the route request is many-to-one and 
the sender supports a route record table. Finally, if the value of bits 2–3 is 2, 
the route request is many-to-one but sender does not support a route record 
table. 
Another NWK command is the route reply command, which is sent by the 
destination device to the originator node in response to a route request 
command. The command option field is very similar to the command option 
field of the route request command and the route request identifier is the 
same as the route request command frame. Thus when the originator 
receives back the route reply command from the target device, the source 
device will know this route reply command is in response to one of the 
source device route requests it sent.  
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The source address field contains the short address (16-bit) of the device 
that originated the request. The responder address field contains the NWK 
address written in the route request command destination address. The 
originator always tries to establish a route to the destination node. In 
ZigBee-Pro, there are two additional fields after the path-cost field: 
originator IEEE address and responder IEEE address. 
The route error command is used to alert the source device about an error in 
relaying the frame toward a destination address. The error code written in 
the error code field can be used to determine which is the cause of the error. 
Possible reasons for routing errors are link failure, lack of routing capacity, 
and low battery level. Finally, the relaying node is incapable of acting as a 
router, because of its battery energy critically low.  
In the new ZigBee-Pro, this command is renamed to Network Status 
Command and it contains all the error codes present in route error command 
plus several additional codes to report incidents like PAN identifier update. 
A node will transmit the leave command either when the node itself wants 
to leave the network or if the node is requesting another node to leave the 
network. If the device itself is leaving the network, the request field of the 
leave command is set to zero, it is set to one, instead, to indicate that the 
sender of this command is asking the target to leave the network.  
The node may leave its parent but can rejoin another device in the network, 
in this case, the rejoin subfield of the leave command is set to one.  
At the latter, if the node that leaves the network is a parent and the remove 
children subfield of the command is set to one to force all the children of 
this parent to be removed from the network when their parent leaves. 
The route record command is sent to record the address of all the devices 
that relay this command frame to the target node via an established route, 
and the count value will be incremented by one for each time the frame is 
relayed. The short address of all the nodes that relayed the message is kept 
in the relay list.  
When a node other than the target node receives this record command, it 
will add its short address to the relay list and then will send it to the next 
hop provided by the routing table. 
If a node loses its connection to the network, it can use the rejoin request 
command to rejoin the network through a node other than its original parent.  
The device provides the list of its capabilities within the rejoin request 
command. This is similar to the capabilities list provided in a MAC layer 
association request (Figure 3.13).  
The node that receives the rejoin request will reply with a rejoin reply 
command. If the new parent device has the capacity to accept a new child, 
the short address field in the rejoin reply command will provide the new 
short address assigned to the child.  
102 
The NWK layer in ZigBee-Pro 2007 has three additional commands not 
available in ZigBee-2006.  
The first one is the Link Status Command. Each node acting as a router can 
use the link status command to provide its link-cost to other neighboring 
routers. The second command is the Network Report, which is used to report 
events such as PAN ID conflict and channel condition to a designated 
device in the nwkManagerAddr.  
The last command added is the Network Update Command used by a 
designated node (identified by the nwkManagerAddr attribute) to broadcast 
configuration changes. The format of these commands is provided in the 
ZigBee specification [Zig08] 
 
 
4.4 The APL layer 
The application layer (APL) is the highest layer in a ZigBee wireless 
network. Most of the works for the design and implementation of our WSN 
system is done on this layer. Also the compression functions are 
implemented at this level since the inclusion on NWK layer, together with 
the encryption algorithm, as lead to the application instability (probably due 
to the time taken from both functions) 
 
 
 
Figure 4.14 - The APL Layer ( APS Sublayer, ZDO, and the Application Framework) 
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The ZigBee APL layer consists of three sections, illustrated in Figure 4.14: 
the application support sub layer (APS), the ZigBee Device Objects (ZDO) 
and the application framework. 
The APS provides an interface between the network  and the application 
layer. The APS sub layer supports both data and management types of 
services. The APS Data Entity (APSDE) offers the data services and is 
accessed through the APSDE Service Access Point (APSDE-SAP).  
The management capabilities are provided by APS Management Entity 
(APSME) accessible through the APSME-SAP. 
The APS sub layer constants and attributes start all respectively with the 
suffix apsc and aps. The APS attributes are contained in the APS 
Information Base (APS IB or AIB). The list of APS constants and attributes 
is provided in the ZigBee specification [Zig08]. 
In the ZigBee stack, the application framework is the environment in which 
application objects are hosted to control and manage the protocol layers. 
Application objects are usually developed by manufacturers to fit various 
kind of applications.  
There can be a maximum of 240 application objects into  a single device 
and they use APSDE-SAP to send and receive data between peer application 
objects (fig. 4.14). Each application object has its own unique endpoint 
address (endpoint 1 to endpoint 240). The endpoint zero is used to access 
the ZDO area.  
To broadcast a message to all objects the endpoint address must be set to 
255. Multiple devices can allow to share the same radio via endpoint 
addressing. For example if we have a light control application, where 
multiple lights are connected and share a single radio, in this case each light 
has a unique endpoint address and can be turned on and off independently. 
The ZDO provides an interface between the APS sub layer and the 
application framework. The ZDO contains all the functionalities that are 
common to all applications operating on a ZigBee protocol stack.  
It is, for example, a duty of the ZDO to configure the device in one of three 
possible logical types of coordinator, router or end-device.  
The ZDO uses primitives to accomplish its duties and accesses the APS sub 
layer Management Entity via APSME-SAP, while the framework accesses 
the ZDO via the ZDO public interface. 
The details of the three APL subsections are reviewed in the following 
paragraphs. 
 
4.4.1 The application framework 
The ZigBee architecture offers the option to use application profiles, also 
referred to as ZigBee profiles, in developing an application which allows 
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further interoperability between the products developed by different 
vendors.  
For example, in a light control environment, if two manufacturers use the 
same application profile to develop their products, the switches from one 
vendor will be able to turn on and turn off the lights manufactured by the 
second one.  
Each profile is identified by a 16-bit integer value known as a profile 
identifier . Only the ZigBee alliance group can issue profile identifiers, a 
manufacturer whom has developed a profile can request a new identifier 
from the ZigBee alliance.  
The application profiles are named after their corresponding application use, 
for instance, the home automation profile provides a common platform for 
manufacturers developing products for home automation. 
The structure of an ZigBee application profile is depicted in Figure 4.15. 
The application profile is built by two main components: clusters and device 
descriptions. A cluster is a set of grouped attributes. Each cluster is 
identified by a unique 16-bit value named cluster identifier . Each attribute 
in a cluster is also identified by a unique 16-bit integer known as a attribute 
identifier. These attributes are used to store data or status values such as in a 
temperature control application, a device that acts as the temperature sensor 
can store the value of the current temperature in an attribute, then another 
device that acts as the heater controller can receive the value of this attribute 
and, accordingly, turn on or turn off the heater.  
The application profile does not contain the cluster itself, instead, the 
application profile has a list of the cluster identifiers. Each cluster identifier 
uniquely points to the cluster itself. 
 
 
 
Figure 4.15 -  The application profile 
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The second part of an application profile is the device descriptions ( Figure 
4.15 ). The descriptions supply information regarding the device itself such 
as the supported frequency bands of operation, the logical type of the device 
(PAN coordinator, router or end device), and the remaining battery energy  
Again a 16-bit number identify each device description.  
The application profile uses the descriptor data structure where, instead of 
including the data in the profile, a 16-bit number is kept and provides a 
pointer to the data location (called data descriptor).  
The device descriptions consist of five fields: node descriptor, node power 
descriptor, simple descriptor, complex descriptor and user descriptor. The 
node descriptor provides information such as the node logical type and the 
manufacturer code. The node power descriptor determines whether the 
device is battery powered and stores the current battery level.  
The profile identifier and clusters are provided in the simple descriptor, 
while  the complex descriptor is an optional part containing information like 
the serial number and the device model name, any additional device 
information can be included as the user descriptor. 
The user descriptor can be up to 16 ASCII characters. For example, in a 
light control application, the user descriptor field of a wall switch installed 
in a room can read “bedroom switch” . 
 
 
 
Figure 4.16 -  Node descriptor fields 
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The node descriptor fields for ZigBee-2006 are shown in Figure 4.16. The 
node descriptor is a mandatory part of the device descriptions:  
 
• The logical type can be coordinator, router or end-device.  
• The complex descriptor and user descriptor are optional and if their 
corresponding fields in the node descriptor are set to zero, they are 
not given as part of the device descriptions.  
• The APS flag field determines the APS capabilities.  
• frequency band (868 MHz, 915 MHz, or 2.4 GHz) is specified in the 
frequency band field.  
• The MAC capacity flags field is the same as the MAC capacity field 
presented before in Figure 3.14. A manufacturer can request and 
receive a manufacturer code from the ZigBee alliance. This code is 
included in the node descriptor. 
• The maximum size of the APS Sublayer Data Unit (ASDU), in 
octets, is specified in the maximum buffer size field. The maximum 
size of a single message that can be transferred to or from a node is 
provided in the maximum transfer size field (in octets). In ZigBee-
Pro, the maximum incoming transfer size and maximum outgoing 
transfer size are two separate fields (16 bits each). 
• The server mask field supplies information regarding the server 
capabilities of this node. A server is a node that provides specific 
services to other devices in the network. If each bit is set to one, the 
device has the corresponding capability depicted in Figure 4.16 
o The trust center is the node trusted within a network to 
distribute security keys for the purpose of network and end-
to-end application configuration management. The security 
features are reviewed further in this chapter. 
o The primary binding table cache is a node that allows other 
devices to store their binding tables with it as long as it has 
storage space left. The primary binding table cache can be 
used to back up the content of binding tables and restore 
them whenever necessary. 
o A ZigBee network may have a primary discovery cache node 
such as a coordinator or router used to store information  
such as node descriptors and power descriptors of some other 
devices which, for example, sleeps for long time. 
 
If a network contains sleeping devices, the network must have at least one 
primary discovery cache node. The node power descriptor fields are shown 
in Figure 4.17. The receiver can stay in ON mode while the node is in idle 
but this is not a power aware solution.  
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Alternatively, the node can turn on the receiver periodically. 
The last option is to turn on the receiver using an external trigger event upon 
an incoming message. As described in fig. 4.17 the node may have multiple 
power sources and for each power source available the corresponding bit in 
the available power sources field is set to one.  
 
 
 
Figure 4.17 - Node power descriptor fields 
 
 
For instance, if the node has both main power and rechargeable battery, the 
available power sources field will read 0011.  
 
 
Field Name  Length (Bits) 
Endpoint 8 
Application profile identifier 16 
Application device identifier 16 
Application device version 4 
Reserved 4 
Application input cluster count 8 
Application input cluster list 16 · i  (i =input cluster count) 
Application output cluster count 8 
Application output cluster list 16 · o (o = output cluster count) 
Table 4.6 -  Simple descriptor 
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Table 4.6 shows the list of simple descriptor fields. The endpoint field 
contains the endpoint address of a node. The application profile identifier 
that is supported by this endpoint is in the application profile identifier field.  
The device description supported by this device is specified by a 16-bit 
number supplied in the application device identifier field. The device 
description may change over time, and the application device version field 
determines which version of the device description is supported by this 
node. All the cluster identifiers supported by the device are included in the 
simple descriptor. 
Figure 4.18 show how the cluster identifiers (clusterIDs) are used in binding 
relationships. Binding is the task of creating logical links between 
applications that are related. Devices logically related in a binding table are 
called bound devices .  
In fig 4.18 two switches share the same radio and they also share the IEEE 
address and network address. The switches are distinguished only by their 
different endpoint addresses.  
Each switch can have its own application object and each application object 
can be accessed independently through its corresponding endpoint address. 
These two switches control three separate lights which are also connected to 
a single radio and each light has a unique endpoint address. 
 
 
 
Figure 4.18 - The binding relationships 
 
 
A cluster can be an input cluster or an output cluster therefore, in the 
binding process, two devices are matched if both devices have the exact 
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same clusterIDs but one is an input cluster and the other one is an output 
cluster. 
The wall switch at endpoint 1 and the lamp at endpoint 1 have the exact 
same clusterIDs and so they are considered bound devices. The wall switch 
at endpoint 2 is bounded to both lamps at endpoint 2 and endpoint 3. The 
information regarding these logical links is stored in a binding table. 
The bind itself can be created by the installer. For instance, the installer can 
push two physical buttons: one on the wall switch and one on the light itself 
to create the bind between these two devices. This would create an entry in 
the binding table corresponding to these two devices.  
More specifically, pushing the button on the wall switch initiates the 
transmission of the end device bind request command 
(End_Device_Bind_req ) to the PAN coordinator.  
This command is part of the device profile discussed in the next paragraph. 
The PAN  coordinator, upon receiving this command, waits for a period of 
time to receive the end device bind request command from the light.  
If this bind request arrives before the timeout period, the PAN  coordinator 
matches these two devices based on their profile identifier and the list of 
their input/output clusters.  
This is called simple binding mechanism. In simple binding, user 
intervention is used to identify the device pairs. 
 
4.4.2 The ZigBee device objects 
Figure 4.19 illustrates the ZigBee Device Objects (ZDO) space as an 
interface between the APS sub layer and the application framework.  
The ZDO has the tasks of initializing the APS, NWK, and Security Service 
Provider (SSP). As for the application profiles defined in the application 
framework, there is a profile defined for the ZDO which is known as the 
ZigBee Device Profile (ZDP) or simply the device profile.  
The ZDP contains device descriptions and clusters, but the device profile 
clusters do not use attributes. 
The ZDO has configuration attributes, but these are not included in the 
device profile. Another difference between the device profile and any 
application profile is that the application profile is created for a specific 
application, the device profile, instead, defines capabilities supported by all 
ZigBee devices.  
The device profile includes only one device description while the clusters 
are divided into a mandatory group and an optional group. The mandatory 
clusters must be implemented in any ZigBee device and the device profile 
furnish support for device and service discovery besides binding 
management.  
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Figure 4.19 - The ZDO Acts as an Interface Between  
the Application Framework and the APS Sublayer 
 
 
 
In service discovery, the ability to determine the identity of other devices on 
the PAN, the device requests that another device in the network supplies 
detailed information like its profile identifier or its ZigBee descriptors. The 
device can also ask the list of input and output clusters of another device 
and this cluster list provided can be used to match devices in the binding 
procedure. 
 
 
 
Figure 4.20 - The ZigBee Device Profile Command Format 
 
 
The device profile can be configured to be a client, a server or both.  
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A client is a node that asks a service such as device discovery or binding 
while  the node that responds to the request and providing the service acts as 
a server.  
Thus the services offered by the device profile are divided into client 
services and server services. Both  these services are provided in the form of 
commands with unique cluster identifiers (clusterIDs), for instance, the 
clusterID of 0x0002 in the device profile is equivalent to the 
Node_Desc_req (node descriptor request) command, which is used to 
request the device descriptor of another node.  
In message exchange between the client and the server, the client is referred 
to as the local device and the server is known as the remote device. 
The ZDP commands are sent using the APS data service which has a format 
shown in Figure 4.20.  
The first part is an 8-bit transaction value, thus means that any application 
object maintains a counter and increments it every time a new transaction is 
sent. The content of this counter is put into the transaction sequence number 
field of the ZDP command. The transaction data contains the command 
itself and all data associated with the command.  
The complete list of ZDP commands and brief descriptions of the 
commands are provided in Appendix C. 
The commands are divided in client services and server services commands 
group. In each group, the ZDP commands, are divided in three sub 
categories: device and service discovery, network management and bind 
management. The commands in these categories form three distinct objects 
in the ZDO: the device and service discovery object, the network manager 
object and the binding manager object. 
The service discovery commands allow a device to ask information such as 
NWK address and list of descriptors of any other node in the network.  
They also allow a device to store its own descriptors in a primary discovery 
cache device or configure the user descriptor of another device in the 
network.  
The bind management commands allow a node to create or remove binding 
relationships, store binding tables on a primary binding table node, create 
backup binding tables, and recover previously stored backup binding tables. 
The network management commands, instead, are used to identify nearby 
networks and manage joining and leaving nodes in the network. 
The ZDO contains two more objects: the network manager and the security 
manager. 
The network manager contains the networking-related functions to interface 
with NLME (like NLME-JOIN.request ). The security manager object 
contains security-related primitives to interface with the APS sublayer 
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Management Entity (APSME). Both these objects are discussed later in this 
chapter. 
The configuration attributes contained in ZDO start with Config _ and they 
are not related to the ZigBee Device Profile but contain information such as 
node descriptor and the network security level. 
The complete list of the ZDO attributes is provided in the ZigBee 
specification document [Zig08]. 
 
4.4.3 The APS sublayer 
The APS sub layer supplies data services to both application objects and 
ZigBee Device Objects through the APS sub layer Data Entity (APSDE). 
The APSDE receives the data that needs to be sent in the form of a Protocol 
Data Unit (PDU) from either ZDO or an application object.  
The APSDE adds headers to the PDU to create an APS data frame, which 
will be passed to the NWK layer.  
The APS sub layer Management Entity (APSME) contains primitives to 
perform bind management, APS Information Base (AIB) management and 
group management tasks.  
The binding functions (APSME-BIND.request and APSME-
UNBIND.request ) enable the higher layer to request to bind two devices by 
creating an entry in the binding table or to unbind two devices by removing 
the corresponding entry from the binding table.  
The APSME-GET.request and APSME-SET.request primitives allow the 
next higher layer to read and write attributes in the APS Information Base. 
The group management primitives are used to add or remove endpoints of 
the node in a group table. 
Besides unicast, broadcast and multicast delivering message methods a 
fourth option is available by the APS sub layer and is known as indirect 
addressing. In the indirect addressing a node with limited resources that is 
bound with other nodes in a network can communicate without knowing the 
address of the desired destination.  
Indirect transmissions are sent to the PAN coordinator by the source device 
and the coordinator itself looks up the source address, endpoint address, and 
clusterID from its binding table and retransmits the message to each 
corresponding destination address/endpoint. 
Figure 4.21 is the APS frame format in ZigBee-2004/2006. In ZigBee Pro, 
there is an optional field called  Extended Header.  
There are a total of three different types of APS frame: data, command, and 
acknowledgment.  
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Figure 4.21 - General APS frame format 
 
 
The frame type subfield in figure 4.21 determines, as the name suggests, the 
type of the frame.  
The delivery mode value indicates the transmission options. If the delivery 
mode is the indirect addressing, the indirect address mode subfield specifies 
which address field (source or destination) must be omitted from the frame 
and if is set to one means that the frame is intended for the ZigBee 
coordinator (destination endpoint must be omitted). If this field, instead, is 
set to zero, this frame is being sent from the ZigBee coordinator to the 
destination (source endpoint must be omitted). 
The Security Service Provider (SSP) set the security subfield value. If the 
acknowledgment request attribute is set to one, the destination of the frame 
must send an acknowledgment back to the originator. 
If a group address is selected, the message will be sent to all endpoints that 
are members of the group. The destination endpoint field and the group 
address field cannot be present together in one frame. 
The cluster identifier field is only present in a binding operation and 
contains the cluster identifier that will be used in the binding procedure. 
The APS counter is an 8-bit counter added to every APS frame and 
incremented by one each time a new frame is transmitted. This counter 
helps to identify and to ignore the duplicate frames. 
Figure 4.22 illustrates the APS frame types. The data frame has the same 
format as a general APS frame.  
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Figure 4.22 - APS layer: (a) data frame, (b) command frame and 
 (c) acknowledgment frame formats 
 
 
4.5 Security 
The Security in the ZigBee standard is one of the aspect that were improved 
by each new set of specification. This is a clear sign of how important is 
considered this aspect and how much it is currently considered 
unsatisfactory. In fact many security flaws were found in all version of 
ZigBee and was an important part of our application work (e.g. in the 
paragraph 5.6 is presented a way to steal the AES key from the nodes). 
ZigBee-Pro supports additional security features that are not available in 
ZigBee-2006 nor in ZigBee 1.0. 
In ZigBee-2006, there are nine APS security commands while in ZigBee-
Pro in addition to the commands supported in ZigBee-2006, there are five 
more commands.  
One of these additional commands, the Tunnel command, allows a device to 
send a command to a device that does not have the current network key. The 
other additional commands are used for entity authentication, which allows 
two nodes to authenticate each other.  
These two nodes must share a common security key. Each device creates a 
16-octet random string called random challenge and sends this challenge to 
the other device. 
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Entity authentication is not supported in ZigBee 1.0 and -2006. In version 
1.0 there is only tone level of security, in ZigBee-2006, instead, the trust 
center can operate in commercial mode or residential mode. Commercial 
mode has  a higher security level than residential mode. For instance, in 
commercial mode, the trust center must maintain a list of nodes, master 
keys, link keys, and network keys while in residential mode, only the 
network key must be saved.  
ZigBee-Pro uses the same concept but renames the commercial and 
residential modes of operation to high security and standard security modes 
respectively. In ZigBee 1.0 every device must share the same base key, In 
ZigBee-2006, the trust center is assumed to be located on the ZigBee 
coordinator. The trust center in ZigBee-Pro can be positioned on any device. 
Among all the research issues, security is an essential requirement in WSN 
environments. 
Compared to wired networks, WSNs are more vulnerable to security attacks 
due to the lack of a trusted centralized authority, lack of trust relationships 
between mobile nodes, easy eavesdropping because of shared wireless 
medium, dynamic network topology, low bandwidth, and battery and 
memory constraints of mobile devices.  
The security issue of WSNs in group communications is even more 
challenging because of the involvement of multiple senders and multiple 
receivers.  
Although several types of security attacks have been studied in the WSNs 
literature, earlier research is focused on unicast (point-to-point) applications. 
The impacts of security attacks on multicast in WSNs have not been 
explored yet [CeC09]. 
For a complete classification of security attacks (and attackers) see the 
Appendix A 
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5  
Design and implementation of a WSN 
 
5.1 Selection of the developer kits 
Nowadays many Developer kits are available worldwide and their number 
will probably increase in the future.  
When the my research project started more then 25 companies were 
proposing their own kits. The WSN Developer kit choice was made 
evaluating many features, including, but not limited to: 
 
• microcontroller characteristics (memory, computing power, number 
and capacity of A/D lines, bus type) 
• Overall Power consumption and battery type 
• On-board sensors 
• Bus expansion capacity (type and number of bus) 
• Developer software and licence 
• Development assistance 
• Kit’s price and single node’s price 
 
Some manufacturers had more than just one single kit or kind of node to 
cover a wider range of application development needs. 
In Appendix B are compared the best fitting solution from any 
manufacturer, considering the type, the number of node and software 
included, just to simplify the reading, because of the complete Synoptic 
table includes over 70 kits. 
The final choice was made considering, as required features, the node 
capacity to work in different environments and the possibility to connect 
different kind of sensors through different type of bus, rather than the node 
size itself.  
The chosen nodes, although their relatively small size (Size 60 x 63 x 24 
mm), have both USB and serial connection, several expansion bus such as 
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I2C, SMBus, SPI, UART e USART easily usable via a standard JTAG 
compatible connector. They use two, the easy-to-find, AA batteries and may 
be also connected to a power supply (included in the kit).  
Although they did not have any unique feature respect others nodes they 
were a right balanced between board size, bus expandability and energy 
features. 
Another very important kit’s feature was the software included and the 
licence type. Open source software or free of charge integrated development 
kit were preferred to proprietary solutions as well as the support from the 
manufacturer developer team support was considered one of the most 
appreciate feature. 
The support was tested in advance via e-mails where were asked many 
technical information about the nodes’ architecture and performance and the 
software solution provided within the kit. The quality of the answer, as well 
as the time elapsed since the initial request was sent, was taken in high 
consideration for the estimation of the technical support. 
Occasionally some interesting kit were found to be only an “advertising”. 
For example an all inclusive software kit  with 5 nodes without sensors at 
the amazing low price of 199,00 dollars, never appeared in stock to any 
vendor official worldwide distributor.  
Is it to be underlined that all prices quoted in this work must be considered 
as indicative, subject to changes and referred to the  specific period (the first 
project month) in which  the WSN kit had to be chosen. 
These kind of events may be typical for every quick tech market that didn’t 
yet find its own identity and target.  
After a careful comparison between the kits we have finally chosen the 
Meshnetics ZigBit Development Kit described in the next paragraph. As 
noted before, this doesn’t mean that the kit chosen is the definitive solution 
but just as good as a starting point at beginning of our research project.  
 
 
5.2 Meshnetics starter kit 
The Meshnetics ZigBit Development Kit is a simple solution designed for 
WSN development.  
It provides development boards based on the ZigBit module and eZeeNet 
Software to test the wireless network features and develop customized 
wireless solutions. 
ZigBit Development Kit includes: 
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• MeshBean2 board (3 pieces) with ZigBit module and (PCB, SMC 
and dual-chip) antenna 
• AC/DC power adapter (3 pieces) with USA and European 
connectors 
• USB cable (3 pieces) 
• RS-232 cable (2 pieces) 
• Software & Documentation CD (1 piece). 
 
 
 
Figure  5.1 - The Development Kit delivery set 
 
 
The ZigBit module with the eZeeNet Software provides the MeshBean2 
board’s wireless connectivity and makes it function as a node in a ZigBee 
network. 
The MeshBean2 board is a full function device (see chapter 3.3..1 for more 
information about ZigBee device) and can be configured to operate as a 
network coordinator, a router or an end-device. 
A manual configuration is allowed by the on board DIP-switches and/or 
sending AT commands. 
The node’s role is defined by the embedded developed applications. 
The boards are delivered with a firmware containing an Hardware Test 
software and a Serial Boot loader. The boot loader allows the serial 
connection to be used to write the new developed software into the node 
without the need to buy a microcontroller programmer.  
The programmer is still needed if something happens to the boot loader or if 
something special, like the software and cryptographic key protection is 
implemented.  
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The boot loader corruption seems to happen on battery replacement, the 
reason may be an electric peak. Although it’s a very rare event, nothing can 
be done without the Atmel programmer’s board. 
 
5.2.1 Hardware general specification 
MeshBean 2 basic parameters are presented in Table 5.1b, the boards, as 
well as all the ones shown above, are provided with the following features: 
 
• Size 60 x 63 x 24 mm  
• Over-Voltage Protection 
• Reverse Polarity Protection 
• 3 programmable color status LEDs 
• external power supply status LED 
• Switches 3 DIP switches 
• 2 programmable buttons 
• 1 reset button 
• Operating Temperature Range: -40°C to 85°C. Minor degradation of 
clock stability may occur beyond the -20°C to +70°C range 
 
The board uses light sensor TSL2550T from TAOS (see [10]) and 
temperature sensor LM73CIMK (see [11]) from National Semiconductors. 
Both sensors are connected in parallel to the I2C bus.  
An USB to RS-232 bridge controller CP2102 from Silicon Labs is installed 
on the board and provides seamless USB interface (see [12]).  
As a result the USB port is visible as generic COM port with a particular 
number. The driver set for Windows and other operating systems can be 
easily downloaded from the manufacturer’s website (silabs) 
 
5.2.2  MeshBean2’s expansion connectors 
The MeshBean2 board contains several interfaces on the Expansion 
Connector. 
The board includes the following interfaces: 
 
• USB 2.0 port 
•  RS-232 interface 
•  Buffered I2C interface with ESD protection and voltage level 
translation 
• Symmetrical dipole PCB antenna  
• JTAG connector for software download and debugging 
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• Power connector (3 V) 
• 20-pin expansion connector to access specific interfaces 
• Battery compartment for AA-size batteries 
• 3 clamps for power consumption measurements 
 
 
 
Figure  5.2 - MeshBean2 with PCB on-board antenna 
 
 
Also, the board contains an internal voltage regulator to supply most of the 
components with 3.6 V. This is needed if ZigBit’s MCU is to be run at 8 
MHz. 
 
5.2.3 eZeeNet functional diagram 
The software included in the kit is called eZeeNet and is a 
IEEE802.15.4/ZigBee library stack that runs on ZigBit modules.  
It is specifically tailored for easy-to-use networking in sensing, control, 
monitoring and data acquisition applications and it claims to provide easy to 
use networking, with a routing mechanism that optimizes network traffic 
and reduces power consumption. 
 
 
122 
 
Figure  5.3– MeshBean2 node 
 
 
eZeeNet Software offers a API for network and smart power management, 
including data exchange, network formation/node join, PAN ID 
management, channel selection, TX power control and many others 
features. It comes with the Framework layer which eases application 
development and simplifies integration and offers opportunity to develop 
user’s own applications based on the eZeeNet API. 
In the ZigBit Development Kit, using the API makes it possible to program 
the target devices for a variety of WSN application scenarios.  
For example, an end-device can be configured to communicate with a router 
between the periods of sleep thus saving power. 
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Figure  5.4 - eZeeNet Block Diagram 
 
 
The SerialNet feature is claimed to enable the user to develop customized 
WSN applications sending AT Commands without programming the 
modules directly or writing any embedded software. Although this is, 
indeed, a little too optimistic, the AT commands can really help sending 
configuration’s parameters to the running nodes without the need to 
reprogramming the boards and, maybe, restart the nodes or the entire 
network. 
The structure of eZeeNet Software is presented in Figure 5.4. 
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5.2.4 EZeeNet API 
In Figure 4.4 is shown the eZeeNet Stack architecture.  
Through the Framework interface several function are managed such as 
user’s Hardware Abstraction Layer (HAL) and the user‘s application 
initialization, user’s loop is call, system time, EEPROM and eZeeNet 
parameters. 
The stack interface provides the network management and data 
transmission’s control.  
Data can be transmitted using logical or network addressing. As advantage, 
logical address of a node is not fixed. Logical addressing is preferable when 
the address of each node is known in advance, or the addresses can be preset 
during the commissioning procedure. As disadvantage, address conflicting 
may happen and should be solved manually or by dedicated software 
running on coordinator node. 
NWK addresses are allocated and changed dynamically. NWK addressing 
scheme is only recommended for initial network addressing setup, when 
application receives data from some unknown node, or when several nodes 
in the network have to use the same logical address. This would be the way 
to solve address. NWK addressing can be also used in wireless network 
where data is collected at a sink and no data should be transmitted back. In 
that case logical addressing is not required, because NWK address is known 
for coordinator and it equals to zero. 
The HAL interface provided in source code can be modified to implement 
user-defined drivers and to manage specific peripherals. The particularly 
configured HAL API, the MeshBean2 board interface provides reading the 
DIP-switches and button control status and LED manipulation.  
The interface of eZeeNet is C-callable but mixing C code  and user’s C++ 
code is not guaranteed and must be avoided. 
User’s application should follow the register conventions for C-callable 
functions and the developed applications should avoid to modify the 
peripheral registers directly. eZeeNet HAL drivers are also C-callable, but 
some functions can be called only from Interrupt Service Routines (ISRs). 
Some functions can be defined as callback handlers. They are used to 
indicate the completion of some process such as data transmission or they 
serve as event handlers. 
eZeeNet does not call user’s functions directly from ISRs, so the defined 
callback functions do not need to save/restore the previous context. There 
are many exceptions due to the performance reasons. 
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5.2.5 State after reset 
The software is allowed to check the reason of the node’s reset. As specified 
in the ATmega1281 datasheet [Atm06], all pins are tri-stated after any kind 
of reset. But, when the SerialNet (the Serial boot loader) runs, it configures 
some pins during the start-up phase accordingly to the configuration values 
stored in the EEPROM. See table B.3 (appendix B) for more information.  
As can be imagined, the application must be aware of the reset state and 
reconfigure the MCU accordingly. 
 
5.3 Development of application code 
Before starting the design work we must be aware of the software 
limitations. This second generation WSN device does not own much 
resources and the ZigBee stack library occupy most of the available space 
The software size problem looks like a knapsack problem (combinatorial 
optimization problem where a set of items must be included in a collection 
so that the total weight is less than a given limit), where we have to balance 
the features we add regarding the memory  space(and computing). 
In our case the most important features will be, in order of their importance: 
 
 The sensor measurements. The application, of course, to be useful 
must gather data even regardless the node problems (e.g. node 
unuble to join the network) 
 System disappearence and non interfearence with the people 
living/working in the enviroment. The lack of study in inhabited 
enviroment is usually due to the confort issues generated by a 
monitorig system. 
 The battery lifetime so that the system can be unuttended for long 
periods (this also help to achieve the previous point) 
 The flexibility (sensor must be changed/swapped/detached without). 
This help to increase the usability of the system without a n IT staff 
intervention 
 Security (it may also help to increase the inhabitants’ perceived 
comfort) 
 System performance. The better are the performance the greater are 
the number of application field for the WSN system 
 
Must be noted that security is not in a higher position due to the lack of 
security of the previously used systems (e.g. the iButton sensors our 
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research centre used in many of our study does not allow any kind of 
security to be activated). 
 
 
5.3.1 General Software Specification and user code limitations 
Software resource usage is summarized in Table 5.1.  
 
 
 
Table 5.1 – Available application’s resource 
 
 
These numbers are valid for the following network configuration:  
 
• Maximum child number: 5 
• Maximum network depth: 5 
• Maximum PAN descriptor numbers (for network discovery): 5. 
 
The multitasking model used in the eZeeNet software imposes some 
limitations on the user’s code: 
• eZeeNet functions must not be called directly from ISRs, Instead, 
buffer the data and post the TinyOS task by TOSH_post() function. 
• data processing in the ISR should be avoided. 
• disable interrupts for a short time (no more than several tens of 
microseconds) to provide normal operation of the ZigBee stack and 
hardware interfaces like UART. 
• C-library functions calling or floating-point manipulations in the 
ISRs must be avoided. 
• The user’s code limitations shown in table 4.6, it’s strongly 
recommended to follow this size restriction as violation would make 
stack corrupted. 
• stack size must be kept as low as possible. 
• All kind of dynamic allocation of the memory by 
malloc()/calloc()/free() functions must be avoided in the working 
phase of the software due to the unpredictable processing time and 
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possible garbage collection problems (if the order of the allocation 
and freeing is not proper). Usually, allocation should be done at the 
initialization phase. 
• The posting of multiple tasks should be avoided. Instead, the code 
can be organized in form of infinite loop and check your status 
variables in the beginning of the loop (it is a MCU typical way o 
programming). 
• The code/data size must be checked before running the application. 
To determine the size of an application image file correctly can be 
used the avr-size utility which comes with AVR Tools [Wed06]. If a 
part of the code is located higher than 0xFC00 address (which seems 
the address of boot-loader itself) , then it will not be downloadable 
with Serial Boot loader. In this case the code  must be loaded via 
JTAG only, disabling UART booting by proper fuse bits. 
• Although user’s application may use standard C-library, most 
functions of this library are not guaranteed to be re-entrant. In 
particular, several functions store local state which are known to be 
non-reentrant. An example of non-reentrant functions are those that 
manipulate IO registers, like the EEPROM access routines. Using 
these functions within interrupt context will result in an 
unpredictable behaviour. 
 
 
5.3.2 TinyOS Functions 
TinyOS is an open-source operating system and can be considered, as 
reported in [Mes06], “a component-based runtime environment designed to 
provide support for deeply embedded systems which require concurrency 
intensive operations while constrained by minimal hardware resources”.  
eZeeNet API Software uses a small subset of TinyOS functions, the ones  
that can be called by a user application are shown in the Table 5.2a-b. They 
include: TinyOS task management, critical section implementation, and 
global interrupt management. 
User’s applications as noted in [Mes06] should not call any other functions 
of TinyOS. 
The programming language of TinyOS is C-like that uses a custom compiler 
'NesC', but TinyOS functions are C-callable.  
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Table 5.2a -  The callable TinyOS functions 
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Table 5.2b -  The callable TinyOS functions 
 
 
5.3.3 Framework Interfaces 
In table 5.3 there is a summary of the main Framework functions and their 
controlling functionalities.  
 
 
Function. Description 
fw_setUserLoop Set user’s loop 
fw_getSystemTime Get system time 
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fw_userEntry Initialize user’s application 
fw_warmReset Warm reset 
fw_setParam Set eZeeNet parameter  
fw_getParam Get eZeeNet parameter 
fw_eepromWrite Direct write to EEPROM  
fw_eepromRead EEPROM direct reading  
fw_registerSleep Register user’s handlers for power 
management 
fw_forceToSleep Force the node to sleep  
fw_appReadyToSleep Ready-to-sleep indication 
fw_forceWakeup Force the node to wake up 
Table 5.3 -  Framework functions 
 
 
These functions supply: 
 
• entry point for user HAL and application initialization 
• periodical call  for user’s loops 
• system time management 
• eZeeNet parameters management 
• EEPROM management 
• periodical calibration of the internal RC oscillator. 
 
The interfaces are declared in the “framework.h” file. 
 
 
5.4 Development of the application 
First of all must be said that our application system must achieve to some 
basic task before implementing an higher level logic. 
For instance each node at startup must read and/or accept its configuration 
and perform a check on its sensors. When the initialization part is completed 
the device must search a network to join, it must decide its role and try to 
join the network. If the network join fails according to its logic and the error 
received the node will try to switch its role, look up for another network or 
just set an error status.  
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When this basic task were achieved then the node may start with the high 
level logic which basically regulate the measurements gathering rate, the 
power energy consumption (e.g. via sleep mode) and security (apply 
encryption) 
While operating the devices may also receive, and answer to, unexpected 
(but not unforeseen) events such as a leave command (due to a parent forced 
disconnection for example due to the depleted battery energy) or the 
impossibility to communicate any more with its WSN. 
Before describing anything, I should say the developed applications must be 
considered the main goal that this research was intended to: build an 
efficient system to gather data on real research scenarios.  
As briefly described in the introduction of this thesis the system project was 
born from a specific need met in a previous research where was built a 
remote control system for surgical rooms [Gad06] and with an eye to the 
future researches which the writer himself will be probably personally 
involved. 
The applications developed are of two different typologies: the first one was 
developed to monitor a house air conditioning plant. The system in this case 
have, as its main objective, to prove the efficiency and performance 
declared by the manufacturer of this system and to prove how it can solve 
many problems such as mould formation because of the walls moisture. 
 
 
 
Figure  5.5 –Our application’s taxonomy 
 
 
This system must be, of course, as non-invasive as possible within an 
inhabited area and, moreover, it needs to be flexible enough to be moved 
often and the sensor should be placed in locations such as air conditioning 
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pipes, or bookshelf. Finally the system should disappear from the house 
inhabitants’ sight otherwise it may cause discomfort (for example people 
may feel observed). 
Under such conditions a wireless system is the best choice and the ZigBee 
wireless sensor network were specifically built for these application field 
scenarios. 
The complete taxonomy’s classification for the developed WSN application 
is illustrated in Figure 5.5. 
We can also say that the data flow expected is periodic and non-intensive, 
because the required values relate on environmental parameter such as 
temperature, Relative Humidity (RH) and CO2 that don’t change at an high 
speed rate. For example when each node send its measurements every 
minute is usually sufficient for most kind of analysis.  
 
 
 
Figure  5.6 –System’s architecture 
 
 
The application is built to suite different application field so that frequently 
source code addition and restyling will be avoided. The measurement’s 
sample frequency is set by default at one every 5 seconds and can easily be 
changed via a client command.  
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The complete system’s structure is depicted in Figure 5.6. As can be seen 
this system requires not only the WSN performing the environmental 
measurements to be fully operational but also a system which will gather all 
the data and store it to a database for further analysis. 
To Gatherer pc send data immediately to the server using multiple threads, 
allowing the research to access the values with a very small latency. The  
latency value is usually less than a second, and without internet line 
problems is always under the 5 seconds of the default sampling rate thus we 
can assert the system is working in real time for our purposes. 
In this chapter we will focus only on WSN application while in the next 
chapter will be provided the description for the rest of the system as well as 
the results of the researches. 
 
 
 
Figure  5.7 –WSN  architecture 
 
 
In Figure 5.7 is depicted the WSN architecture used. The network shape 
chosen is the tree due to the beacons which allow end-node to have a sleep 
period between two measurements saving the battery energy. Furthermore 
the router beacons can be used as an heartbeat by a backup node, as will be 
explained further in this chapter, without braking the ZigBee standard’s 
rules. 
Although a mesh network is more resilient and fault tolerating, the test 
results supplied does not show a great differences with our system, made of 
a relatively small number of deployed device (about twenty). 
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Figure  5.8 –Application functional diagram 
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The node was introduced to analyze the network’s messaging stream 
helping in the application debugging  itself and, more recently, as part of a 
Network Intrusion Detection System (NIDS)because of  the security issues 
coming up in the literature ( see as example [Goo09] and [GoT09]). 
 
 
 
Figure  5.9 –Role decision diagram 
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The sniffer device was also used to test the flaws and weakness of the 
wireless Network [PtN98] and [One01]. Many bugs were found, in this way, 
through the classic buffer overflow attack. 
In Figure 5.8 is illustrated the application functional diagram while in 
Figure 5.9 is shown the simplified version of the role decision algorithm. 
The Framework allows a message passing style event, typical of the non-
object oriented programming (such as the windows 3.1 event handler) where 
the main function contains an huge case for all the incoming events and 
works as a dispatcher.  
The following code is the example of the main loop function in the 
developed application: 
 
void mainLoop() 
{ 
//wait for new state can be activated 
  if ( ((signed long)(newStateTime - fw_getSystemTime())) > 
0) return; 
  switch (appState) 
  { 
    case WSND_INITIAL: 
      forceStateWithDelay(WSND_RESET,10000); //watchdog timer 
      leds_indication__init(); 
      leds_indication__indicate(SLEEP); 
      checkLocalParams(); 
      checkButtonsAndParams(); 
   checkExternalMemory(); 
   checkSensorList(); 
      initSensors(); 
      checkBattery(); 
   //va controllato il cambio di ruolo anche in base 
allo stato delle batterie 
      if (isRoleForced())  
    checkRole(); 
   else  
    buffer.nodeType = choseRole(); //coordinator WILL 
initDataBridge() 
      initDataBuffer(); 
      showRole(); 
      if (buffer.nodeType = ZIGBEE_COORDINATOR_TYPE) 
setNetworkParameters(); 
      forceState(WSND_START_SEARCH_NETWORK); 
      break; 
 
    case WSND_START_SEARCH_NETWORK: 
      forceStateWithDelay(WSND_FORCE_RESET,REJOIN_PERIOD); 
      leds_indication__indicate(NETWORK_SEARCHING); 
      fw_joinNetwork(); //wait join() or lost() 
      break; 
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//il join setta questo stato 
    case WSND_IN_NETWORK_GETSENSORS: 
      forceStateWithDelay(WSND_GET_SENSORS_DONE,1500); 
      leds_indication__indicate(ACTIVE); 
      getBoardSensors(); 
      break; 
 
    case WSND_GET_SENSORS_DONE: 
//sensors has read. sending 
      updateDataBuffer(); 
      if (buffer.nodeType != ZIGBEE_COORDINATOR_TYPE) 
        
forceStateWithDelay(WSND_RESENT_TRY,SUCCESS==sendData(&buffer
,sizeof(buffer))?RESEND_PERIOD:100); 
#ifdef WSN_COORDINATOR 
      else 
//      if (buffer.nodeType == ZIGBEE_COORDINATOR_TYPE) 
      { 
        leds_indication__indicate(TRANSMIT); 
        transmitToDataBridge((void*)&buffer, sizeof(buffer) 
); // saves data and transmits through uart 
        previousSendTime = fw_getSystemTime(); 
        forceStateWithDelay(WSND_PREPARE_TO_SLEEP,40); 
      } 
#endif 
      break; 
    case WSND_RESENT_TRY: 
//additional try to send 
  if (myParameters.lastRetryTimes < MAXRETRY ) 
       
 forceStateWithDelay(WSND_RESENT_TRY,SUCCESS==sendData(&
buffer,sizeof(buffer))?RESEND_PERIOD:200); 
       ELSE 
forceStateWithDelay(WSND_RESENT_FAILURE,SUCCESS==sendData(&bu
ffer,sizeof(buffer))?RESEND_PERIOD:200); 
      break; 
    case WSND_RESENT_FAILURE: 
  leds_indication__indicate(LED_WARN_FAILURE); 
      
 forceStateWithDelay(WSND_LEAVE,SUCCESS==sendData(&buffe
r,sizeof(buffer))?RESEND_PERIOD:400); 
      break; 
//if it is an end device start to sleep, 
    case WSND_PREPARE_TO_SLEEP: 
//send was succesfull 
      forceState(WSND_DATA_DELAY); 
#ifdef WSN_ENDDEVICE 
//end device goes to sleep 
      if (buffer.nodeType == ZIGBEE_END_DEVICE_TYPE) 
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      { 
    stopSensors(myParameters.sensorList); 
        
forceStateWithDelay(WSND_DATA_DELAY,myParameters.sleeptime); 
 
        fw_forceToSleep(); 
      } 
#endif 
      break; 
//delay state. Router will do this code while its delay is 
not expired 
//end device go out from this state immediately after sleep 
    case WSND_DATA_DELAY: 
      if ((fw_getSystemTime() - previousSendTime) > 
ROUTER_SEND_PERIOD) 
        forceStateWithDelay(WSND_IN_NETWORK_GETSENSORS,1); 
      break; 
    case WSND_LEAVE: 
      fw_leaveNetwork(); 
      forceStateWithDelay(WSND_RESET,MAX_LEAVE_TIME); 
      break; 
    case WSND_FORCE_RESET: 
    case WSND_RESET: 
      fw_warmReset(FALSE); 
      break; 
    case WSND_SET_CHANNEL_MASK_DONE: 
      { 
        static uint16_t ledsCounter; 
        
leds_indication__indicate((ledsCounter++&2)?TURNOFF_ALL_LEDS:
TURNON_ALL_LEDS); 
        if 
(ledsCounter>=(SET_CHANNEL_MASK_WAIT_TIME/MAINLOOP_PERIOD)) 
          forceState(WSND_LEAVE); 
      } 
    case WSND_COMMAND_RECEIVED: 
      RESET = processCommand(); 
   if (RESET) fw_warmReset(TRUE); //o in alternativa 
usare il watchdog timer 
      break; 
    default: 
      break; 
  } 
} 
 
All the nodes, except for the coordinator that can also send messages via the 
usb connection, use the three leds installed on board to show the status. 
The message specification is shown in the table 5.4. 
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The check for any isolated or dead node is not done by the network itself, 
because it requires the coordinator to use memory and calculation resources 
which depend directly to the number of attached nodes. This task is instead 
performed by the gateway application that connects the PAN coordinator to 
the rest of the world. The gateway application will be briefly illustrated in 
the next chapter, but it is obvious that its main tasks are the data gathering, 
their validation and data forwarding to the database server (or the temporary 
local storage if the connection to the DB server cannot be performed). 
The Gateway application, running on a personal computer has much more 
resources and it can easily maintain a node table via one of the threads 
without missing the main tasks just listed. 
 
 
LED state 
Node state LED1 
Red 
LED2 
Yellow 
LED3 
Green 
Sleeping (end device only) OFF OFF OFF 
Network searching   blinking 
Having joined the network   ON 
Message receiving  blinking ON 
Message transmitting blinking  ON 
Too many send failure  blinking OFF 
Buffer full blinking blinking OFF/ON 
Changing channel mask blinking blinking blinking 
Table 5.4 – Application LED indication  
 
 
5.4.1 Call Sequences 
When the application start due to a power on event or a cold reset, it will 
start an initialization phase to properly configure the framework and the 
application parameters and to set the hardware accordingly. The program 
initialization sequence is shown in Figure 5.10.  
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Figure  5.10 - Application initialization sequence 
 
 
The fw_userEntry() initializes user’s HAL and application and it should be 
implemented in user’s code. initialization. After the initialization phase the 
interrupt can be enabled and must be called the fw_setUserLoop(period, 
userLoop) function which allows to set parameters of user’s handler . The 
period is expressed in milliseconds and the userLoop parameter is a pointer 
to a void function. 
To reduce the power consumption the device can be set to go into the sleep 
mode.  
The sleep mode activation sequences are illustrated in Figure 5.11 and 5.12. 
The procedure can be initiated both by the framework (fig. 5.11) or by the 
application itself (fig. 5.12). 
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Figure  5.11 - Going to sleep sequence (when initiated by Framework) 
 
 
The Framework initiated sleep mode seems to affect the application event 
timer which usually reduces its period before it fires the event. More 
information about this misbehaviour will be done in “on field analysis” 
section further in this chapter. 
As can be seen from the two sequences the mainly difference between a 
framework initiated sequence and the user’s application sequence is merely 
the user call to invoke the framework fw_ForceToSleep() function. 
On the other hand these differences affect the application flow allowing the 
developer to choose the actions performed between two sleep phases, such 
as reading sensors data and store/send them as well as enable/disable the 
watchdog timer.  
For example the data compression, developed by the user and requiring a 
‘long time’ period to be performed, cannot be done between the 
fw_ReadyToSleep()and the fw_appReadyToSleep() calls due to application 
crash probably caused by a to-early forced sleep status. 
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Figure  5.12 -  Going to sleep sequence (when initiated by user’s application) 
 
 
the waking-up sequence initiated by user’s interrupt handler during sleep is 
shown in Figure 5.13. 
In this sequence the HAL receives, from any attached device or from the 
timer, an interrupt event and invokes the user interrupt handler which 
provides, based on the event answer to the call’s interruption. 
During the interrupt event, any  incoming command message will be stored 
to a command message buffer, mainly because all activity, including 
command execution such as network leave and role change must be done 
only when the device is fully operational. 
After the interrupt phase is completed, the application can start the wakeup 
procedure calling the fw_forceWakeup() framework’s primitive and the 
device will be fully operative again ready to perform all the required 
measurements. 
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Figure  5.13 - Waking-up sequence, when initiated  
by user’s interrupt handler during sleep 
 
 
 
 
 
The connection sequence, illustrated in Figure 5.14 can be fully supplied by 
Framework itself relieving the user’s application developer from the burden 
of controlling the network connection.  
In this way, however, the device network role (PAN coordinator, router, 
end-point) is selected by switches and not changeable.  
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Figure  5.14 - Join-leave sequence 
 
 
Since a fully dynamic network which adapts the node’s role depending on 
situation is much more advisable and resilient, the join/leave procedure in 
the actual developed application is controlled by the application itself, 
invoking when necessary the Framework primitives.  
The general join-leave-join sequence is shown in Figure 5.15. 
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Figure  5.15 -  Join-lost-join sequence (automatic networking disabled) 
 
 
 
5.4.2 The heartbeat system 
When the  WSN application was tested in an on research’s field one of the 
main problems was the node ‘disappearing’, meaning that suddenly a 
random node stop working for a variable period of time. Such behavior was 
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unpredictable and could happens after few minutes or days. A continuous 
node check process by the PAN coordinator was out of discussion because 
of the required resources’ cost (this control was implemented in the gateway 
application).  
 
 
 
 
Figure  5.16 - Heartbeat system between two nodes (tree topology) 
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There are several reasons of these nodes disappearing behavior such as 
strong signal interferences, application or ZigBee stack crash (without 
watchdog intervention).The problems were only partially solved in the 
thesis period due to the manufacturer ZigBee stack update, a re-codification 
of some critical application functions such as sensor reading and I2C 
memory management.  
One of the most efficient methods to solve the problem was forcing a cold 
restart after each sensor read cycle this take usually about 2 seconds (0,5 sec 
for the startup process and 1,5 or more for configuration and join the 
network again). 
However the restart can be done only by end-node device with non-
continuous sensor reading and it does not eliminate completely the problem.  
To solve this problem affecting very important measurement the application 
developed includes an heartbeat system which involves two nodes that share 
the same address.  
This system is illustrated in many works (see [Tan02]) as a couple of 
computer acting as servers machine. One of the computer provides the 
services required by the clients and sends a heartbeat message to the second 
computer that is just waiting. When the first computer stop sending the 
message (as an heartbeat signal suggest it usually means a severe 
malfunction of the computer itself) the second computer starts and takes the 
place of the first computer acting exactly as it is the same computer. 
The originality of the solution is the extension of this idea to a wireless 
context taking advantage of the beacons signals sent by routers (in a tree 
topology). This also means that we don’t need to modify the ZigBee 
standard to add this feature. 
As we can see from figure 5.11 when one of the node Y start, before trying 
to join the network, it waits for a beacon message of the other device (node 
X). If the main node is working, the backup node (Y) works as a end-node 
with sleep periods, if Y does not receive the beacon signal it joins the 
network acting as exactly as the X node. The sleeping period it’s 
programmable and reflects the ‘response time’ of the heartbeat system: If Y 
sleeps for 5 seconds it will backup the X node died in about 5 seconds, 
during this period the data will be lost. 
Moreover there are three conditions to satisfy to keep the heartbeat system 
working (without breaking the ZigBee rules):  
 
• The network must use implement tree topology (mesh topology does 
not allow beacons) 
• the X device must act as a router, since only the routers, in  a tree 
topology send beacons 
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• The two nodes must be in the direct range because the second node 
must receive the beacons directly (this usually is not a problem as 
the two nodes must measure the same event) 
 
As alternative solution the two nodes must work together, but in this case 
they waste their power energy in performing the same measurements. 
 
 
5.5 Buffering 
When the accelerometer was introduced the bandwidth requirements 
increased since the node needed to send at least eight packet per second, but 
with a beacons every 0,25 seconds (see par 4.5.1) the number of messages 
sent could not be more than four. Moreover as already mentioned (and 
discussed further in paragraph 4.9) sometimes the nodes could not send 
messages for a variable period of time.  
Two solutions were implemented for such nodes. The first one was a RAM 
buffer for the accelerometer data in this way even if prolonged network’s 
absence happens due to, for example, signal interferences, the device can 
continue to achieve its task storing the measurement into the memory.  
When the device can re join the network it will start sending all the stored 
values. 
The second solution was data compression which helps to reduce the 
number of packets saving also the battery energy and decreasing the 
bandwidth needs. Data compression will be discussed in the next chapter 
(see 4.8). 
The following algorithm briefly describes the data buffer management: 
 
 
Read values(LastMessage) 
If connected 
 While (ObjectList is Not empty)  
  send Next(packet) 
 Send LastMessage  
 //it’s in a different buffer area  
Else  
 If FRAM Memory present 
  If AddObjectToList(LastMessage,Time)  
  Else set leds (Buffer Full)  
/*the values are not discarded but the next read 
will overwrite them*/ 
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The data buffer is implemented as a circular list stored in an array with a 
start and an end pointer, using the typical list functions (such as  ListEmpty, 
push, pop, ListFull). 
When the buffer was implemented were available as I2C flash memory the 
module 1 Megabit chip is available Ferroelectric Non-volatile RAM 
(FRAM). This module has great advantages versus the standard flash 
memory, first of all the read/writes cycles are about 1014 times meaning the 
chip use is virtually unlimited, much more than the typical 100.000 cycles 
of the flash RAM. Additionally FRAM has better read/write performance 
(400 khz clock ) and lower power consumption (Active Current < 150 µA, 
90 µA Standby, 5 µA Sleep Mode versus a 2mA of a flash eeprom) 
This buffer area provides a storage space for about 4 minutes of 
measurements (considering 90 values of 16 bits per second) which is 
enough for the most disconnection problems. 
 
 
5.6 Data compression 
The ZigBee WSN are basically made for low traffic rate application. 
Additionally the used WSN has a clear bottleneck in the PAN coordinator 
connected to the Gateway computer via an USB port installed as a virtual 
serial port. This bottleneck is very common with this second generation 
device (is expected to be solved in the nowadays third generation).  
To improve the total bandwidth available one of the best solution found was 
the data compression. 
Since we are compressing measurements we need certainty that we achieve 
the same what we compressed after decompression, thus lossless 
compression is the only choice. The compression algorithm chosen is the 
Hoffman coding due to its compression performance and its simple 
algorithm. The WSN device implementation of this code use a static table to 
eliminate the computing and memory resource needed by the modeling 
phase of the compression system. The results will be a worse (i.e. a bigger 
size of the compressed data) than we can expect adopting also a modeling 
phase based on the data flow itself but don’t require additional resource 
besides the pre-calculated table. 
For more information about this compression algorithm see appendix C. 
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5.6.1 Data structure 
After the Huffman tree creation (see appendix C) as the figure C.1 shows 
each leaf block has a given weight. The largest-numbered node in a block is 
the leader of the block. The main operations supported by the data structure 
are [Kun85]: 
 
• Represent a binary Huffman tree with nonnegative weights that 
maintains the invariant. 
• Store a contiguous list of internal tree nodes in non decreasing order 
by weight; nodes of the same weight are ordered respect to their 
numbering.  
• Find the leader block based upon the numbering. 
• Contents interchange of two leaves of the same weight.  
• Increment the weight of the leader of a block by 1, which can cause 
the node's numbering to move past the implicit numberings of the 
nodes in the next block, causing their numberings to decrease by 1.  
• Represent the correspondence between the k symbols of the alphabet 
appeared in the message and the positive-weight leaves in the tree.  
• Represent the n-k symbols in the alphabet that have not yet appeared 
in the message by a single leaf 0-node in the Huffman tree.  
 
The components of the data structure are listed below. The number of leaves 
of zero weight is specified by integer variables M, E, and R:  
 
M = n - k = the number of zero-weight symbols in the alphabet  
= 2E + R, where 0 ≤ R < 2E, except that R = -1 when M =0.  
 
The data structure uses an explicit numbering, which corresponds to the 
physical storage locations used to store information about the nodes. This 
must not be confused with the implicit numbering defined in the last point. 
Unless stated, all references to node numberings are based upon the explicit 
numbering. Leaf nodes are explicitly numbered 1 to n in contiguous 
locations in physical memory, and internal nodes are explicitly numbered 
n+max{1, M}, ... , 2n-1 in contiguous locations in memory.  
The node q is a leaf node if and only if q ≤ n. When k < n (when M > 0), the 
0-node in the Huffman tree is node M, and the positive-weight leaves are 
nodes M + 1, ... , n.  
Nodes 1, ... , M represent letters of zero weight, though only node M 
actually appears in the Huffman tree. When k > 1 (that is, when M < n), the 
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root of the tree is internal node 2n - 1; otherwise, we have M = n and the 
root of the tree is node n, the 0-node.  
There is a close relationship between the explicit and implicit numberings: 
For two internal nodes p and q, we have p < q in the explicit numbering if 
and only if p < q in the implicit numbering; the same holds for two leaf 
nodes p and q.  
The tree data structure is called a “floating tree” [Kun85] because the parent 
and child pointers for the nodes are not explicitly maintained. 
Each block, indeed, has a parent pointer and a rtChild pointer that point to 
the parent and right child of the leader of the block. This allows a node to 
slide over an entire block without having to update more than a constant 
number of pointers. The locations of the parents and children nodes in the 
block can be computed in constant time via an offset calculation, due to the 
contiguous storage of leaves and of internal nodes, from the block's parent 
and rtChild pointer.  
The correspondence between leaf nodes and the letters they represent is 
given by the arrays alpha and rep: 
 
Alpha[q] = j, for 1 ≤ q ≤ n, 1 ≤ j ≤ n, if and only if aj is the symbol 
represented by node q.  
Rep[j] = q, for 1 ≤ j ≤ n, 1 ≤ q ≤ n, if and only if node q corresponds to letter 
aj.  
 
The main entity in the floating tree representation is the block. Blocks are 
numbered in the range 1, ... , 2n - 1 in no particular order. Mapping between 
blocks and nodes is given by  
 
block[q] = block number of node q, for max{1, M} ≤ q ≤ n or n + max{1, 
M} < q ≤ 2n - 1.  
 
The next eight arrays of integers are each indexed by a block number b in 
the range 1 < b < 2n - 1:  
 
weight [b] = weight of each node in block b.  
parent [b] = the parent node of the leader of block b, if it exists; and 0 
otherwise.  
parity [b] = 0 if the leader of block b is a left child or the root of the 
Huffman tree; 1 otherwise.  
rtChild[b] = q if b is a block of internal nodes and node q is the right child 
of the leader of block b.  
first[b] = q if node q is the leader of block b.  
last[b] = q if node q is smallest-numbered node in block b.  
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prevBlock [b] = previous block on the circularly-linked list of blocks.  
nextBlock[b] = next block on the circularly-linked list of blocks.  
 
Each slot in the array weight must be capable of storing any integer in the 
range [0,t]. The unused blocks are linked together using nextBlock in a list 
headed by  
 
availBlock = first block in the available-block list if the list is non-empty; 
and 0 otherwise  
The final component of the data structure is an array indexed by 1 ≤ i ≤ n:  
stack[i] = ith-to-last bit of the encoding of the current letter being processed.  
 
Except for the elements of the array weight, each integer variable can take 
on at most n or 2n - 1 values, which requires either (log2 n) or (log2 n) + 1 
bits of storage. The total amount of storage (in bits) needed for the data 
structure is  
 
2(log2 n) +[(log2 log2 n)  + 2n(log2 n) + (2n-1) [ (log2 t) + +7 (log2 n) 7] + 
(log2 n)+ n  ≈ 16 (log2 n) + 15n +2n [log2 t] 
 
The storage requirement can be reduced by n(log2 n) bits if separate 
available-block lists are kept for internal nodes and leaf nodes, since leaf 
blocks do not need a rtChild value. If storage is dynamically allocated, 
instead of a pre-allocated array, it will be much less. 
In our case if we consider n = 256 (8bit symbols) and t = 16bit integer the 
storage required (a pre-allocated array for performance and memory 
management reason) is about 12 Kb. 
 
5.6.2 Data compression validation 
When compressing data one of the biggest problem is that one bit error in 
the package can waste all data decompression process. 
Thus when the data compression is applied the application calculate also 
CRC16 value to ensure data validation 
The byte-oriented CRC algorithm is quite simple: 
while message not exhausted 
 calculate control byte from R’s top byte 
 X ← sum of CRC at various offsets that are to 
  be ⊕-ed into R in accordance with  
  the control byte 
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 shift R left one byte 
 read new input byte into rightmost byte of R 
 R ← R ⊕ X 
 
Is to note that most of the calculation can be pre-computed, so a more 
efficient implementation will use a pre-calculated table  
 
while augmented message not exhausted 
 idx ← leftmost byte of R 
 shift R left by one byte 
 read in a new input byte 
 use idx to index table of 256 16-bit values (32 bits for CRC 32) 
 R ← R ⊕ table value 
 
The following code use a pre calculated table CRC algorithm 
 
u_long table[256]; 
u_long crc16(u_char *buf, int len) { 
 u_char *p; 
 u_long crc; 
 if (!crc16_table[1]) init_crc16(); //must be created 
 crc = 0xffffffff;  
 for (p = buf; len > 0; ++p, --len) 
  crc = (crc << 8) ^ table[(crc >> 24) ^ *p]; 
 return ~crc; /* return the complement */ 
} 
 
In our WSN application the table is stored in the program itself and does not 
need any further initialization code. 
 
5.6.3 Compression results 
The modelling stage can be a resource and time computing greedy task to be 
performed by a 4 Mhz ( and 4 Mips) device doing several other operation 
such as wireless network listen/transmit, and sensors’ measurements. 
Instead, as a compromise, we can pre calculate the Hoffman symbols table 
and then implement on the node only the coding stage. This was the solution 
developed for the WSN system. 
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Figure  5.17 - The device data compression rate comparison 
 
 
The Hoffman compression algorithm was chosen just  because of its 
lightweight and speediness of the coding stage. 
We are aware that the solution is non optimized on the real data flow and we 
expect a final compression rate far less than the one obtained analyzing the 
data flow itself. To reach a better result, the pre calculated table was built 
upon a sample dataflow coming from the same sensor connected to the 
device. The final results are shown in figure 5.17, the first to left bar are the 
compression rates coming reached by the node with respectively t=28 and 
t=216 (see appendix C).  
 
5.6.4 The software analysis 
In complexion we can say the ZigBee stack proved to be a real work-saving 
library removing most of the from time needed for design and developing of 
the network. However the stack was also create to ease the hardware 
programming, deleting the need for the Application developer to know the 
device architecture and this task is not achieved at all. It’s true that 
developer does not need to know how the boards itself is built but when a 
sensor must be changed/modified like in our situation, the lack of standards 
force the developer to a machine-level programming accessing the MCU 
pins directly to read/write information, for example the sensirion sht75 
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Temperature/RH sensor does not use the I2C bus but a similar proprietary 
two-wired bus. 
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Figure  5.18 – Number of dead nodes 
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Figure  5.19 – Node’s death period (green is better) 
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The stack itself suffers from the typical software youth problems.  
The automatic Framework’s behaviour such as going to sleep, join, leave, 
transmit data seems to affect the event timer which usually fires the event 
within a reduced period of time. For example if you set the timer on 5000ms 
to read temperature (and send it) the event will be initiated every 1500ms 
instead.  
This period cannot be increased unless the application is developed without 
using the automatic behaviour. 
Another example, involving the data compression, developed by the user 
and requiring a ‘long time’ period to be performed, this compression cannot 
be done between the fw_ReadyToSleep()and the fw_appReadyToSleep() 
calls due to application crash probably caused by a too-early forced sleep 
status. 
Moreover the use of TinyOS calls such as TOSH_run_next_task() and 
atomic blocks are not very clear in the kit documentation. And if the first 
next_task call is easy to use (and used and very often), once understood its 
meaning the next code showing the atomic blocks examples may be not 
clear enough. 
 
ATOMIC_SECTION_ENTER 
    battery__state = IDLE;   
    adc_close( ADC_BAT ); 
ATOMIC_SECTION_LEAVE 
 
In this first example  is easy to understand that the two operation are tied 
together. The next one is: 
 
ATOMIC_SECTION_ENTER 
 Sht75__state = IDLE;  
ATOMIC_SECTION_LEAVE 
 
This one is a little obscure, usually it’s not needed for any  variable to have 
an atomic block when it is assigned a new value. But without the atomic 
section this operation can fail with unbelievable and unexpected results. 
Another negative aspects found in the stack architecture was the lack of 
control about the buffer overflows. Using the sniffer board were generated 
fake oversized messages and we obtained several application crashes. In the 
same way, also a non-listed (fake) command message gives unpredictable 
results. 
Finally we can consider the code size of the developed application. The 
available memory (see paragraph 5.3.1) is not much, but we must consider 
that we have an entire ZigBee stack loaded.  
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The new ZigBee versions implemented by the manufacturer, with more and 
interesting specifications, decrease this free memory value to much to be 
considered safe the application porting to the new stack. 
 
 
Section Max size Used size 
Code 96kb ≈78kb: 
• 37 kb base code 
• 6 kb AES+ AES start Key 
• 8 kb Compression algorithm 
• 12 kb Pre-calculated compression table 
• 15 kb sensor drivers 
 
Data 6kb < 1 kb data structures 
2 kb area for AES 
2 kb area for compression 
 
Stack 1kb < 1 kb 
Table 5.5 – Actual code size 
 
 
The porting must wait the third generation MCU and boards. 
In table 5.6 is briefly reported the main problems found and solved. 
 
 
Problem How is solved Note 
USB virtual com at 
38400 baud 
Serial flow control 
applied requiring a 
reconnection every 
time a corrupted packet 
is received 
It works only at 57600 
baud, and the resync 
lose part of the 
performance 
Node Battery charge 
depleted in less than 2 
days 
Sleep/wakeup for the 
sensors applied by 
application and tree 
structure 
Node now can work for 
1 week (router) and 
about 3 weeks (end 
node)  
Timer fired before the 
requested period  
Application force the 
sleep/wakeup disabling 
the framework 
sleep/wakeup 
automatic behaviour 
The new framework 
release seems to have 
partially solved the 
problem 
Temperature sensor is Use a better sensor The sensor can be 
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near the voltage 
regulator (VR) ad its 
measurements are 
sometimes greatly 
affected by the VR heat 
(Sensirion) with a 
small wire 
inserted in small space 
without involving 
directly the board 
The node cannot be 
inserted in the air flow 
pipe due to temperature 
and/or moisture 
Used sensor 
(Sensirion) with a 
small wire (only the 
sensor is inserted into 
the air flow pipe) 
The node stop working 
completely at -2°C and 
a condensing humidity 
my be very dangerous 
to it 
Security flaws found 
also in implemented 
AES  
AES implemented with 
primary key into code 
space, AES replay 
disabled to avoid 
replay attack, Nonce 
introduced 
Also implemented a 
simple Nids with 
separate sniffer node 
Payload Packet size is 
91 byte effective (73 
when aes cryptography 
is included) 
Compression applied 
with a static symbol 
table(to avoid long 
time analysis)  
In ZigBee pro version 
packet can be 
fragmented allowing a 
packet size to be large 
as the available buffer 
(compression is still a 
better solution) 
Stack crash due to 
oversized packets 
(buffer overflow) or 
fake command frame  
Beta test results were 
sent to manufacturer 
The new stack version 
(ZigBee PRO) seems to 
suffer very similar 
problems 
Table 5.6 – Main problems summary 
 
 
5.7 Practical of experiences on Meshnetics boards 
This paragraph want to be a summary of all hardware/software problems 
found with the provided WSN kit. It does not have any intention to prove 
the boards’ kit to be good or not, but we can assert that ZigBee WSN are 
young systems and this is proved by the four different specifications release 
prepared in this last four years. Thus we didn’t really expect a mature 
product ready to use but something useful for the real indoor research. 
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5.7.1 The hardware analysis  
The on board sensors as noted before in this chapter consist in a temperature 
sensor (LM73) with a declared  ±1.0°C (max) accuracy in the -10°C -80°C 
temperature’s interval. This sensor is to be considered quite good for an 
environment monitoring system but the on board sensor position is very 
close to the voltage regulator and its measurements are affected by the 
regulator heat dissipation. This problem increases greatly when the 
measurements are near the 0° Celsius. Moreover the difference between two 
sensors, in the same condition and position are sometimes greater then 4°C, 
far too much also for an environment’s monitoring system. 
To solve this problem was firstly experimented a calibration with several 
intervals (10 to 20 nominal intervals) and then the temperature sensors were 
substitute with another, wired, model (Sensirion sht75) including RH 
measurements capability. 
Although the boards are claimed to operate at -20° Celsius and to be as few 
as possible affected by temperature even less than that point. The test made 
demonstrates that the node completely stops to send any kind of message at 
about -3°C and start having radio listen/receive problems just under 0°C . It 
wasn’t possible to completely evaluate the node internal condition but it 
seems that the clock and batteries were greatly affected by the temperature 
condition. 
 
 
 
Table 5.7 - Virtual COM-port recommended settings 
 
 
The presence of an USB 2.0 port allows the board to be powered directly 
from a Computer, on the other hand as correctly declared by manufacturer, 
the instability of USB’s port current greatly affect the sensors’ 
measurements. Moreover the USB port has a RS-232 to USB bridge 
controller (model CP2102 from Silicon Labs) that provides a seamless’ 
connection from the Serial port to the USB port, thus, from an PC Operating 
System (like windows) the port is visible as a generic, virtual, COM port 
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with a particular OS-given number. Although this system is quite easy to 
uses and allows to send AT commands over the USB port, the system itself 
use the speed and characteristics of a serial port (see figure 4.5), this means 
that instead of a 12Mbps raw data rate of an USB 1.1 (or 480 Mbps for the 
2.0). The recommended settings visible in table 4.10 use a 38400 bauds 
connection (to a maximum of 115000 unusable due to sync problems) that is 
about 4,5 Kbps (to a max of 12 Kbps). With a great effort we were able to 
reach a connection speed of 57600 bauds using a rough flow control to test 
whether the COM connection must be resynchronized.  
This bottleneck, coming from the Atmel MCU architecture (and not to a 
manufacturer fault), dramatically decreases the overall network bandwidth 
towards the gateway system. 
The next µcontroller’s generation, which is probably ready nowadays, it’s 
claimed to solve this problem. 
The power consumption is another painful aspect of these device. Although 
these devices are claimed to be very low in power requirement and if we 
take a look in figure 5.20 we can see it (with a idle period of 0.2 seconds). 
The real on field test demonstrates that these nodes are more greedy in 
power consumption.  
In fact with an average power draws of 15 mAh  and two AA rechargeable 
batteries (2000 mAh) we can expect a lifetime of more than five days (well 
this is far less than the many moths lifetime claimed by ZigBee Alliance) 
while the test tell us that lifetime is of about 48 hours that means a power 
consumption average, including idle periods, of more than 40 mAh. 
 
 
 
Figure  5.20 – MCU power energy consumption   
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Of course on our boards there are many sensors and other electric devices 
(voltage regulators, usb to com bridge, leds etc) and not only the MCU/radio 
couple. The introduction of beacons followed by deep sleep period has 
helped to reach these five or even more days of lifetime (see figure 4.19e) 
but their far from the months advertised by many manufacturers. 
On the other hand, if we set the nodes to survive for a full year (beacons 
every two or more second) we can find out we have only 20 hours (of 
energy) for measurements, with one sensor [Aky04]. 
 
5.7.2 Board changes and additions  
The Meshnetics ZigBee boards come with two sensors (see paragraph 
5.2.1): a light sensor and a temperature sensor both connected via the I2C 
bus. In our researches the light sensor wasn’t used yet so nothing can be said 
about it, although it datasheet described features and the values read seems 
to be enough correct about the context to say if there was sunlight, artificial 
light (or cloudy day) or there’s no light at all. 
 
 
 
Figure  5.21 –The modified board protected by a plastic box 
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Instead the temperature sensor does not fit our need due to its precision of 
±1°C and its proximity to the voltage regulator (VR) causing its 
measurements sometimes to be greatly affected by the VR heat. 
 
 
 
 
Figure  5.22 –The sensirion SHT75 temperature/Relative Humidity sensor 
 
Moreover the nodes cannot be always inserted in the air flow pipes due to 
temperature and/or moisture or just because they partially stop the airflow 
itself. 
 
 
 
Figure  5.23 –The sensirion SHT75 temperature/Relative Humidity sensor 
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For these reasons the boards were modified disabling the installed lm73 
sensor and installing a better temperature/RH SHT75 sensor produced by 
Sensirion (precision ±0.3°C, ±3% RH  see figure 5.22).  
For the first research, were also connected on the boards some open/close 
switches to control the doors and windows status.  
To ease the process of connecting/disconnecting the open/close switch and 
to protect the board itself, the node was enclosed in a plastic box (for 
electronic device) with some connector plugs. 
The SHT sensor is connected to the board by a little cable allowing the 
insertion of the sensor inside pipes without the rest of the device. 
The figure 5.21 shown the board modifications while in the figure 5.23 can 
be viewed the box protected node at work. 
 
 
 
Figure  5.24  – the DE-ACCM3D accelerometer 
 
 
For the second research, instead, it was needed a node with a 3-axis 
accelerometer. These accelerometers (many accelerometers were tested for 
this purpose, see the de-accm3d in figure 5.24) can record samples at thirty 
hertz per axis (most of them can reach 160 Hz or even higher rates).  
 
5.7.3 Extracting Keys from Second Generation Zigbee Chips 
This special section may be considered as part of physical attacks as 
described in Appendix  A.1.2.1.  
The paragraph will describe the state-of-the-art of physical attacks against 
ZigBee networks and their implementation of security. All the literature 
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involved is written and published during the years 2008 and 2009, and as far 
as I know they are still up to date . 
This experience can be easily completed with few tools and the author have 
also partially achieved the task. In our situation in fact there’s no a on-board 
hole has in figure 5.25 where we can fix the needle and we stop the test just 
to avoid any scratch that can irreparably damage the board itself-. 
The First generation of ZigBee chips were simply digital radios with a 
SPI interfaces and hardware-accelerated cryptography. They relied 
completely upon an external microcontroller to perform even the basic 
functions such as run a ZigBee stack. [Goo09] 
This first generation chips send the security keys as clear text between their 
components which can be easily sniffed by an SPI-device allowing an 
attacker to participate in a network. 
The second generation of ZigBee chips, the ones used in this thesis, hold a 
complete ZigBee implementation internally, thanks to a reprogrammable 
microcontroller.  
They may also lack the vulnerability to bus probing, as keys need not travel 
over an exposed SPI bus. The microcontroller cores were added for 
convenience, not security. 
The third generation of chips, which is almost ready will include more 
powerful microprocessors and hopefully more security, but these chips are 
out of our study as they are not yet commercially available yet.  
Although some datasheet and various literature claim that some 
microcontroller, for example the EM250, employs a configurable memory 
protection scheme usually found on larger microcontrollers this refers to 
protection from accidental self-corruption of memory not to a debugging 
fuse or boot loader password.  
This protection allow the ZigBee stack to defend certain regions of RAM 
and radio registers from accidental corruption by the application itself 
[Goo09]. 
In any case, the debugging port of these chips does not contain a security 
fuse. There is no supported method of denying access to an attacker who 
controls those pins. Most manufacturers such as Atmel and Ember are aware 
of the oversight, and their  third generation (like EM300 series ) does not 
share this vulnerability, instead, there are presently no plans to fix the 
second generation chips. 
The author of [Goo09] uses a GoodFET1 USB bus adapter implementing a 
JTAG protocol, developed by the author himself to prove the vulnerability 
described. Its adapter’s firmware includes support for the debugging 
protocol as documented in programming interface specification (in this case 
of Chipcon), allowing the radios to be debugged using a python script. 
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This vulnerability can be tested for on any Chipcon device and many other 
microcontroller of different manufacturer and is strictly dependent from a 
RAM non deletion by the CHIP ERASE procedure. 
The Key identification within non-key data has been demonstrated in 
various articles such as [HSH08] where the authors manage to reliably 
identify disk encryption keys from DRAM, and they conclude with the 
statement that it might become necessary to treat DRAM as untrusted, and 
to avoid storing sensitive information there, but this will not become 
feasible until architectures are changed to give software a safe place to keep 
its keys. 
While personal computers and several microcontrollers like the EM250 
might lack such a place, it is possible to instruct several compiler to store a 
constant in Code (Flash) memory, rather than in Data (RAM).  
This is also described in [HSH08], but as a workaround for RAM limitations 
rather than as a security measure. 
The code keyword must be applied to all const variable as well as any 
pointer to such a constant. This is due to most microcontrollers such as the 
8051, as a Harvard machine, that does not have a unified address space.  
Must be noted that there is a performance penalty to fetches from code 
memory, as they cannot occur at the same time as an instruction fetch. 
The author of [Goo09] demonstrate how a Chipcon radios at the time of 
publication are vulnerable to key theft because of unprotected Data memory.  
In the same paper he demonstrates how Ember radios offer even less 
security. Extracting a key is as simple as connecting a debugger, erasing the 
chip, then freely reading the contents of DRAM. 
Further, the same author in [GoT09] illustrates and proves how to brake the 
AES 128 security in other µcontroller such as MSP430 and the AVR family.  
In this case  it is a attacked the hardware-accelerated AES128 
implementation, by taking advantage of the fact that keys must be loaded 
over the SPI bus. 
In the fig 5.25 it’s shown how to tap one of three SPI pins of the CC2420 
radio chip (on a Telos B node) using a hypodermic syringe.  
The SPI bus consists of four lines: SCL, MOSI, MISO, and !SS. SCL is the 
serial clock and is output helps to synchronize communications with the 
slave devices.  
MOSI and MISO are data lines, respectively Master Out Slave In and 
Master In Slave Out.  
Finally !SS or Slave Select is an inverted line to indicate the slave chip’s 
selection. In the figure 5.25 [Goo09], it is tapped only SCL line, and only 
one of the data lines will be used just to simplify the test. Since the ground 
is shared by USB it is not necessary to tap it. 
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Figure  5.25 - An active attacks 
 
 
 
Figure  5.26 – the syringe tool 
 
 
As shown in figure 5.27 (portable scope), the tapped pin is the SCL, the data 
clock. 
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Figure  5.27 - SCL signal (on portable scope) 
 
 
 
Figure  5.28 - data signal (on portable scope) 
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The clock stands out because it idles low, and because all pulses in a batch 
are of regular width. Unlike a system clock, the clock only cycles when data 
is being transported. 
The remaining two pins, in the group of three, are data. As shown on the 
scope image 5.28, SPI data lines idle high, and bits are measures on edges of 
the clock. 
When the clock and data lines have been found, it is necessary to sniff the 
traffic using a bus adapter. In this example Total Phase Beagle I2C/SPI 
Protocol Analyzer it is used as shown in figure 5.29 (now it is available the 
SPI-sniffing firmware for the Hackaday Bus Pirate claimed to be much 
more powerful). A screenshot of the Total Phase client follows. 
All that remains to identify the key in use, or anything else sent over the 
bus, is to read the log or to analyze with a script in search of the AES key. 
 
 
 
Figure  5.29 –Data sniffer 
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6  
Results 
 
6.1 WSN performance benchmarks 
The application development had a long test period in which many 
functionalities were observed. The first on field research was intensively 
used also as the WSN test-bed due to the long period required to gather all 
information (more than one year ). Moreover in the same period were used 
as data backup the buttons sensor (with only purpose of measuring 
temperature and relative humidity values) from Dallas Semiconductor.  
These button-shaped sensors, the only practical resource before the WSN 
introduction, can stay into place, gathering data for two weeks (one 
measurement each five minutes) and then require a user to download the 
data, for each button, to export the saved data to a useful format (text 
delimited), to reprogram the buttons and, finally reposition them 
accordingly to their position’s number, to start again the gathering (This 
require about two work-hours for a single person to complete the task). 
Additionally if a sensor is not working  because of any reason (i.e. bad 
reprogram) the full two weeks’ data will be lost. 
The features observed in our WSN system were: 
 
• Network performance regarding topology used 
• Sensor efficiency and precision 
• Network reliability and fault tolerance 
 
These features help to take several decision, like network topology, sensor 
in use what kind of fault tolerance may be useful. 
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6.1.1 Application performance 
First of all must be noted that our WSN system cover a little area (a house) 
and is formed by less than twenty nodes. This is due to the main task we 
want to achieve: an on-field indoor research system as automatic and non-
invasive as possible. 
 
 
Figure 6.1–Application performance (No security, no retry) 
 
 
In this comparison the literature is represented by the ZigBee alliance itself 
(www.zigbee.org). The measurements for our tests were made sending one 
thousand packets (the same packet) from the farthest node to the PAN 
coordinator. This process was repeated one hundred times in different daily 
moments.  
The overall network performance is important since it says the real 
bandwidth available to a node and its data flow. The literature has usually 
tested these WSN in open space or in laboratory while our situation is in a 
common and real inhabited apartment.  
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Figure 6.2 –Application performance (No security, APS retry) 
 
 
As we expected the performance is worse than the ones proposed by many 
specialized articles (i.e. [Mis07] and [BPC07]) and the ZigBee Alliance 
itself (zigbee.org). 
Of course the main reason to this decrease in performance results due to the 
possible signal’ interferences in our environment, where many wi-fi 
networks coexist and, moreover, a lot of electronic devices are powered up 
(and turned off) continuously thus we can consider our research field as a 
WSN hostile environment. 
In favor of our results we can say that the performance degradation is much 
more visible after the first three hops, and this is important since our 
network covers all the apartment’s area within three hops, and usually in 
just one a direct hop (to reach the five hops we had to put the nodes outside 
the apartment itself). 
The figures 6.1, 6.2 and 6.3 shown the performance results compared to the 
ones coming from the literature under different network configurations. 
Must be noted that the retry option (the message re-send on error) greatly 
reduce the performance (but of course it ensure the reception of the 
messages). 
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Figure 6.3 –Application performance (Security, no retry) 
 
 
Instead figures 6.4 and 6.5 illustrate the differences between the to two main 
topologies considered: mesh and tree regardless the throughput and the 
battery lifetime.  
Although the mesh offers more fault tolerance characteristics the results tell 
us that the difference is not appreciable in our environment (and with one 
which have less than twenty nodes) unless we have more than four hops 
distance between the source and destination nodes. 
The possible causes could be the relative few nodes disposed and the small 
covered area in which a node, in a tree topology, that can’t see the parent 
any more can just try to rejoin the network asking to another node in its 
radio range. 
Under this condition a node, receiving a join request, can automatically 
promotes itself to the router role and, if necessary, allow join of the isolated 
node. 
On the other hand is very interesting the lifetime that we can obtain by 
exploiting the tree topology.  
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Figure 6.4 –Application performance (Mesh vs Tree) 
 
 
 
Figure 6.5 –Nodes lifetime in tree topology, they are to be  
compared of approximately 46 hours of lifetime of mesh nodes 
 
In the graph depicted in figure 6.5 we can observe how a end-node in a tree 
topology can reach a lifetime of about one month, while can triple the 
routers lifetime via the beacons period. 
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Appling the algorithm shown in figure 6.6,6.7 and 6.8, we can obtain that all 
nodes have an average lifetime of about two weeks due to a ‘role rotation’.  
In fact a router R when sees its battery power decreasing under a certain 
value, it sends a network message asking for a new router candidate. When 
the node sends the message it specifies who is its parent and its battery 
power value. All the end-node upon receive the message check their power 
energy and if (and only if) their power is more (of the decided quantity) they 
also check if they can see the P node (if they are in the P range). 
If both the conditions are satisfied then the end node will answer the help 
request, sending their battery power and also their RSSI values for the node 
P (it’s a way to measure the strength of signal they receive from P). The 
router receiving the answers use a raw bully algorithm based on power 
energies and then the RSSI values (if the first values are equal) to decide the 
winner. Finally the router device acknowledges to the winner node (all the 
other node will receive the same message indicating the new router) and 
start the tree leave procedure. 
 
 
 
Figure 6.6 –Phase 1: Router ask to change 
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Figure 6.7 –Phase 2: The new candidate answer 
 
In our WSN the beacons were set to be sent every 0,25 seconds allowing 
about one week of battery lifetime for the router and more than three weeks 
for the end nodes. 
 
 
 
Figure 6.8 –Phase 3: The new tree structure 
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The new router after the leave procedure will immediately start the join 
procedure as a router, while the other end-device will perform a rejoin. 
Of course, it must be possible to switch a router device back to be an end-
node role, which means the router is not part of an heartbeat system or its 
gathering requirements are not continuous (for instance the node has an 
accelerometer sampling at 30 values per minute and per axis). 
 
 
6.2 On-field test application I 
The first research started in June 2007 and its aim was to characterize the 
qualitative and quantitative performance obtained from mechanical 
ventilation systems (HVAC system) for residential use, in comparison to the 
traditional systems of natural ventilation [MRB07]. 
The research was performed by CIAS (Centro Ricerche Ambienti Alta 
Sterilità - High Sterility's Environments Research Center) Laboratory from 
the University of Ferrara, together with Aldes France research and 
development centers of Lion and Modena (Aldes is an HVAC 
manufacturer) and the DREAM laboratory of the University of Palermo (for 
the sensors). 
Although the HVAC’s systems in Europe are relatively common in 
residential buildings, in literature there are few articles which compare  
energy saving to natural ventilation system. Moreover usually do not take in 
consideration experimental data about the obtained energy saving compared 
to the natural ventilation system. The literature about aspects such as Indoor 
Air Quality (IAQ) use even less experimental data. 
These information lack is partially due to the difficulties of the realization of 
a non-invasive monitoring system which continuously gather data for long 
period of time. 
For this reasons our study also wanted to take into account several factors 
such as energy aspects, IAQ comfort (comfort aspects concerning thermo 
hygrometric, olfactory, CO2, pollution and microbiological parameters) 
 
 
177 
 
Figure 6.9 – Ceiling’s mould in the apartment 
 
 
 
Figure 6.10 - wall moisture’s droplets 
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The research’s objective requires the use of a real inhabited place and, for 
this purpose, was chosen a 110 m2 apartment in Ferrara with a living family 
consisting of three persons where was installed a mechanical ventilation 
system with dust filters. 
 
 
 
Table 6.1 – Ferrara’s climatic data 
 
 
The apartment is situated at the fourth floor of a building, consisting in 
fifteen apartments and five floors, close to the city centre (near the 
pedestrian area). 
The city of Ferrara is located in a flat area, with a lot of moist due to the 
proximity to the river Po.  
 
 
 
Figure 6.11 – node sensor’s implementation (past-present and future) 
 
 
The urban area is particularly polluted due to the chemical industries 
situated in the northern part and to the city cars traffic (the legal limit for 
PM10 dust is exceeded tens times a year). 
The chosen apartment has many problems generating great discomfort 
coming from the moisture visible in figures (6.9 and 6.10). The HVAC 
system is claimed to remove the moisture thus to eliminate the mould 
generation. 
The monitoring system consists in the wireless sensor network developed in 
this thesis and in the hardware and software that make the data available in 
real time to the researchers. Also this part of the system was developed by 
the author. 
It must be noted that some measurements such as microbiological findings, 
due to their nature, were taken manually by two biologist. 
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The interdisciplinary character of this study involves different types of 
researchers such as medical, biologists , engineers (apart from IT staff). 
The monitoring system is designed to potentially perform more tasks than 
the ones actually carried out in our on field application test as we can see in 
figure 6.11. 
This monitoring system has produced a significant quantity of data (a 
hundreds of gigabyte) which allow a deep analysis of the different aspects 
as planned. 
 
 
 
Figure 6.12 – First research’s system architecture 
 
 
6.2.1 The monitoring system 
The monitoring system is formed by the WSN gathering data automatically 
and a gateway application which receives data from the PAN coordinator 
via an USB (a virtual COM port). 
The gateway application after a data validation splits the data according to 
the Database structure and then inserts the new rows in the Database server.  
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Figure 6.13 – Gateway application 
 
 
The application was organized via separate threads as depicted in figure 
6.13 where each node can be treated by a single database thread which 
performs the required checks and, when necessary, executes the data 
conversion to fit the database format. The main application window is 
shown in figure 6.14. 
The last application version can be configured to use one thread for many 
nodes or, vice versa, to specialize one thread for one node (it was done for 
the node having high data flow). In this way instead of using N threads, we 
can use just one thread for all the nodes, if they gather data at low rate (e.g. 
temp, RH and CO2), and one more thread for each node requiring special 
attention (e.g. gathering accelerometer’s data ).  
If, for any reason, the client cannot reach the DB, it stores the information 
into an SQL script file ready to be executed. In this way, the client can be 
fully operative even without an internet connection and an available local 
DB server but, without a working database, the data are not available in real 
time.  
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Figure 6.14 –Application main window 
 
 
 
Figure 6.15 –File reader window (the application thread) 
 
 
A file reader thread is activated when the DB is not available and performs a 
periodic DB connection check. When this thread find a useful connection to 
the DB it starts reading the SQL data’s script inserting the rows into the 
newly on-line database as can be seen in figure 6.15. 
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The only application prerequisite is that the Database server must be 
reachable at the start of the application itself because it needs to check the 
password and the access rights and needs to load the sensors information 
and calibration values. If this condition is not met, the file reader cannot 
perform any action and must be invoked manually as an external application 
providing the right password. 
In this last situation, without a db connection from the beginning, it must be 
prepared a local configuration file for the nodes and sensors data. 
The configuration file has the following structure (a tipical windows config 
file): 
 
 
[node_mac_address] 
id1=sensorid   ; the integer sensor id in database 
 
type=typeid 
; type id (temp/rh...) as in database  
 
calib=value ; single real value or NONE keyword 
;or ApplyOnInsert (if there are values for each range) 
 
id2=... 
 
 
There is no need to insert any position’s information since they must be  
already in the database at the rows’ insertion time. 
 
 
 
Figure 6.16 –HVAC virtual control 
 
 
A special thread was developed to control, via WSN node’s command, the 
HVAC plant. This thread can be pre-programmed to switch the plant on or 
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off, and to change the plant speed. A timer will provide the support to send 
the commands at the right time. An user can also directly change the plant 
properties overriding the programming. Although this system was partially 
tested (both node command the actuator are operational) it was not used yet 
because the actuator needs special micro soldering that cannot be done 
without the right device. 
 
 
 
Figure 6.17 – DB’s entity-relationship diagram 
 
 
The gateway application, all developed in C++ code, actually is running 
without problems (that means at least one full week of continuous uptime) 
on a Pentium 3 notebook with 512 Mb RAM, a very cheap and common old 
computer nowadays. 
184 
On the same notebook, just described, can be executed at least two instances 
of the gateway application, one on each different virtual com port, together 
with a Nids application briefly described furthering this chapter. 
In parallel to the WSN system, used for the first time, has been used the old 
gatherer system consisting in iButtons: button sized and shaped temperature 
and RH sensors with a five minutes sample rate. Their data were 
downloaded every two weeks (this is far to be a real time system) and 
reprogrammed with a three hour men cost. This system has proved to be 
much time costing and, when an error occurred, usually all the two weeks 
data were lost.  
The database server was, also, designed to run on a common computer, in 
our specific case a Pentium 4 with one gigabyte of RAM (and Linux OS). 
The Database server chosen was the Postgresql 8 open source database, 
preferred to other open source DB like mysql due to its properties and 
flexibility (for instance mysql’s scripts, as reported in the user manual, can 
bypass the unique index check properties and also transactions have limits 
not found in postgres database) and its plsql script language very versatile.  
The main entity-relationship diagram is illustrated in figure 6.17. Must be 
noted that to different tables exist that gather the measurements: one for the 
values such as temperatures or relative humidity, that can be described as a 
specific value in a specific moment, and one for events such us open/close 
door or window switches that have few states and last with the same state 
for long time. For these events, instead of generating thousands values all 
equals (i.e one thousand ON value for a door, one each five seconds) a 
single event with the value and the first and last timestamp was created into 
our table. Compared with 2,3 million data generated from switches less than 
two thousand rows were effectively created in our event table. The event 
management algorithm is aware of the possibility that many events can 
reach the DB in a different time and order respects the generation timestamp 
and is able to rearrange the events range accordingly to a unordered data 
flow. For a pre-configured period of time where no data are received on a 
switch state (the default is five minutes) an UNKNOWN event status is 
inserted reporting the period without data. 
Although the creation of an events table has reduced the rows’ number in 
the measurements, the table itself has reached an over 20 millions records 
size exceeding the four gigabytes of space and very used indexes such as the 
pair sensor-timestamp values is now more than one gigabyte. 
This situation has generated a significant performance degradation, for 
example a single record query (single value selection) has required more 
than 30 seconds to be performed on such database. Moreover these kind of 
query must be performed sometimes thousands times to satisfy the 
researches’ request (e.g. find two periods of at least one day with same 
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external/internal condition one with HVAC running and one with HAVC 
turned off). 
On of the main problems is due to the index size, the nearly two gigabytes 
were much over the 500 MB of RAM dedicated by the linux server to the 
database, thus any kind of tree search was impossible and the DB server 
performs a sequential read on disk at each request. 
Moreover the postgres’s clustering operation is a non dynamic process 
which means it works on the already stored value but it does not affect the 
new arriving values.  
 
 
 
Figure 6.18 – pgsql trigger diagram 
 
 
To improve the performance to a reasonable level the initial measurements 
table was divided into small tables (a dynamic cluster alike system) created 
by a pgsql trigger (postgresql script languages) rules based. The rows 
number of the tables is one of the script’s parameter and must be calculated 
on the table final size desired. One of the values between the maximum flow 
rate and the maximum time range period must be specified to help the 
trigger to create tables that do not exceed the specified size. These values 
were introduced because sometimes, as explained before, the connection to 
the database is somehow interrupted (usually due to an adsl problem). In 
this case it may happen that a big volume of rows with an older timestamp 
(respect to the real time flow) arrives and, without any prevention 
mechanism, the results would be a table with a size greater than the 
requested limit. 
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The actual rows number is set at 750 thousands to achieve a final index size 
of about 64 Mb allowing the DB to perform tree scan over more tables 
simultaneously. The final performance reached is 0,5 seconds on a multi-
table query (that is quite good considering the starting point of 30 seconds 
for a single table query). 
The data are available, on real time (with usually less than two seconds of 
delay), through a web server apache on the same Linux OS computer where 
the DB is stored. 
From this web server the researchers can view and download the required 
data in a format compatible with the most used tools (spss, matlab, excel). 
 
 
 
Figure 6.19 – a web site view  
(from the real time demonstration of Bologna [MRB07]) 
 
 
The web site (access protected) is presented with a home page consisting of 
the house map where the user can click to access a room. For each room a 
sub-map is presented and the list of the found sensors. For each sensor is 
presented a summary with the day average value, the last value (and 
timestamp) and finally a graph with the last thousand values (with a rate of 
one measurements every 5 seconds this correspond at about 1,5 hours). By 
clicking on the graph or using the appropriate button a researcher can access 
the data download area. In figure 6.19 illustrates a web site page coming 
from the live demonstration of AICARR workshop in Bologna on 
25/10/2007 (the temperature graph shows the results of a window opening). 
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6.2.2 Data analysis  
Starting from September 2007 we stored in the database data about the 
following sensors ([MRB07] and [MRB08]):  
• external air temperature and humidity conditions 
• HAVC air temperature and humidity conditions before and after its 
heat exchanger 
• Rooms air temperature and humidity conditions 
• Bedrooms CO2 conditions 
• Windows and doors open/close state 
 
 
 
Figure 6.20 – House map with HVAC system 
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The HVAC system has an air flow 110 m3/h which is equal to 0,4 house 
volume/h at 62 W of power consumption (speed 1 of 3).  
 
 
Figure 6.21–  Bedroom Temperature, RH and  
CO2 conditions between 22.01.08 and 27.01.08 
 
 
Figure 6.22 –  Kitchen conditions (temp/RH)  
between 22.01.08 and 27.01.08 
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For more information about the HVAC properties and working condition 
see [MRB07] and [MRB08]. 
In figure 6.21 and 6.22 is shown an example of respectively the bedroom’s 
and the kitchen’s measurements stored in the database about a specific 
periods (respectively without and with HVAC running).  
 
6.2.3 The efficiency of the HVAC heat exchanger. 
Here is presented the efficiency of the heat exchanger calculated on the 
basis of the gathered data. The efficiency is calculated by: 
(5.1)  
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where: 
• t11 is the average temperature of internal incoming air flow before 
the heat exchanger 
• t21 is the average temperature of external incoming air flow (before 
heat exchanger) 
• t22 is the average temperature of internal outgoing air flow past the 
heat exchanger 
 
 
Figure 6.23 –  Temperature measurements to calculate the HVAC efficiency 
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The data demonstrates that the heat exchanger efficiency is nearly the 90% 
as shown in figure 6.24  
 
 
 
Figure 6.24 –  HAVC’s heat exchanger efficiency 
 
 
6.2.4 Conclusion of the first on-field study 
The first results analyzed are showing that mechanical ventilation plays an 
important role in limiting  the CO2 and humidity levels. The heat exchanger 
efficiency, referring at UNI EN 308/1998, reaches values of almost 90%.  
Moreover, the data will be analyzed in relation to the habits of the 
inhabitants by monitoring also some parameters such as the state of the 
windows (opened or closed), the effective presence of people in the rooms 
and energy consumption of the dwelling in relation to the adopted 
ventilation systems (natural or mechanical). 
The energy recovery is close to the theoretically value of 90% provided (by 
Aldes France) although Indoor Air Quality (IAQ) level (of inhabitants) can 
be improved. 
 
 
6.3 On-field test application II 
Aim of this second study was to demonstrate that between healthy subjects 
and subjects with Parkinson’s disease and Ataxia objective detectable 
differences can be found in the average accelerations, obtained with an 
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accelerometer, in strategic locations of the body, while they are walking at 
their comfortable speed.  
Sixty-five subjects participated in the experiment (after giving their 
informed consent). For the age/disease distribution see table 5.1 
Each subject, equipped with the accelerometer, was asked to walk in 
average three times (one for every experimental condition) at his more 
comfortable speed, a straight corridor 25 meters long. This distance 
permitted us to discard data from non-stabilized walk (beginning and end of 
walking test). In the first test the accelerometer was attached to the sternal 
region. In the second one it was attached in front of the sacral region. In the 
third, behind the sacral region (see figure 6.25). 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6.25 –  Accelerometer positions 
 
 
 
The mean acceleration value was calculated (at 20Hz sampling rate) via the 
following formula 
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Age distribution: 
20 - 
39 
40 -
49 
50 - 
59 
60 - 
69 
70 - 
85 
Total: 
Healthy subjects 8 6 4 3 3 24 
Patients with Parkinson’s 
disease 
- - - 5 12 17 
Ataxic patients 7 6 2 5 4 24 
Table 6.2 –  Age/disease distribution 
 
 
6.3.1 The monitoring system 
In the first period (late 2006 to early 2007) since the WSN system was not 
yet ready thus the monitoring system consisted of a Bluetooth device from a 
medical kit. 
 
 
 
Figure 6.26 –  A patient test in progress 
 
 
This device, with its triaxial piezoelectric accelerometer, was attached to the 
body with an elastic belt. The device had a sampling rate of  20 Hz so every 
0.05 seconds it computed the arithmetic mean of the three axis acceleration 
and transmitted to the personal computer via a Bluetooth connection.  
The main problem of such device is the interference produced by any other 
Bluetooth device (every time a mobile phone with Bluetooth activated were 
nearby the patient the connection between the medical device and the 
computer has fallen) and it’s limited range. 
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Moreover the device itself although if has a tri-axial accelerometer it sends 
only the deviation from the arithmetic mean calculated over a time window. 
Due to such limitations the test was performed only at hospital. 
The WSN system, with the same architecture shown in figure 6.12 and with 
the implemented compression illustrated in paragraph 5.6 can perform the 
task with a wider range of functionality. 
For example, with the WSN system, the patient can be monitored at own 
home and over a long period to check how the movements change over 
time, how much and in which way the patient walk and if the trembling of 
the limbs are shown any kind of variation. 
 
6.3.2 Conclusion of the second  on-field study  
With the technique used, based on the recording of the accelerations in the 
positions illustrated in figure 6.25, we found objective differences between 
healthy subjects, Ataxic patients and patients with Parkinson’s disease 
(which show the lowest acceleration mean) [FGM08].  
 
 
 
Figure 6.27 –  Sum of  the accelerations’ mean of the three patient positions 
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Moreover, independently from the Type of Subject, the Frontal Sacral 
acceleration was always greater than the Back Sacral acceleration, that is 
greater than the one in the Sternal Region. The results suggest that triaxial 
accelerometry is a good tool for assessing the gait’s alteration in PD and 
Ataxia. Moreover this assessment permits to obtain objective parameters in 
the evaluation of disease’s progression and of therapy’s efficacy. The WSN 
system data are still being analyzed. 
 
 
6.4 The Network intrusion detection system (NIDS) 
The security of the WSN was another important aspect of the system and as 
noted in paragraph 4.5 there are many flaws in the ZigBee security 
mechanism. 
The literature demonstrates an actual lack of Network Intrusion Detection 
Systems (NIDSs) although exist articles where we can find some 
proposition about a distributed intrusion detection systems for WSNs (i.e. 
[MaR07], [VBC06] and [Eid04]).  
The described methods are too expensive in term of MCU calculation time 
and memory requirements to be implemented on our WSN (where we have 
about 10 kb free memory space and virtually no more stack space). 
Moreover actually there aren’t any specialized IDSs for WSNs or any 
wireless security systems with ZigBee packet analysis. 
 
 
 
Figure 6.28 – a packets’ log 
 
 
For these reasons was implemented a Nids using a sniffer device, a node 
that just read all packets and send it to the attached computer. The sniffer 
device is powered by both batteries and via an USB connection, so it can 
use more power to the signal antenna covering a larger area (in the first on-
field test application, par. 6.2, it covers all the house). For a larger area, of 
course, we need more than one sniffer that gather data packets and send 
them to the same IDS. 
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Figure 6.29 –  A decoded packet 
 
 
As Nids was used Bro. Bro is a IDS developed as a research tool at the 
Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory [Pax99] used by the writer for his 
bachelor thesis [Gad01].  
Bro provides high speed, large volume monitoring of the networks without 
dropping packets. It has a modular structure and it is easy to make 
distinction between different system modules. It is also easy to add new 
events, to the event engine, such as the ones coming from ZigBee packets. 
There are three main layers in Bro:  
 
• The Packet Capture Unit. It uses the libpcap library to capture 
packets from the network. 
• The Event Engine analyzes packet streams captured by the Package 
Capture Unit, verifies their integration and sends them to the 
appropriate handler. Handlers are provided by the policy script 
interpreter. 
• The Policy Script Interpreter runs scripts written in Bro language 
and associated with a handler. This script may execute other 
arbitrary commands to log events, modify state or record a data. 
 
Bro is also designed to deal with attacks against itself such as overload 
attack , Crash attacks (using a watchdog) and subterfuge attacks. 
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The structure of the Capture Unit is specially made to isolates Bro from the 
underlying network technology and makes it portable and in our system the 
libpcap was substitute with a C++ library based on the pcap described in 
[Oks07] and [Gad01] designed to be connected on the USB port, instead of 
an Ethernet one, and the packet were decoded accordingly to the ZigBee 
packet structure illustrated in the previous chapters (see paragraphs 3.5, 3.6 
and 4.3).  
The event engine was expanded to generate the events accordingly to the 
new decoded packets, recognizing the overflow attempts and the replay 
attacks. 
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7  
Conclusions and future works 
This thesis is about the building of an efficient WSN system to be used in 
real indoor researches. The efforts were made towards the realization of a 
reliable yet flexible monitoring system easily capable of adapts to different 
scenarios. The WSN can be deployed in an inhabited place with the less 
visibility possible to avoid any kind of comfort reduction. Regardless of the 
results obtained much work is yet to be done. 
 
 
7.1 Evaluation of results 
The programmable WSNs, not specialized in a single task,  are a relatively 
young area and the new specifications released in three different moments in 
the last years (ZigBee 2004, ZigBee 2006, ZigBee 2007 and PRO) 
demonstrate how the market is rapidly growing and its asking for more 
functionalities and security. 
The ZigBee standard, as illustrated in this work, is made to a WSN with low 
data rate and very low power requirements and most of the development kits 
are designed just to demonstrate the WSNs can be useful, not to really 
realize projects. 
The WSN system developed in this thesis, when used as a environment 
monitoring system, fits perfectly these properties, while the system applied 
in the second study needs a sustained data rate higher than the one the 
ZigBee is designed for.  
The requirements of the second study does not completely fits neither the 
ZigBee WSN nor other wireless networks. On the other hand the WSN are 
the closest networks typologies answering to these needs. 
The compression algorithm implemented into the WSN nodes demonstrates 
that it is possible to achieve even to tasks which are usually not directly 
allowed by the ZigBee but that are not so far from  requirements.  
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Thus we can say that our system performs most of the tasks for which it was 
designed, with good disappearing properties. While the reliability and 
unattended capacity, although were greatly increased from since the starting 
situation, are not completely satisfactory and can be improved. In fact still 
persist  the unexpected and random death of nodes, strongly decreased in 
number, because of causes that need a further investigation. A partial 
solution to this problem was created via a heartbeat system which create a 
more fault resilient system for the task that are considered particularly 
important. The heartbeat system developed was a simple way to create a 
backup node which can take the place of the dead node, without  great 
sacrifices in power consumption, because the second device can use the 
sleep mode, and avoiding any data loss. 
The modular library built to contain the sensor ‘driver’, with a common 
interface, help to increase the flexibility of our WSN application, allowing 
the swap or the link of a sensor without a node reprogramming but only via 
a new configuration command. Moreover this solution allows the developer 
to adapt the size of the library (and the number of sensor drivers) to the 
situation balancing the flexibility and the occupied resources. 
However the lack of standards for the sensors communication is another 
limitation that is not expected to be solved in short periods, but as for the 
ZigBee standard, if a big manufacturer alliance, driven by WSN’s market 
request, will propose a bus standard or will adopt one of the existent like the 
I2C serial bus (hopefully with greater performance because of the new 
technologies available), then the situation could change. 
A special attention was posed on the security issues which reveal several 
flaws due to the youth of the standard and the devices’ few resources 
available. Nowadays, in fact, the security threats are taken in high 
consideration from both researchers and patients (or research’s subjects), 
which are aware, at least, of the privacy’s aspects involved. 
Some procedures were implemented to solve the found security weakness 
and a network intrusion detection system (NIDS). In particular the packet 
capture library was substituted to adapt the NIDS itself to analyze the 
ZigBee traffic. The Nids was known by the author of this thesis since the 
2000 and studied in his bachelor’s degree thesis [Gad01]. 
This is just the first effort toward a WSN IDS as we may notice a lack in 
this security area while the first WSN malware is already available. 
This NIDS, due to its resource requirements, run outside the WSN itself. In 
fact the MCU speed and the memory size of this second generation devices, 
almost completely occupied by the ZigBee stack library, greatly limit the 
expansion capabilities for these systems.  
On the other hand the third generation devices, ready nowadays, seems 
finally solve this problem. Moreover also the bottleneck coming from the 
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virtual com port connection present on our nodes will be surpassed by the 
next generation chips (see paragraph 7.3.1 for more details). 
So it is conceivable that with new technologies, the networks will also cover 
these needs and abilities, such as compression, will be implemented inside 
the standard layers. 
A brief  summary of the developed WSN system developed features can be 
seen in table 7.1. 
 
 
 2006 2009 
WSN 
node role chosen by switch 
  
node role chosen by algorithm (dynamic) 
  
Temperature sensor 
  
Light sensor 
  
RH sensor 
  
CO2 sensor 
  
Tri-axial accelerometer sensor 
  
Modular sensor code library 
  
security flaws patches (anti syringe system) 
  
power consumption management 
  
cryptography 
* 
 
crypto key protection 
  
heartbeat system 
  
data compression 
  
data buffer 
  
Gateway application  
multithread 
  
COM reader 
  
packet validation 
  
sensors calibration values 
  
node timeout check 
  
nodes' command console  
(sends sensor config command)   
Database connection 
  
DB failsafe insertion 
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DB insertion when DB Server is on line 
  
Error reports and logs 
  
Database  
table split into dynamic sub-tables (cluster 
simulated)   
Web interface 
remote access 
  
monitor data in real time 
  
download data 
  
Criteria based data extraction 
  
* flaws found 
Table 7.1 – WSN system’s features 
 
 
7.2 Difficulties encountered 
In this three year work many efforts were done to built a reliable system and 
many problems were found on the path. 
One of the not completely solved problems are the ‘dead nodes’. This 
problem was deeply investigated and many software bugs were patched, 
most of dead situation now cover periods of few minutes where the node 
memory buffer helps giving the possibilities to maintain the gather data. 
Most of the problems were due to the automatic behaviour of the library that 
was disabled, forcing an application redesign. Regardless there are still 
undiscovered death causes. 
The main difficulty of this kind of problem, like most programming bugs, 
resides in the impossibility of a complete debug of the node application, that 
communicate only some status information via the three on board led. The 
programmer with debug capabilities helps only when the problem show no 
random properties and happens frequently (a node usually stops working 
after many hours). 
The device power consumption was another painful aspect of our 
development. Most of the problems were caused by interrupt request, not 
managed, meanwhile the devices were in sleep mode. On the other hand the 
actual battery lifetime, although greatly increased (a router can last for a 
week instead of only two days) cannot be considered fully satisfying. This 
lifetime was increased to two weeks by using a bully algorithm that 
promotes the best node (regarding the battery charge) to be the router, while 
the other nodes use the sleep mode to preserve their energy (of course we 
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are using the tree topology that allow this mode). The dynamic change 
between routers and end device implemented in our WSN help to achieve 
this task.  
From the code programming development point of view the biggest problem 
was found on the ATOMIC_SECTION instruction that must be sometimes 
used to a single assignment statement to avoid unpredictable behaviours.  
Also the implemented heartbeat system was a very difficult task to 
complete, many strategies were tested such as a distributed bully algorithm 
(that worked for the energy saving purpose) or a parent driven control. For 
many reasons the results were worse than expected and often the backup 
node did not succeed to the dead node. At last the beacon driven heartbeat 
system demonstrate to be the most efficient system. 
Finally the few available resources (96kb of free code memory and 1kb of 
stack) were (and are) a real limit to the design of the system which force to a 
continuous application code profiling to avoid any kind of unexpected 
system crash. 
 
 
7.3 Perspectives 
A great number of indoor researches fields, requiring moderate data flows, 
can be completed using our WSN system with little application 
development efforts. Most of the work will be on adding new sensors into 
the library and in the web interface to adapt it to the application scenario. 
One of the studies, we want carry out, that cannot be achieved yet by our 
WSN system is the mental disease monitoring system to research mental 
disorders at electroencephalography (EEG) level to foresee, via objective 
measurements, abnormal behaviours. 
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Figure 7.1 – an EEG sensors’ cap 
 
 
The EEG (32 or 48 lines 240hz minimum sampling rate) sensors’ cap 
produces a data flow that is not sustainable by our second generation 
devices. On the other hand, the new generation nodes can probably perform 
the data gathering, but to complete the task a deep analysis of pattern 
recognition algorithm, regarding their memory and computing resource 
requirement, must be performed. This analysis can be done only when a 
knowledge discovery phase applied on the gathered data will be completed.  
 
7.3.1 MCU Evolution (the third generation devices) 
The AVR ATMega MCU provided with our second generation kit is a 8 bit 
device with 256Kb Flash memory and a 4 Mhz clock and 4 Mips (but can 
reach 8 Mhz and 8 Mips) and 4 KB sram. The new MCU series are divided 
in two different categories: for very power consumption applications or for 
performance applications, but also in the last case the power consumption is 
less or equal to the second generation MCU. Actually we can find chips that 
reach 66 Mhz of clock speed and capable of more than 70 Mips (16/32 bit 
architecture) 512 Kb (but there are MCU with 1 or 2 Mb ), Real usb 2.0 
(12Mbps) and/or full Ethernet connection.  
Most MCU now offer an event engine support, DMA channels and 
controllers, crypto engine (DES and AES) and are designed to be more 
secure. 
This is a clear sign of how manufacturers are responding to the market 
requests. 
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7.4 Open problems 
One of the main open problems for the WSNs is the minimization of the 
orphan problem. Every time a node cannot join the network, not because is 
out of the range of any router but because the close routers have already 
reached their maximum number of children then that node is called an 
orphan. Our system does not suffer for this problem only because the 
reduced number of nodes connected. 
But in a WSNs where a large deployment of nodes is realized this effect is 
highly visible. For example in [Pat07] over 3 thousands node, with eight 
hundred router, where randomly deployed. The results using the ZigBee 
address assignment first stage algorithm lost about 25% of devices that will 
become orphan nodes (see figure 7.2).  
 
 
 
Figure 7.2 - Network formation results by ZigBee [Pat07]  
(red points are the orphan nodes) 
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Another great step for this WSN, would be the distributed pattern 
recognition that can greatly help a single device to achieve a computing 
exhausting task to be performed with the help of other idle nodes. 
The main problem to achieve this task is to manage the set of node that tend 
to change over time, due to very different (and often) unpredictable reasons, 
without notice. 
The last improvements is a distributed WSN NIDS as described in 
[MaR07]. Its implementation as many difficult aspects regarding how a 
node can be considered suspect. Moreover, although some type of attacks 
can be easily recognized (e.g. replay attacks see appendix A for more 
information) an event engine like the one used in our external NIDS (Bro) 
may be needed for the stealth type attacks and the malware. 
All the three improvements described have high cost in term of design 
time and resource requirement and they can easily cover a study period 
equal of the one just described in this thesis. 
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A.  
Security attacks and attackers 
Different types of attacks 
Security attacks can be classified into two classes: passive and active 
attacks. Passive attacks, where intruders do not make any emissions, are 
usually against data confidentiality while, in active attacks, malicious acts 
are not only against data confidentiality but also data integrity.  
Active attacks can also aim for unauthorized access and resources usage or 
the block of an opponent’s communications. An active attack makes an 
emission or action that can be detected. 
Apart from security attacks security threats can also come by mistakes. The 
WSN’s nodes can be exposed to tampering and destruction, and classified 
data and resources can be categorized as unauthorized access.  
 
Passive Attacks 
Must be notes that RF is not the only wireless medium used. There are 
several wireless carriers, such as infrared, which are more resilient to attacks 
because these kinds of channel are usually directed and spatially limited. 
To intercept them, the intruder’s receiver needs to be located accordingly, 
which makes the adversary’s goal more difficult and the possibility that to 
be detected higher 
In passive attacks attackers are usually camouflaged (hidden, disguise) and 
tap the communications to collect data. Passive attacks can be grouped into 
eavesdropping and traffic analysis types.  
 
Eavesdropping 
Data can be eavesdropped by intercepting communications, and wireless 
links are easier to tap, so wireless networks are more susceptible to these 
kind of  attacks. We can consider a situation where known standards are 
used and plain data, which is not encrypted, it is sent wirelessly. In fact, in 
this case, an adversary can easily receive and read the data  
WSNs are more secure against eavesdropping than to other longer range 
wireless technologies because signals are sent over shorter distances. 
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An intruder needs to get close enough to the attacked node to be able to 
intercept the signals. If the facility where these wireless technologies are 
used has enough space controlled against intruders it becomes more secure. 
However, they can never become as secure as wired communications.  
An attacker close enough to a device can receive all frames to or from it, 
store them in some medium and take them out of the facility. 
Moreover, the existence of wireless communications makes the 
implementation of multiple networks with different security levels much 
more difficult. For instance, if there are a classified networks and a network 
attached to the Internet in the same facility and wireless access to the 
classified networks is allowed, the splitting of the Internet and the classified 
networks can become very difficult due to passive attacks and 
mistakes/misjudgements.  
Must also be noted that is a difference between privacy and confidentiality. 
Environments enabled by wireless ad hoc and sensor networks may be 
forced in order to access not only confidential data but also private 
information. For instance, the security system cameras may be attacked 
passively to observe the private lives of others.  
Analysis of data may also lead to private information, therefore, some 
information not considered confidential at first sight may be private and 
should be protected. 
 
Traffic Analysis 
As well as the data packets content, the traffic pattern may also be very 
valuable for intruders. 
For example, important information about the networking topology can be 
derived by analyzing traffic patterns.  
In sensor networks, the nodes closer to the base station such as the sink, 
have more transmissions than the other nodes because they relay more 
packets than the nodes farther from the base station.  
Similarly, clustering is important for scalability and cluster heads are busier 
than the other nodes in the network.  
The detection of the sink, the nodes near to it or cluster heads may be very 
useful for adversaries because a denial-of-service (DoS) attack against these 
nodes or eavesdropping the packets have a greater impact.  
By analyzing the traffic, this kind of valuable information can be derived. 
Traffic analysis can also be used to project attacks against anonymity. 
Detecting the source nodes for certain data packets may also be a target for 
intruders. This information helps to localize weaknesses, capabilities and the 
functions of the nodes. 
Moreover, traffic patterns can concern to confidential information such as 
actions and intentions.  
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In tactical communications, silence may indicate preparation for an attack, a 
tactical move or infiltration, while a sudden increase in the traffic rate may 
indicate the start of an attack.  
Similar information can also be derived by traffic analysis in civilian 
networks. One of the following techniques may be used for traffic analysis: 
 
• Traffic analysis at the physical layer: in this attack only the carrier is 
sensed and traffic rates of the nodes are analyzed. 
• Traffic analysis in MAC and higher layers: MAC frames and data 
packets can be demultiplexed and headers can be analyzed. This can 
reveal the routing information and the network topology. 
• Traffic analysis by event correlation: events like detection in a WSN 
or transmission by an end user can be correlated with the traffic and 
detailed information, such as routes, can be derived. 
• Active traffic analysis: traffic analysis can be conducted as an active 
attack. For instance, a certain number of nodes can be destroyed, 
stimulating the self reorganization of the network gathering in this 
way valuables information about topology. 
 
Active Attacks 
In active attacks an intruder actually affects the operations in the attacked 
WSN. This effect may be the goal of the attack itself and can be detected. 
For instance, some services may be degraded or terminated as a result of 
these attacks.  
Sometimes the intruder tries to stay undetected, aiming to gain unauthorized 
access to the system resources or threatening confidentiality and/or integrity 
of the content of the network.  
We classify active attacks into four different classes, as illustrated in figure 
3.23 
 
 
 
Figure A.1 - Active attacks 
218 
 
 
Physical Attacks 
An intruder may damage hardware to destroy the nodes. This is a security 
attack that can also be considered to fall in the domain of fault tolerance (the 
ability to sustain networking functionalities without any interruption due to 
node failures).  
Physical attacks may become a serious issue, especially in sensor networks, 
sensor nodes, indeed, may be positioned in unattended regions accessible by 
external people. Therefore, they can be moved out of the sensor field to 
access the inside information or damaged.  
When we must avoid these risks we have to use nodes resilient to physical 
attacks. 
Node tampering can help in masquerading a DOS attacks, explained further 
in this chapter. Tamper resilience is an issue that needs to be considered 
carefully in many sensor network, although it can be very expensive to 
achieve. 
We can group tampering into two classes: invasive and non invasive 
tampering.  
Invasive techniques aim to gain unlimited access to a node. In non invasive 
attacks, unlimited access to the node is not the intention. Instead, by 
analyzing the behaviour of a node, such as the power consumption, or the 
execution timings of the algorithms for various inputs, confidential data 
about the procedures and keys used by the encryption schemes can be 
derived. 
Electromagnetic pulse (EMP) can also be listed within physical security 
attacks. An EMP is a short-duration burst of high-intensity electromagnetic 
energy. It can produce voltage surges damaging electronic devices within its 
range. 
Although today are available portable devices that can generate EMPs, there 
are still unsolved issues related to the practicability of these attacks because 
of their threat for all kinds of electrical devices, not only for WSN’s nodes. 
This can be considered, again, as part of the fault tolerance domain and it is 
possible to build nodes that are more resilient to EMPs.  
 
Masquerade, Replay and Message Modification 
A masquerading device acts like if it would be. Messages can be captured 
and replayed by masquerading nodes and in addiction the content of the 
captured messages can be modified before being relayed.  
Ad hoc and sensor networks introduce particular advantages for 
masquerading techniques. In mobile ad hoc networks, nodes may change 
their location in the network. This location is not given or fixed, and self-
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forming and self-healing mechanisms are counted on to adapt to topology 
changes. It may be difficult to check the consistency of a node’s access 
point to the network since the reactive techniques are preferred to the 
control ones due to network’s topology. 
Sensor networks are even easier in terms of masquerading because global 
identifications is not used in sensor networks.  
Masquerading, message replay and content modification can be used to 
attack the integrity of the content of messages or even a service in a 
network. Sensor networks in particular have several network functions 
susceptible to security attack because they are based on a collaborative 
effort of many nodes. For instance, node localization schemes may be 
subject to one of the following security attacks: 
 
• A malicious node may act as a beacon and disseminate its location 
wrongly. This is an obstacles to node localization procedure when 
the node uses beacon signals transmitted by the malicious node for 
triangulation. 
• A beacon may be tampered with and introduce wrong location data, 
or slightly desynchronize the RF transmission. 
• Beacon signals may be replayed by a malicious node. 
• Beacon nodes may be destroyed by physical attacks. 
• An obstacle may be placed between nodes to block the direct line of 
sight. 
 
There are many more attack and in addition to node localization schemes, 
the integrity of the following services may also be subject to similar attacks: 
 
• Data aggregation and fusion make WSNs more sensitive to replay 
and content modification attacks because changing the content of 
message may change the data provided by several nodes. 
• Time synchronization is also a vulnerable service. Several insiders 
that inject false synchronization’s messages may prevent the system 
from achieving time synchronization. Time synchronization can be 
very sensitive to replay attacks. A malicious node can jam a time 
synchronization message at a certain part of a network, and then 
replay the message at that part after a very short delay. This may 
prevent correct time synchronization and create many problems on 
all services that rely on the accuracy of the synchronization protocol. 
• Data correlation and association techniques are also compromised 
when node localization or time synchronization services are 
attacked. 
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• Modifying the contents of the messages, event and event boundary 
detection algorithms can be hampered. 
• Node management systems can be blocked by modifying the 
messages that report node status or commands for node 
management. 
 
An improved version of masquerading is a Sybil attack, where a malicious 
node introduces itself as multiple nodes. Having multiple identifications can 
be very useful for a malicious node.  
For instance, a Sybil attack can be brought against data correlation and 
aggregation algorithms. A node that sends multiple values with different 
identifications can change an aggregated value considerably. A Sybil attack 
can also take control of multiple path routing, and similarly to node 
localization, and several other services. Multiple identifications also help to 
keep the attacks hidden. 
Must be noted that we can also consider attacks against the integrity of 
services as DoS attacks (explained later in this paragraph) because they 
reduce the availability of some services.  
Message replay, content modification and masquerading attacks can also be 
used against confidentiality by making the other nodes send the confidential 
data to a malicious node or by accessing the confidential data directly.  
Finally they can be used for gaining unauthorized access to system 
resources via phishing techniques, which means deceiving someone in order 
to make him/her give confidential information voluntarily (phishing is a 
combination of the words password and fishing  which defines this attack 
well).  
 
Denial-of-Service Attacks 
A denial-of-service (DoS) attack mainly targets the availability of network 
services and is defined as any event that diminishes a network’s capacity to 
perform its functions correctly. A DoS attack is characterized by the 
following properties [WSJ05]: 
 
• Malicious when it prevent the network from fulfilling its expected 
functions. It is not accidental, otherwise it is not in the domain of 
security but reliability and fault tolerance. 
• Disruptive if it degrades the quality of services offered by the 
network. 
• Asymmetric: the adversary puts in much less effort compared to the 
scale of the impact made on the network. 
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Every networking service may be subject to a DoS attack and now the most 
important DoS scenarios will be briefly illustrated for ad hoc and sensor 
networks. 
 
DoS in The Physical Layer 
All physical attacks previously illustrated can also be considered as DoS 
attacks because they prevent a network from performing its expected 
functions.  
In this section, the physical layer indicates the OSI layer responsible for 
representing 1s and 0s correctly in the wireless medium, and a DoS attack in 
the physical layer, which is called jamming, means a security threat against 
this. 
An attacker device can jam a wireless carrier by transmitting a signal at that 
frequency. The jamming signal contributes to the noise in the carrier and its 
strength is enough to prevent the nodes to receive data correctly.  
Jamming can be conducted continuously in a region but also temporarily 
with random time intervals,  both methods are usually very effectively.  
 
DoS in The Link Layer 
The algorithms in the link and MAC layers schemes, present many 
opportunities for DoS attacks. For instance, MAC layer DoS attacks such as 
one the following may completely and continuously jam a channel 
[WSJ05]: 
 
• Whenever an RTS signal is received by the malicious device, a 
signal that collides with the CTS signal is transmitted. Since the 
nodes cannot start transmitting data before receiving the CTS, they 
continue sending RTS signals. 
• If the MAC scheme is based on sleeping and active periods (using 
beacons), jamming only the active periods can continuously block 
the channel. 
• False RTS or CTS signals with very long data transmission 
parameters are continuously sent out, which makes the other nodes 
wait forever. 
• Acknowledgement spoofing, where an intruder sends false link layer 
acknowledgements for overheard packets addressed to neighbouring 
nodes, can also be a very effective link layer DoS attack. 
• Spoofed, altered or replayed routing information: routing 
information exchanged in the WSN can be altered by malicious 
devices to have a worsening effect on the routing capability. 
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• Hello flood attack [KaW03]: an attacker device may broadcast 
routing or other information with high enough transmission power to 
convince every node in the network that it is their neighbour. When 
the other nodes send their packets to the malicious node, those 
packets are not received by any node (Figure 3.24). 
 
 
 
Figure A.2 - Hello flood attack 
 
 
• Wormhole attack: a malicious device can eavesdrop or receive data 
packets and transfer them to another malicious node, which is at 
another part of the network, through an out-of-band channel. The 
second malicious node then replays the packets. This makes all the 
WSN’s nodes that can hear the messages by the second malicious 
device believe that the node that sent the packets to the first 
malicious node is their single-hop neighbour and they are receiving 
the packets directly from it. For instance, the packets sent by node a 
shown in Figure 3.25 are also received by node w1, which is a 
malicious device. Then node w1 forwards these packets to node w2 
through a channel which is out of band for all the nodes in the 
network except for the intruders. Node w2 replays the packets and 
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node f receives them as if it was receiving them directly from node 
a. The packets that follow the normal route, such as a to f, reach 
node f later than those conveyed through the wormhole and are 
therefore dropped because they do more hops. Wormholes attacks 
are usually established through faster channels. Wormholes are very 
difficult to detect and can dramatically impact on the performance of 
many network services such as time synchronization, localization 
and data fusion. 
 
 
 
Figure A.3 - Wormhole attack 
 
 
• Detour attack: an adversary may attempt to detour traffic to a sub 
optimal route or to partition the network. Various techniques can 
achieve this goal. For example, [HYP05] define a gratuitous detour 
attack, where a device on a route adds virtual nodes to the route. 
• Neighbour attack: An intermediate node usually, upon receiving a 
packet, records its ID in the packet before forwarding the packet to 
the next node. An attacker, however, simply forwards the packet 
without recording its ID in the packet to make two nodes that are not 
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within the communication range of each other believe that they are 
neighbours. The result is a disrupted route 
• Sink hole attacks: a malicious device can be made very attractive to 
the closed nodes with respect to the routing algorithm. For instance, 
attractive routing advertisements can be broadcast and all the 
neighbouring nodes can be convinced that the malicious device is 
the best next hop for sending the packets to the base station. When a 
node becomes a sink hole, it becomes the hub for its vicinity and 
starts receiving all the packets going to the base station.  
• Black hole attack: a malicious node may drop all the packets that it 
receives for forwarding. A blackhole attacker first needs to invade a 
multicast forwarding group, for instance, by implementing rushing 
attack, in order to intercept the multicast session data packet. Then 
drops some or all data packets it receives instead of forwarding them 
to the next node on the routing path. This type of attack often results 
in very low packet delivery ratio. This attack is also very effective 
when the black hole node is also a sink hole. Such a combination 
may stop all the data traffic around the black hole. 
• Selective forwarding (gray hole attack): when a malicious node 
drops all the packets, this may be detected easily by its neighbours. 
Therefore, it may drop only selected packets and forward the others. 
• Routing loop attack: detour or sink hole types of attack can be used 
to create routing loops to consume energy and bandwidth as well as 
disrupting the routing. 
• Sybil attack(also classified as a masquerade attack): a single node 
presents multiple identities to the other nodes in the network. This 
reduces the effectiveness of fault-tolerance schemes and poses a 
significant threat to geographic routing protocols. See paragraph 
3.7.2.2 for more information. 
• Rushing attack [HYP05]: an attacker disseminates route request 
and reply messages quickly throughout the network. This suppresses 
any later legitimate route request messages, i.e. nodes drop them, 
because nodes suppress the other copies of a route request that they 
have already processed. ZigBee protocols use a form of duplicate 
suppression in their operations, and this behaviour is vulnerable to 
rushing attacks. When source nodes flood the network with route 
discovery packets in order to find routes to the destinations, each 
intermediate node processes only the first non-duplicate packet and 
discards any duplicate packets that arrive at a later time.  A rushing 
attacker exploits this duplicate suppression mechanism by quickly 
forwarding route discovery packets in order to gain access to the 
forwarding group. 
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• Attacks that exploit node-penalizing schemes: schemes that avoid 
low performance nodes can be exploited by intruders. For example, 
malicious devices can report error messages for a node which is 
actually performing well. Therefore, the routing scheme may avoid it 
using a route that includes this node. Similarly, a link may be 
jammed for a short time but since error messages are generated 
about the link during that time interval, the routing scheme may 
continue to avoid the link even though it is not jammed any more. 
• Attacks to deplete network resources: when devices are 
unattended and rely on their onboard resources, those resources may 
be depleted by malicious actions. This is especially the case for 
sensor networks. For instance, a malicious node may continuously 
generate packets to be sent to the data-collecting node and the nodes 
that relay these messages will deplete their energy rapidly. 
• Jellyfish attack: A jellyfish attacker first needs to intrude into the 
multicast forwarding group. Then, it delays data packets 
unnecessarily for some amount of time before forwarding them. This 
results in significantly high end-to-end delay and thus degrades the 
performance of real-time applications 
 
DoS in The Transport Layer 
Transport layer is also susceptible to security attacks. Some attack scenarios 
are described below: 
• Transport layer acknowledgement spoofing: false 
acknowledgement or acknowledgement with large receiver windows 
may make the source node generate more segments than the network 
can handle, causing congestion and degrading the network 
performance. 
• Replaying acknowledgement: in some transport layer protocols, 
acknowledging the same segment multiple times indicates negative 
acknowledgement. A malicious device can replay an 
acknowledgement multiple times to make the source node believe 
that the message was not delivered successfully. 
• Jamming acknowledgements: a malicious device can jam the 
segments that convey acknowledgements. This bring to the 
connection’s termination 
• Changing sequence number: in many protocols, a malicious node 
may change the sequence number of a fragment simulating the loss 
of some fragments. 
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• Connection request spoofing: a malicious device can send many 
connection requests to a node, using up its resources such that it 
cannot accept any other connection request. 
 
 
Attackers 
Attackers can also be classified according to several criteria.  
The following classification of attackers is based on the characteristics 
shown in Figure 3.30: emission, location, quantity, motivation, rationality 
and mobility.  
First, an intruder can be passive or active; matching the attacks’ 
classification. Active attacks are carried out by active attackers and passive 
attacks by passive attackers. 
 
 
 
Figure A.4 - Classification of attackers 
 
 
An attacker can be an insider or an outsider. An insider is a device that has 
been compromised, and it is a part of the attacked network.  
The attacker knows all the cryptographic information owned by the 
compromised device when it is an insider.  
Outsider attacks can be either passive or active. Moreover, an insider can be 
perceived as a legal entity inside the network such as a node that is allowed 
to join the network. Instead, an outsider is typically a device that is not 
welcome to access the network. 
The attacker can be a single entity or more than one. When there are 
multiple attackers, they can collaborate with each other, which can be 
considered a more difficult case to defend against. 
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In [HYP05] active attackers are denoted as Active-n-m, where n is the 
number of insider nodes, and m is the total number of insider and outsider 
nodes. They then propose an attacker hierarchy with increasing strength as 
follows: 
 
• Active-0-1: the attacker owns only one outsider node. 
• Active-0-x: the attacker owns x outsider nodes. 
• Active-1-x: the attacker owns x nodes and only one of them is an 
insider. 
• Active-y-x: the attacker owns x nodes and y of them are insiders. 
 
Must be noted that in this hierarchy all the nodes represent a single attacker. 
Therefore, they are supposed to collaborate. An attacker usually have 
motivations to act against the network, such as breaking confidentiality, 
integrity and privacy.  
This may also be done to gain access to unauthorized resources. An attacker 
may also attack to hinder the operations of the other side.  
Selfishness, avoiding payment or getting unearned rewards may be other 
motives.  
However, an attacker may attack simply in order to attack and break a 
security system, perceiving this as a challenge. 
Rational attackers carry out their attacks to obtain something which is more 
valuable than the cost of the attack. 
Finally, adversary can be fixed or mobile. Detecting mobile attackers and 
defending against them is usually more difficult than defending against a 
fixed adversary 
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B.  
Development kits and Meshnetics ‘how 
to’ guide 
 
 
 
In this appendix is shown the summary of the synoptic table used to analyze 
the available kits, at the beginning of our work. 
In the table are presented only the main characteristics of the kits and must 
be underlined that the prices reported are to be intended as indicative and 
strictly linked to the periods the kits were analyzed (at the beginning of this 
work). 
After the synoptic table we illustrate a brief guide of how to install and use 
the selected kit to allow any comparison to other existing software. 
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Table B.1a - The Development Kit s 
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Table B.1b - The Development Kit s 
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Table B.1c - The Development Kit s 
233 
 
Table B.2a - The Development Kit s 
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Table B.2b - The Development Kit s 
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Table 4.2c - The Development Kit s 
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PC Software Installation 
The developing system require several component to be downloaded 
directly from the manufacturer an example maybe the USB driver, fitting 
different Windows versions, and available from the Silicon Laboratories 
(Silabs) website. 
 
 
 
Figure  B.1 - COM port drivers in the Windows Device Manager window 
 
 
After installation of the Virtual Com Port (VCP) driver kit the MeshBean2 
board can be connected to the USB port. Windows should detect the new 
hardware, and driver installation wizard will appear, performing the 
windows’ standard procedure.  
When the process is completed, the new COM port is present in the device 
list and can be used freely (see fig. B.1). 
 
Programming the Boards 
The MeshBean boards come with a test software installed, so at node start-
up, if we press and hold the SW1 onboard button (see Figure 5.2 for at least 
1 second, the LED1 will get flashing 3 times. Next, LED1, LED2 and LED3 
will start blinking for 2 sec. This means the board is fully functional and 
with the Serial boot loader installed. 
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All the boards can be programmed in two ways: either you can use Serial 
Boot loader utility or you can do it under AVR Studio, using JTAG 
emulator  like JTAGICE mkII from Atmel, employed in our development. 
The choice between the boot loader and the jtag programmer must be done 
wisely since each one of MeshBean2 boards come with the bootstrap 
downloaded into the MCU, which is needed to run Serial Boot loader.  
If JTAG has been used, it will make impossible using Serial Boot loader, 
unless bootstrap is reloaded to the board. 
 
Using Serial Boot loader 
To program a board using Serial Boot loader do the following steps:  
 
1. Connect the board to the PC via USB or RS-232 port  
2. Run Serial Boot loader specifying the image file, COM port and the 
optional keys in command line (see table 5.3). 
3. Press reset button on the board. 
4. Release reset button on the board.  
 
This procedure must be preceded by a complete power off if the node has 
been configured as end-device and it is currently controlled by the running 
application. 
The Serial Boot loader indicates the operation progress and once loading is 
finished successfully, the board will restart automatically. If, for any reason, 
the loading procedure fails, the Serial Boot loader will indicate the reason.  
In rare cases the booting process can fail due to the communication errors 
between the board and the PC and must be repeated.  
In the following example of how to use the Serial Boot loader, from a 
command window: 
 
bootloader –f wsnapp.srec –p COM5 –M 1 –C 100000  
–P 5320 
 
In this example we are programming the node via the com port number 5 
(the one where the node is connected to) writing in it the new program 
program file (wsnapp.srec) and assigning a new MAC address equal to 1 (-
M 1), a channel mask allow in only one channel (-C option) and a network 
id of 5320 (-p option).  
Thus, as our example shows, we can define, via serial commands, the 
boards MAC address, that must be unique for each node to get 
interconnected in WSN network and many other parameters (shown in table 
B.3).  
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Table B.3 - Bootloader Options 
 
 
In general if the MAC address is not defined by hardware, the node ID 
derived from MAC should be programmed avoiding any duplication of 
MAC address and of the short address often created using the MAC address 
itself. 
Programming a MeshBean2 board with MAC address can be performed in 
two alternative ways: MAC address can be downloaded to a board by means 
of Serial Bootloader running with the key specified within command line or 
MAC address can be programmed using SerialNet AT-commands. 
 
Using JTAG 
The board can be programmed also using the JTAG connector. The JTAG 
programmer/debugger must be linked together with the MeshBean on-board 
JTAG connector (see Figure 5.2 for more detail and table B.4 for JTAG 
connector  pin out).  
While using the JTAG interface, the Fuses state must be checked carefully 
because an error in setting their value may cause the impossibility to 
reprogram the MCU again.  
Some of the Fuses option must be always in a ON status like in the next 
screen: 
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Brown-out detection disabled; [BODLEVEL=111] 
 
JTAG Interface Enabled; [JTAGEN=0] 
 
Serial program downloading (SPI) enabled; [SPIEN=0] 
 
Boot Flash section size=1024 words Boot start 
address=$FE00;[BOOTSZ=10] 
 
Divide clock by 8 internally; [CKDIV8=0] 
 
Int. RC Osc.; Start-up time: 6 CK + 65 ms; 
[CKSEL=0010 SUT=01] 
 
 
At the bottom of Fuses Tab the following hex value string must appears: 
0xFF, 0x9D, 0x62, otherwise the node can’t be reprogrammed. 
Additionally if we want to use the Serial Bootloader we need in ON status 
also the next values: 
 
Boot Reset vector Enabled (default address=$0000); 
[BOOTRST=0] 
 
 
 
Table B.4.-  JTAG connector pin out 
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And in this last case the following hex value string appears at the bottom of 
Fuses Tab: 0xFF, 0x9C, 0x62. By default, each MeshBean node  (MCU) 
comes programmed with the fuse bit latter option above enabled. 
JTAG can also be used to restore the device's ability to respond to Serial 
Bootloader commands. Serial Bootloader code can be reprogrammed with 
JTAG by selecting bootloader.hex image from the ZDK cd that comes with 
the Development kit and transferring the image to the device. 
 
 
 
*[2] = eZeeNet™ Software 1.4. SerialNet™ Reference Manual. AT-Command Set. MeshNetics 
Doc. P-EZN-452~01 
Table B.5 - HAL resources state at startup 
 
 
Using AVR Programming Tools 
The Atmel’s AVR Studio IDE shown in Figure 4.6 is recommended, not 
only because it is free of charge and downloadable from the Atmel (the 
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MCU’s manufacturer) site, but also to develop custom applications based on 
eZeeNet API.  
This multiplatform Integrated Development Environment provides support 
for editing the source code, compilation, linking object modules with 
libraries, debugging, making executable file automatically, and, if you have 
a compatible with the JTAG programmer it allows the application writing 
directly in the MCU flash memory.  
AVR Studio can be integrated with WinAVR: a suite of very useful 
software development tools for the Atmel AVR series of RISC 
microprocessors hosted on the Windows platform. 
 
 
 
Figure  B.2 – The AVR Studio 4 IDE at work 
 
 
WinAVR contains a set of utilities including AVR GCC compiler, linker, 
automatic Makefile generator, system libraries.  
Installing the AVR GCC plug-in lets those tools working automatically in 
AVR Studio. The GCC plug-in is configured to work only on Windows 
platform and configured to compile C or C++ codes (the Linux version at 
this time is not supported ).  
There are some equivalent IDE and JTAG programmer support, such as 
AVaRICE, also for the Linux platform and the GCC compiler has added the 
support for the AVR series of microcontrollers. 
The easiest way to configure an AVR project is to use a Makefile which 
specifies compilation and linking flags. Makefile also specifies 
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corresponding directories in order to include header files and to link the 
system object libraries. 
An example of a minimum application is provided in Appendix C 
 
JTAG emulator 
Programming with JTAG gives more flexibility in managing the loading 
process than the Serial boot loader but requires special hardware.  
For Windows environment we used, as recommended, the AVR Studio 4.12 
(actually is available the version 4.18) while Linux platform AVaRICE 2.40 
was available. In both cases, the JTAG emulator JTAGICE mkII (see fig. 
B.3) from Atmel was the programmer chosen because of its debugging 
capabilities. Other programming devices can be utilized as well, but, 
although are less expensive, they usually don’t have any debugging feature 
available and sometimes they require special plugin to be used by the AVR 
IDE. 
 
 
 
Figure  B.3- JTAGICE mkII programmer 
 
 
The Atmega1281 MCU HEX files for Serial Boot loader, provided on the 
kit cd, contain both flash memory and EEPROM images (MOTOROLA 
version).  
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AVR Studio does not support downloads of such combined files into the 
MCU. Instead, it requires separate images for flash memory and EEPROM, 
and it recognizes files in the Intel HEX format only.  
This is the reason why we ask to the kit manufacturer to deliver also two 
separate image files in the Intel HEX format that are downloadable by AVR 
Studio or other JTAG tools. 
 
 
 
Figure  B.4 - AVR Studio dialog box for JTAG firmware downloading 
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C.  
Data compression 
A definition of data compression 
Let us formalize a definition of data compression.  
Assuming that x = x1x2 . . . xn is a sequence. The sequence length, denoted 
by n, is the number of elements in x, and xi denotes the ith element of x. 
We also define the reverse sequence, x−1, as xnxn−1 . . . x1. Given a 
sequence x let us assume that x = uvw for some, possibly empty, 
subsequences u, v, w. Then u is called a prefix of x, v a component of x, and 
w a suffix of x. Each element of the sequence, xi, belongs to a finite ordered 
set A = {a0, a1, . . . , ak−1} that is called an alphabet.  
The number of elements in A is the size of the alphabet and is denoted by k. 
The elements of the alphabet are called symbols or characters.  
A special term for a non-empty component of x consisting of identical 
symbols is called a run. To simplify the notation we denote the component 
xixi+1 . . . xj simply xi..j.  
Except the first one, all characters xi in a sequence x are preceded by a 
nonempty prefix x(i−d)..(i−1). We name this prefix a context of order d of the 
xi. If the order of the context is unspecified we arrive at the longest possible 
context x1..(i−1) that we simply call it a context of xi.  
 
Modelling and coding 
The modern compression splits the compression algorithm into two different 
stages: modelling and coding. The reason is quite simple: first of all, we 
must recognise the sequence, then look for regularities and similarities. 
This is the task of modelling. The modelling method, indeed, is specialised 
for the type of data we compress. It is obvious that in video data we will be 
searching for different similarities than in text data. Applying the proper 
modelling method is important for the final results. In particular, we cannot 
reduce the sequence length at all if we do not know what is redundant in it. 
The second stage, coding, is based on the knowledge obtained in the 
modelling stage, and removes the redundant data.  
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The coding methods are usually very similar because the modelling process 
is the stage where the adaptation to the data is made.  
 
Modelling 
The modeling stage analyze the sequence to compress, building a model to 
estimate the probability distribution of symbols’ occurrences and allowing, 
in this way, the prediction of  future symbols in the sequence 
The simplest way of modeling is to use a pre-calculated table of 
probabilities of symbol occurrences [Deo03]. The better is our symbol 
occurrences knowledge the better we can predict the future characters.  
We can use pre-calculated tables only if we know exactly what we 
compress. If we know that the input sequence is an Italian text, we can use 
typical frequencies of character occurrences.  
Otherwise, if we do not know the language of the text, and we use, for 
instance , the pre-calculated table for the Italian language to a German text, 
we will achieve much worse results, because the difference between the 
input frequencies and the pre-calculated ones is usually big.  
Furthermore, the probability of symbol occurrences differs from text to text 
depending from various parameters such as the authors.  
So a better way to build the model is not to assume too much about the 
sequence and realize the model from the encoded part of the sequence. 
During the decompression process, the decoder can build its own model in 
the same way.  
This compression approach is called adaptive, because the model is built 
only from past symbols and adapts itself to the contents of the sequence. We 
could not use the future symbols because they are unknown to the 
decompressor.  
Other methods, usually static, build the model from the whole sequence and 
then use it. The decompressor has no knowledge of the input sequence, and 
the model has to be stored in the output sequence, too. The static approach 
is usually avoided because requires much more computation while is can be 
proved that the adaptive way is equivalent. 
 
Entropy coding 
The second stage of the compression method is the entropy coding. The 
entropy coding is based on a probability distribution of occurrences of the 
symbols, which is prepared by the modeling stage, and then compress these 
characters.  
When we know the probability of occurrences of every symbol from the 
alphabet, but we do not know the current character, the best solution is, 
probably, to assign to each character a code of length [HiL92]. 
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The difference between these codes and the ones used for representing the 
symbols in the initial sequence has a simple reason: the codes have different 
length, while such codes as ASCII or Unicode store all symbols using the 
identical number of bits. 
The expected code length of the current symbol is not greater than the code 
length of this symbol. Replacing all characters from the input sequence with 
codes of smaller length causes a reduction of the total length and this is 
what gives us compression. Must be noted that if the modeling stage 
produces wrong estimated probabilities, the sequence can expand during the 
compression.  
For example let us assume that we have to compress the German letter ã for 
which the expected probability is 0 (in Italian). Using the rule of the best 
code length (C.1) the coder would generate an infinite length code. 
 
Huffman coding 
The formulas  C.1 means that we usually should assign codes of non integer 
length to most symbols from the input sequence.  
It is possible: in fact  and this coding procedure was introduced by Huffman 
[Huf52] in 1952. 
Assuming that we have a table symbol occurrences frequencies in the 
encoded part of the sequence, we start building a tree by creating the leaves: 
 
• Create one leaf for each symbol from the alphabet.  
• Create a common parent for the two nodes without parents and with 
the smallest frequency.  
• Assign to the new node a frequency being a sum of the frequencies 
of its sons.  
• Repeat the last passage until there is only one node without a parent.  
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Figure C.1– Huffman tree for the sequence abracadabra 
 
 
 
This node will be the root of the tree. After the tree building process we 
create the code for a given symbol, starting from the root and moving 
towards the leaf corresponding to the symbol, starting with an empty code, 
and whenever we go to a left son, we append 0 to it, whenever we go to a 
right son, we append 1. When we arrive to the leaf, the code for the symbol 
is ready.  
This procedure is repeated for all symbols. Figure C.1 illustrates an example 
of the Huffman tree and the codes for symbols after processing a sequence 
abracadabra (a very classic word used in compression examples).  
While building the tree, if there are two nodes with the same frequency we 
can choose any of them thus means that there are more than one possible 
Huffman tree for our data. 
Although the Huffman coding is simple, rebuilding the tree after processing  
each character is quite complicated. It was shown by Gallager that its 
maximum inefficiency, (the maximum difference between the expected 
code length and the optimum) is bounded by: 
(C.3) 086,0log2log 22 +≈+ mm p
e
e
p  
where pm is the probability of occurrence of the most frequent symbol.  
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Usually the loss is smaller of the estimation and due to the simplicity and 
effectiveness of the compression, this algorithm is often used when 
compression speed is important. 
The Huffman coding was deeply studied during the years. Some examples 
were provided by Knuth [Kun85] and Cormack [CoH84], where they show 
methods of storing and maintaining the Huffman tree. 
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D.  
Acronyms 
 
AES  Advanced Encryption Standard  
AIB  APS Information Base (also APS IB) 
AODV  Ad-hoc On-demand Distance Vector (routing) 
APL Application (Layer) 
APS  APplication Support (layer or sub-layer) 
APS IB  APS Information Base (also AIB). 
APSDE  APS Data Entity  
APSDE-SAP APS Data Entity Service Access Point  
APSME  APS Management Entity  
ARP  Address Resolution Protocol 
ASDU  APS Sublayer Data Unit 
BLE Battery Life Extention  
CAP Contention Access Period  
CCA  Clear Channel Assessments 
CFP  Contention Free Period 
CID  Cluster IDentity 
CMOS Complementary Metal Oxide Semiconductor 
CSMA-CA Carrier Sense Multiple Access with Collision 
Avoidance  
DLL  Data Link Layer 
DOS denial-of-service (attack) 
DSSS Direct-sequence spread-spectrum   
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EEG Electroencephalography 
EMP Electromagnetic pulse  
FCC Federal Communications Commission 
FCS  Frame Check Sequence 
FFD  Full Function Device 
FHSS  Frequency-hopping spread spectrum  
FRAM  Ferroelectric Non-volatile RAM  
GLONASS  Global Navigation Satellite System  
GPS Global Positioning System 
GRAd  Gradient routing 
GTS Guaranteed Time Slots 
HAL  Hardware Abstraction Layer 
HVAC Heating, Ventilation and Air Conditioning  
IAQ Indoor Air Quality 
IETF Internet Engineering Task Force 
ISR Interrupt Service Routine  
LLC logical link control (layer) 
LQI Link Quality Indication 
MAC Medium Access Control (layer) 
MEMS Microelectromechanical Systems 
MIC Message Integrity Code 
MISO Master Out Slave In (data line) 
MLME MAC Layer Management Entity  
MLME-SAP  MAC Layer Management Entity Service Access Point 
MOSI  Master In Slave Out (data line) 
NIB  Network Layer Information Base 
NIDS  Network Intrusion Detection System 
NLME  Network Layer Management Entity 
NLME-SAP  Network Layer Management Entity Service Access 
Point 
NWK  network (layer) 
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ODV  On-demand Distance Vector  
OSI Open Systems Interconnection 
PAN  Personal Area Network  
PD  PHY Data 
PD-SAP  PHY Data Service Access Point 
PHI Physical (layer) 
QOS  Quality of Service 
RDT Route Discovery Table  
RFD  Reduced Function Device  
RIP  Routing Information Protocol  
RKE Remote Keyless Entry 
RREP  Route REPly  
RREQ  Route REQuest  
RSSI Received Signal Strength Indication 
RT Route Table 
SCL  Serial Clock (line) 
SS  Slave Select (also called !SS) 
SSP  Security Services Provider 
VCP  Virtual Com Port (driver USB-to-Com) 
WLAN Wireless Local Area Network 
WPAN Wireless Personal Area Network 
WSN Wireless Sensor Network 
ZDO ZigBee device object 
ZDP ZigBee device profile 
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